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Abstract 
Difficulty with knowing or identifying one’s internal feeling states is 
considered the hallmark feature of the personality construct of alexithymia. It is 
currently unclear, however, whether alexithymia also involves difficulty recognising 
external emotion cues, such as facial expressions of emotion. Facial expressions 
provide salient cues about one’s feelings, intentions and motivations that allow us to 
navigate our social contexts. Better facial emotion recognition is associated with 
positive outcomes across psychological, social and physical health domains.  
Typically, the ability to recognise facial emotions has been assessed using 
cognitive tests underpinned by the traditional cognitive science perspective which 
postulates that our conceptual knowledge of emotion is stored as symbolic 
representations within the semantic memory network. Yet, the neuroscientific 
discovery of sensory-motor mirror neurons has led to embodied accounts of cognition 
that assume motor and somatosensory systems within the brain are also involved in 
recognising others’ emotion, with mirror neuron activity producing a re-
experiencing or simulation of the observed emotion of the other in one’s self.  
The primary aim of this dissertation was to examine facial emotion recognition 
and alexithymia from a broad theoretical perspective. As the small number of previous 
studies on facial emotion recognition and alexithymia are mostly derived from the 
cognitive science perspective, this thesis included the embodied cognition theoretical 
viewpoint. In a series of six experiments, university students were assigned to three 
groups based on their scores on the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20). Participants 
with TAS-20 scores above the clinical cut-off were divided into two groups, a ‘High 
Alexithymia’ group (HA) and a ‘Moderate Alexithymia’ group (MA), using median 
split for a comparison of mean scores. A control group comprised students with TAS-
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20 scores in the normal range. To reduce the confounding of results due to variables 
known to impair facial emotion recognition performance, all participants with clinical 
range scores on the Depression and Anxiety Scales (DASS) were excluded from 
participation. Significant differences were found between the HA and MA groups on 
various measures of performance in most of these experiments, using a different 
sample of participants for each experiment.   
Experiment 1(a) examined the ability to accurately and rapidly identify 
dynamic facial expressions. Performance on this task is assumed to depend upon 
explicit access to schematic representations of emotion, which are proposed to be 
impoverished or unavailable to consciousness in individuals with alexithymia. While 
previous studies have typically utilised static stimuli, dynamic stimuli were used to 
provide ecological validity and to increase the level of task difficulty. Experiment 1(a) 
found that the HA and MA groups combined were significantly less accurate and 
slower to recognise facial expressions than controls. An unexpected finding was that 
the HA group were faster (but as accurate) on the task than the MA group. 
It was thought that addressing the question of how groups perform under 
dynamic and static conditions might help to clarify this unusual pattern of results. This 
assumption was based on prior research findings suggesting that static faces are 
processed using motor simulation and dynamic faces using emotion simulation. 
Experiment 1(b) presented the same task as Experiment 1(a) under Static and Dynamic 
conditions. The results of Experiment 1(a) were replicated in the Dynamic condition 
of Experiment 1(b), with a different group of participants. Importantly, while the HA 
group were significantly faster to recognise facial expressions than the MA group 
under Dynamic conditions, these groups performed with equivalent speed under Static 
conditions. It was argued that this result is consistent with the idea that the HA group 
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relied on the recruitment of motor-simulation processes to improve their performance 
in Experiments 1(a) and 1(b). 
A difficulty in interpreting the above studies is that the task itself relies upon 
linguistic processes. To reduce the possibility of a verbal deficit accounting for the 
results, Experiment 2 (a and b) required participants to make ‘same’ or ‘different’ 
discriminations of two static facial expression stimuli of high or low intensity of 
expression. No differences were found between groups in Experiment 2(a). 
Experiment 2(b) then increased the level of task difficulty by employing low intensity 
of expression stimuli. This was done to address the potential issue of using shallow 
information-processing strategies to perform the discrimination task. Results showed 
that while the HA group was less accurate than the MA group and controls, the MA 
group was slower than the HA group and controls. It was argued that the difficult task 
conditions of Experiment 2(b) involving degraded stimuli may have prompted the use 
of a compensatory motor-based strategy among the HA group, resulting in the 
facilitation of their speed, but not accuracy, to discriminate facial expressions, relative 
to the MA group.  
Experiment 3 (a and b) examined facial emotion recognition from an embodied 
cognition perspective that allowed the examination of facial mimicry, which refers to 
congruent ‘micro-expressions’ of facial muscle activity that putatively support the 
recognition of others’ emotions. In Experiment 3(a), controls produced a greater 
amount of facial mimicry than the groups with clinical range TAS-20 scores and the 
HA group produced more mimicry the MA group. In addition, while the HA group 
and controls produced greater amounts of mimicry in the Happy condition than the 
Anger condition, the MA group produced equivalently low amounts of smile and 
frown facial reactions in both Expression conditions.  
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It has been suggested that facial mimicry may not be an exclusively automatic 
reaction but rather depends on a number of goal-directed or top-down factors. 
Experiment 3(b) thus sought to further our understanding of these factors by exploring 
differences in performance following manipulation of the instruction given to 
participants. Within group comparisons showed that while controls produced a 
significant increase in frown facial mimicry when asked to adopt the observed emotion 
(Emotion Simulation condition) than when they passively viewed dynamic faces, the 
HA group produced similar levels of facial mimicry across the instruction conditions, 
while the MA group produced less frown facial mimicry in the Emotion Simulation 
condition than the Passive Viewing condition. It was argued this pattern of results is 
also consistent with the idea that the HA group employ a compensatory strategy 
involving the enhanced recruitment of action relevant simulation. It was also argued 
that the decrease in frown facial mimicry by the MA group only in response to the 
instruction to simulate anger may indicate that they rely instead on context dependent 
implicit learning of facial mimicry responses. 
A potential limitation of these experiments is the allocation of participants to 
categorical groups based on extreme TAS-20 total scores. On-going investigation of 
potential subtypes in alexithymia is clearly an important issue for future research.   
This series of experiments confirm that facial emotion recognition, 
discrimination and facial mimicry processes are detrimentally affected in alexithymia. 
This thesis also demonstrates the importance and utility of integrating notions of 
embodied forms of emotional processing into the conceptual framework of 
alexithymia and acts as a basis to prompt new treatment strategies for alexithymia 
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This outline is designed to provide the reader with a brief map, prior to making 
the lengthy journey through this thesis. 
In Part One of the Introduction I discuss how the ability to recognise the 
messages conveyed by facial expressions helps us to gain a better understanding of 
our social environments. I outline some of the psychological and physical health 
outcomes known to be associated with facial emotion recognition ability. Following 
this, I introduce the concept of alexithymia; a personality construct that is defined as 
a limited ability to identify one’s feeling states and subsequently describe one’s 
feelings in words. I provide a description of the historical background of alexithymia, 
which was originally known as a psychosomatic disease. Then I outline the prominent 
cognitive-developmental theory underlying alexithymia. 
In Part Two of the Introduction, I discuss the development of the TAS-20, a 
self-report personality questionnaire developed to measure alexithymia, and outline 
some of the early psychometric findings on the prevalence of alexithymia among 
normal and clinical populations and its association with various demographic 
variables. I offer a comprehensive literature review of the experimental studies of 
alexithymia that are relevant to the current series of studies.  These studies are derived 
from the cognitive science perspective and have utilised what is known as the facial 
emotion recognition judgement paradigm. On this task, participants identify and 
verbally label facial expressions.  Performance is assumed to depend upon explicit or 
conscious access to pre-existing schematic representations of emotion (for the 
purposes of this thesis, the terms emotion and affect will be considered synonymous). 
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This task has been used to examine alexithymia, given that the leading theory of 
alexithymia proposes that these representations are absent, impoverished or 
unavailable to consciousness in individuals with alexithymia. I then outline the 
limitations of this research, including the use of static and exaggerated (non-
prototypical) facial expression stimuli, methodologies with low task difficulty 
involving long stimulus presentation and extensive participant response times, 
participant sample issues and the use of relatively insensitive performance measures.  
Part Three of the Introduction broadens the topic of emotion recognition to 
include an embodied cognition perspective. This position draws upon findings on 
mirror neurons in the affective neuroscience literature. Theories of embodied 
cognition posit that emotion recognition does not rely solely on access to intact 
conceptual or schematic emotion representations, but that motor and somatosensory 
processes are also involved in the emotion recognition process. The relevance of 
other constructs, such as facial mimicry and facial feedback, are also considered and 
described. The two prior studies that have examined facial mimicry in alexithymia are 
reviewed.  
Following the literature review, I offer the overall aims of this thesis before 
presenting the six empirical chapters that describe the specific aims, methodology, 
results and conclusions of each of the studies in the present body of research. Finally, 
in the General Discussion a preliminary theoretical revision of alexithymia is put 
forward. It will be argued that the results of this series of experiments support the 
integration of the extant literature on alexithymia with an embodied cognition 
perspective. It is hoped that this may lead to a better understanding of the nature of the 
deficits involved in alexithymia and be of relevance to new approaches to treatment. 
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PART ONE: Facial Emotion Recognition and Alexithymia 
 
Why is Facial Emotion Recognition Important? 
One way to understand how we interact with others is to study how we identify 
each other’s emotional expressions. Facial expressions convey messages about the 
emotional states, intentions and behaviours of others that may help us to gain a better 
understanding of the social environment (Halberstadt, Denham, & Dunsmore, 2001; 
Salovey & Mayer, 1990). This information may be used to guide our social 
interactions (Grynberg, 2014). For instance, an angry expression may provide a 
warning signal of possible psychological or physical threat and indicate that it would 
be advisable to modify one’s behaviour. Alternatively, a happy expression is likely to 
signal cooperative intentions and be useful in determining whether to engage with 
others.  
Understanding the facial expressions of others is central to effective social 
functioning and helps individuals to establish interpersonal bonds (Grynburg et al. 
2012). Facial emotion recognition ability is proposed to be a necessary component of 
empathy, which is defined as the ability to share and understand another person's 
feelings. Empathy provides a bridge between the feelings of one person and another 
that allows individuals to affiliate and care for each other (Levenson & Ruef, 1992).  
Not unexpectedly, a large body of research demonstrates a positive association 
between facial expression recognition ability and indicators of well-being. These 
include social adjustment (e.g., Carton, Kessler, & Pape, 1999; Ciarrochi, Chan, & 
Capuit, 2000; Denham, McKinley, Couchoud, & Holt, 1990; DePaulo, 1992; 
Feldman, Philippot, & Custrini, 1991; Field & Walden, 1982; Hall, 1980; Noller, 
 4 
1985; Nowicki & Duke, 1994; Nowicki & Carton, 1997; Rosenthal, et al. 1979), 
relationship satisfaction (Carton, Kessler, & Pape, 1999; Yoo & Noyes, 2016), and 
better academic and work performance (e.g., Costanzo & Philipott, 1986; Elfenbein et 
al. 2007; Halberstadt & Hall, 1980; Izard, 1971; Izard, Fine, Schultz, Mostow, 
Ackerman, & Youngstrom, 2001; Nowicki & Duke, 1994). Further, studies that link 
facial emotion recognition to the broader concept of emotional intelligence (EI)1 have 
found that higher EI has a positive impact on health behaviours and outcomes (Austin, 
Saklofske, & Egan, 2005; Day, Therrien, & Carroll, 2005; Herbert & Choen, 1993; 
Johnson, Batey, & Holdsworth, 2009; Lanciano & Curci, 2014; for review Lanciano 
& Curci, 2015; Mikolajczak, 2014). 
In a similar vein, research has also shown that deficits in facial emotion 
recognition are associated with poor interpersonal functioning (Nowicki & Duke, 
1989). For instance, deficits in recognising facial emotion is associated with a greater 
likelihood of interpersonal difficulties during childhood, such as problems interpreting 
the intentions of other children (Rowe & Carton, 1995), an external locus of control 
(Nowicki & Duke, 1992), feelings of inferiority and poor perceived competence 
(Nowicki & Carton, 1997) and peer rejection (e.g., Boyatzis & Satyaprasad, 1994; 
Edwards, Manstead, & MacDonald, 1984; Rowe, 1993; Vosk, Forehand, & Figueroa, 
1983). It has also been found that young offenders and adolescents with conduct 
disorders show impairment on facial emotion recognition tasks compared to controls 
(Bowen, Morgan, Moore, & van Goozen, 2013; Fairchild et al. 2009, 2010).  
 
1 Emotional intelligence has four proposed characteristics: perceiving emotions in others 
(which includes facial expression recognition), using emotions to facilitate thought, understanding 
emotions, and managing emotions (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 1999). 
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It has been demonstrated in studies of adult populations that poorer facial 
emotion recognition skills are associated with reports of less satisfying and less 
supportive interpersonal relationships (Cooley & Nowicki, 1989). A high prevalence 
of facial emotion recognition difficulty has also been found among many 
psychological disorders, including depression (Carton, Kessler, & Pape, 1998; 
Colussy & Zuroff, 1985; Cooley & Nowicki, 1989; Feinberg, Rifkin, Schaffer, & 
Walker, 1986; Giannini, Folts, Melemis, Giannini, & Loiselle, 1995; Zuroff & 
Colussy, 1986), anxiety (Winton, Clark, & Edelmann, 1995), schizophrenia (Erol, 
Mete, Sonmez, & Unal, 2010; Kohler, Turner, Bilker, Bresinger, & Siegel, 2003) and 
bipolar disorder (Benito et al. 2013).  
As indicated by the research outlined above, the ability to recognise emotion 
in faces is central to skilled interpersonal functioning. This ability serves the important 
function of maximising relational outcomes and improving psychological and physical 
health. It is therefore a matter of considerable importance that preliminary evidence 
has suggested that approximately 10% of the general population, who meet criteria for 
the personality construct that is referred to as alexithymia, may show deficiencies in 
this domain. Alexithymia is characterised by a difficulty with the subjective awareness 
of one’s internal feeling states.  
Whether this deficit also extends to the recognition of external emotion cues, 
specifically, others’ facial expressions of emotion, will be investigated in this thesis. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the question of whether individuals with alexithymia have 
difficulty recognising other’s facial expressions has been the subject of only a limited 
number of studies. Arguably, the findings from this research are inconclusive due to 
numerous limitations that will be outlined in detail in this thesis. Furthermore, it will 
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be argued that the extant findings may not be entirely consistent with the prevailing 
theoretical view of alexithymia.  
In the next section, the early psychodynamic origins of alexithymia will be 
described, followed by an outline of the dominant theoretical model of alexithymia 
which is drawn from cognitive-developmental theory. 
 
Alexithymia: Psychodynamic Origins  
Alexithymia was originally observed by psychoanalysts in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s (e.g., Horney, 1952; Kelman, 1952; Reusch, 1948). They noted that 
certain patients used rudimentary vocabulary for describing or expressing feelings, 
symptoms, and motivations, in contrast to their verbal skills in other areas (Horney, 
1952; Kelman, 1952; Reusch, 1948; 1957). It was also noted that these patients lacked 
imagination, as suggested by their absent or featureless dreams and the “mundane” 
and “unimaginative” content of their associations on projective tests, such as the 
Rorschach and the Thematic Apperception Test (Horney, 1952; Kelman, 1952; 
Reusch, 1948; 1957). Clinically, these individuals appeared emotionally blunted and 
often displayed a preoccupation with the detail of external events. 
Complaints of multiple somatic symptoms among this population led to the 
formation of the clinical construct referred to as ‘psychosomatic disease’2, which was 
considered a form of somatoform disorder. It was theorised that distressing emotions 
 
2 As an aside, the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-V) published in 2013 has removed the diagnostic code of somatoform disorders (which includes 
somatization disorder, hypochondriasis, pain disorder, and undifferentiated somatoform disorder), and 
replaced it with somatic symptom and related disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
Somatic symptom disorder (SSD) is now “characterized by somatic symptoms that are either very 
distressing or result in significant disruption of functioning, as well as excessive and disproportionate 
thoughts, feelings and behaviours regarding those symptoms”. 
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were being expressed in the psychosomatic patient through somatic or physiological 
pathways. This was considered to reflect a limited capacity to ‘symbolise’ or mentally 
represent emotion (as illustrated by patients’ impoverished verbal accounts of feelings 
and poor imaginative processes). In the original view of psychosomatic disease, it 
represented a categorical diagnostic entity equalling a clinically relevant condition. 
It was noted by Horney and Kelman (1952) that these patients often reached 
impasse in psychoanalytic psychotherapy. This was thought to be due to a limited 
awareness of their emotions, a “paucity of inner experience, minimal interest in 
dreams, concreteness of thinking, and behaviour that is guided by rules, regulations, 
and the expectations of others rather than by one’s feelings or wishes” (Krystal, 1998, 
p. 246). These patients were prone to developing somatic symptoms and often engaged 
in compulsive behaviours, such as binge eating or alcohol abuse, seemingly in an 
attempt to regulate distressing inner states. Although attending therapy sessions 
regularly, they did not appear to be engaged in the therapy process. They were 
described as “unaware of an inner life” and it was remarked that they tended to fill 
each session with “a chronological recital of events [that] transpired since the last 
therapy hour” (Kelman, 1952, p. 20). Similarly, the content of their thoughts was 
described as a “dull, mundane, unimaginative, utilitarian, and sequential recitation of 
concrete facts” (Krystal, 1998, p. 246). 
In the 1970s, psychiatrists Peter Sifnéos and John Nemiah re-examined the 
psychosomatic construct, starting with a review of the transcripts of interviews with 
psychosomatic patients.  Sifnéos (1975) concluded that the construct was coherent but 
multifaceted, involving:  
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“…an impoverishment of fantasy life, a constriction of emotional 
functioning, and a difficulty in interpersonal relations; a striking 
inability to find appropriate words to describe emotions and a 
tendency to describe endless situational details or symptoms instead of 
feelings; a preference for using action to avoid conflicting situations; 
rigid postures, including sitting in such a way as to give the impression 
that the person is frozen into one position…” (p. 67).3  
In 1975, this cluster of salient characteristics was consolidated under a new 
term, alexithymia (the term literally meaning ‘no words for emotion’: a = lack, lexis = 
words, thymos = emotion). Shortly after the alexithymia construct was established, a 
cognitive-developmental theory was proposed to account for the types of deficit that 
were associated with alexithymia. This theory is described in the next section4. 
 
Models of Alexithymia 
Lane and Schwartz (1987) Model 
The cognitive-developmental Levels of Emotional Awareness model of 
alexithymia proposed by Lane and Schwartz in 1987 arguably continues to be the 
leading theoretical conceptualisation of alexithymia. It is primarily a cognitive-
developmental theory, derived from an integration of Piaget’s (1971) theory of 
cognitive development with Werner and Kaplan’s (1963) conception of symbolisation 
and language development. According to Lane and Schwartz’s model, typical 
 
3 Nemiah and Sifnéos were unclear as to whether they considered alexithymia a categorical or 
dimensional variable. However, Krystal (1982) reported that alexithymia varied in intensity between 
individuals, and also within the same individual, and thus conceptualised alexithymia as a 
personality trait with potential state variation. 
4 Although derived from clinical observations, the alexithymia construct was formulated 
within a theoretical framework for the cognitive processing and regulation of emotions. 
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emotional development advances through five hierarchical levels of ‘emotional 
awareness’, with each ascending level affording more flexibility and complexity to the 
processing of emotion.  
Beginning at the first level (sensorimotor reflexive level), emotional 
experience is restricted to bodily sensations. At the second level (sensorimotor 
enactive), emotion is experienced as both a bodily sensation and as an action tendency 
(i.e., impulse to action). The third level (preoperational awareness) introduces the 
psychological facet of emotion to the somatic experience of emotion. Lane and 
Schwartz (1987) argue this marks the beginning of the progressive transformation of 
knowledge from implicit form (i.e., procedural, sensorimotor) to explicit form 
(conscious thought) through language. Importantly, while at the third level of 
development emotions are represented as conceptual schemata, they are one-
dimensional or basic in nature and the language used to describe them is limited and 
stereotyped. It is not until development advances to the fourth level (concrete 
operational) that the capacity to discern blends of feelings and to describe 
differentiated subjective emotional states is attained. Finally, at the fifth level (formal 
operational), there is the capacity to construct complex emotions and feelings from 
blends of emotions and to make subtle distinctions between nuances of emotion. 
Within Lane and Schwartz’s (1987) model, alexithymia is conceptualised as a 
failure in emotional development from the third stage upwards (Bagby & Taylor, 
1997). It is argued that due to impaired capacity to structure and define concepts 
through conscious thought and language, there is a failure to develop complex 
schemata so that an awareness of emotional reactions is constrained to the experience 
of bodily sensations. Indeed, Lane et al. (1997) later used the term ‘blindfeel’ to 
describe the proposed loss of emotional awareness in alexithymia. This term is derived 
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from blind syndromes such as blindsight, blindtouch, and prosopagnosia, where 
individuals are thought to covertly process information at an implicit or sensory level 
without the contents of such processing being fully available to consciousness 
(Frawley & Smith, 2001; Weiskrantz, 1986). Therefore, while most people have a 
subjective awareness regarding their emotional states, Lane et al. (1987, 1997) argue 
there is a failure to form fully explicit or consciously accessible emotional 
representations in alexithymia, resulting in a marked disruption of the conscious 
experience of emotion. This disruption is conceptualised as an underlying functional 
dissociation between implicit and explicit forms of emotional processing. If such a 
dissociation exists, this would not only signify a loss of explicit knowledge of the 
contents or representations of consciousness, it would also restrict the ability to further 
process such knowledge, for instance to use emotional knowledge to identify 
emotional cues, to acquire and store new knowledge, frame problem-solving and focus 
attention (Oatley & Larocque, 1995). 
 
Other Cognitive-Developmental Models of Alexithymia 
Taylor et al. (1997) have developed a theory of alexithymia which, while 
largely compatible with Lane and Schwartz’s (1987) model, categorises alexithymia 
as a disorder of affect regulation. Taylor et al.’s notion of affect regulation emphasises 
the role of cognitive and interpersonal mechanisms in the integration and regulation 
of the emotion system. They propose that, in alexithymia, a cognitive-developmental 
arrest during early childhood results in the individual possessing a very limited or non-
existent ability to understand and regulate emotions at the conscious cognitive level. 
This is argued to result in an exaggerated focus on, and misinterpretation of, the bodily 
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sensations accompanying emotional arousal and an inability to utilise emotional 
information to reduce negative emotional experience. 
Whereas Taylor et al.’s model of alexithymia views the condition as arising 
from difficulties regulating and modulating emotions, Bucci (1997) has proposed that 
alexithymia results from a dissociation among sub-symbolic and symbolic emotion 
schemas. Drawing on knowledge from cognitive science, Bucci’s ‘multiple code’ 
theory proposes that emotions are represented and processed through multiple 
schemas. Non-verbal emotion schemas, which develop at an early age, include sub-
symbolic processes, involving sensory and somatic sensations, as well as symbolic 
processes. Verbal schemas, which develop at a later age, are organised symbolically 
as language. Bucci (1997) argues that the verbal and nonverbal schemas are connected 
by referential links, but dissociation within and between these schemas may allow 
physiological activation to occur during emotional arousal without corresponding 
cognitive activation.  
Further to their early theories, Lane, Bagby and Parker (2015) published a 
review paper on alexithymia, titled “Affective agnosia: Expansion of the alexithymia 
construct and a new opportunity to integrate and extend Freud’s legacy”. In this 
review, they apply the concept of a stage process, based on Marr’s (1982) model of 
stages in visual perceptual processing, to the alexithymia construct. They liken 
alexthymia to an ‘affective agnosia’ and propose two subtypes of alexithymia, referred 
to as ‘apperceptive’ and ‘associate’ types.  
The broad term ‘agnosia’ signifies a ‘lack of knowledge’. There are two types 
of visual agnosia; associative and apperceptive. Associative agnosia refers to an 
impairment in the retrieval of knowledge of, or meaning given to, a stimulus. While 
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the individual is able to accurately perceive the perceptual features of a stimulus (that 
is, to see shape, colour, texture, pitch, volume, etc), the associated memories/concepts 
regarding the meaning of the stimulus are not activated.. The other type of agnosia, 
apperceptive, refers to a disturbance of the ability to integrate the perceptual elements 
of a stimulus, even though those individual elements are perceived normally. In both 
conditions, the relatively intact perception is thus rendered meaningless. However, 
associative agnosia is considered a disturbance of memory while apperceptive agnosia 
is primarily a disturbance of perception. 
While Lane et al. (2015) further outline the possible neural circuits implicated 
in these subtypes of alexithymia, this conceptual framework does not differ widely 
from the earlier Levels of Emotional Awareness model published by Lane and 
Schwartz in 1979 where they propose that individual differences in emotional 
awareness reflect variations in the degree of differentiation and integration of the 
schemata used to process emotional information. Perhaps for this reason, this proposal 
has not sparked a lot of interest among researchers and the earlier Levels of Emotional 
Awareness theory (1987) continues to be the more prominent theory of alexithymia.  
 
Summary 
Our ability to read others’ facial expressions is central to our ability to 
understand the social environment. Facial expressions of emotion provide valuable 
information about the subjective feelings, intentions, and motivations of others. 
Having the ability to recognise others’ facial expressions of emotion may serve to 
maintain and improve relationships and is generally associated with better 
psychological and physical health outcomes. A psychological construct that may be 
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relevant to facial emotion recognition ability is known as alexithymia. Lane and 
Schwartz’s (1987) leading Levels of Emotional Awareness model of alexithymia 
proposes that individuals have the capacity to experience their emotions at different 
levels of awareness and that individuals with alexithymia are unable to form fully 
conscious or aware representations of emotional knowledge.  
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PART TWO: Empirical Investigations of Alexithymia 
 
The Measurement-Based Study of Alexithymia 
It has been noted that the TAS-20 put alexithymia on the “empirical map” 
(Lane et al., 2015). Indeed, scientific interest in alexithymia began following the 
development of the self-report 26-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Taylor, Ryan, & 
Bagby, 1985), which was later revised to the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale, or 
TAS-20 (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994). The psychometric properties of 
the TAS-20 supported the validity of the alexithymia construct and allowed substantial 
research attention to be directed toward gaining an understanding of alexithymia using 
psychometric methods.  
There has been some criticism of self-rating measures of alexithymia, like the 
TAS-20, on the grounds that valid responses on alexithymia self-rating questionnaires 
require recognition of the absence of the trait being measured (that is, they require an 
ability to be aware of a lack of awareness) and therefore may not detect those with a 
very high degree of alexithymia (e.g., Parker, Tayor, & Bagby, 1997; Lundt, Johnsson, 
Sundqvist, & Olsson, 2002). Nevertheless, the TAS-20 remains the most commonly 
used and currently the most valid and reliable means of identifying alexithymia 
(Taylor et al. 1997; Taylor et al. 2003; Salminen et al. 2006; Parker et al. 2008)5.  
Explanatory factor analytic studies of the TAS-20 have confirmed that 
alexithymia has a three-factor structure (Bagby, Parker & Taylor, 1994; Parker, 
Bagby, Taylor, Endler & Schmitz, 1993). This is consistent with the earlier 
 
5 It is important to emphasise that psychometric measuring instruments only allow inferences 
to be made about the construct they purport to measure. Therefore, in the present studies, the level of 
alexithymia is inferred from the TAS-20 score. 
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formulation of alexithymia proposed by Nemiah, Freyberger and Sifnéos (1976), 
based on their clinical research findings, that alexithymia is a “coherent but 
multifaceted” construct. The three factors are now considered to be the ‘defining 
features’ of alexithymia. These features are as follows: (1) difficulty identifying and 
verbally describing one’s feelings; (2) difficulty discriminating between feelings and 
the bodily sensations of physical arousal; and (3) diminished focus on inner 
experience and heightened externally oriented thinking. 
According to epidemiological studies using the TAS-20, clinically high levels 
of these features appear to be prevalent in an estimated 10 percent of the general 
population (e.g., Hintikka, Honkalampi, Lehtonen & Viinamaki, 2001). As 
alexithymia appears to be normally distributed in the general population, it is now 
commonly referred to as a continuous personality variable (e.g., Berenbaum & Prince, 
1994; Keefer, Taylor, Parker & Bagby, 2017; Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1997). 
Alexithymia has also been found to be associated with male gender, increased age, 
low education, and low socioeconomic status (Honkalampi, Saarinen, Hintikka, 
Virtanen, & Viinamaki, 1999; Honkalampi, Hintikka, Laukkanen, Lehtonen, & 
Viinamaki, 2001; Kokkonen et al. 2001; Lane, Sechrest, & Riedel, 1998; Salminen, 
Saarijarvi, Aarela, Toikka, & Kauhenen, 1999). Elevated levels of alexithymia are also 
common in a large array of medical conditions. These include: rheumatoid arthritis, 
hypertension, peptic ulcer, inflammatory bowel disease, cardiac disease, some types 
of cancer, diabetes, morbid obesity, kidney disease, stroke, fibromyalgia, erectile 
dysfunction, acquired brain injury, chronic pain conditions and more (See Lumley, 
Neely, & Burger, 2007). It has been suggested that dysfunctional emotion regulation 
in alexithymia may cause prolonged states of sympathetic nervous system arousal that 
may contribute to the development of somatic illness (see Shalev, 2019). However, 
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this conclusion is largely based on correlational findings. More longitudinal studies 
that measure alexithymia before the onset of any medical disorder are needed before 
causal inferences can be drawn (Bagby & Taylor, 1994).  
The increased prevalence of alexithymia in several forms of psychopathology 
has been a topic of recent scientific interest. A high prevalence of alexithymia has 
been found in substance abuse (Corcos & Speranza, 2003), anxiety disorder (Parker 
et al. 1993), eating disorder (Beales & Dolton, 2000, Nowakowski, McFarlane, & 
Cassin, 2013), depression (Carpenter & Addis, 2000, Honkalampi et al. 2001), various 
personality disorders (Sexton, Sunday, Hurt, & Halmi, 1998), panic disorder 
(Galderisi, Mancuso, Mucci, Garramone, Zamboli, & Maj, 2008), and posttraumatic 
stress disorder (e.g., Alvarez & Shipko, 1991; Frewwn et al. 2008; Hyer et al. 1990).  
Studies also suggest high levels of alexithymia are present in at least 50% of 
individuals with autism (Berthoz & Hill, 2005; Hill, Berthoz & Frith, 2004; Lombardo, 
Barnes, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2007; Shah, Hall, Catmur & Bird, 2016). 
Further, it has been proposed that the signs of atypical interoception that are seen in 
autism are actually due to the high prevalence of co-occurring alexithymia in this 
population (see Brewer, Happe, Cook & Bird, 2015; see also Gaigg, Cornell, & Bird, 
2016; Shah, Hall, Catmur, & Bird, 2016 ; for a review, see Bird and Cook, 2013). 
Interoceptive deficits associated with alexithymia have been argued to represent a 
first-order umbrella factor (or p-factor) that impacts upon a range of symptoms across 
diagnostic categories (Brewer, Cook, & Bird, 2016; Murphy et al., 2017).  
Correlational studies suggest that alexithymia is positively associated with 
retrospectively reported adverse early childhood environmental factors. These include 
an insecure attachment (Besharat, 2010), emotional or physical neglect (Berenbaum 
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& Irvin, 1996; Frewen et al. 2008; Goldsmith & Freyd 2005; Gulec, Altintas, Inanc, 
Bezgin, Koca, & Gulec; 2013), maladaptive family dynamics (Taylor et al., 1991; 
Yelsma, Hovestadt, Nilsson, & Paul, 1998), sexual or physical abuse (Evren et al., 
2009; Paivio & McCulloch, 2004; Zlotnick, Mattia, & Zimmerman, 2001) and 
parental divorce (Joukamaa, et al., 2007). Berenbaum and James (1994) found that a 
childhood home environment that discouraged emotional expression was the best 
predictor of alexithymia. Sivik (1993) proposed that when the primary caregiver 
consistently fails to supply a verbal language for emotions, the child’s capacity to 
verbalise feelings is compromised. Bucci (1997) advanced the proposal that childhood 
traumatic events can disrupt the referential connections within emotion schemas, 
thereby contributing to the individual with alexithymia experiencing unregulated 
states of emotional arousal. 
Unfortunately, while alexithymia is associated with poorer psychological and 
physical health outcomes, it is also been implicated in a poor response to many forms 
of therapy. Krystal (1982) stated that, “alexithymia is possibly the most important 
single factor diminishing the success of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy” (p. 364). Sifnéos (1973) was also noted to link alexithymia to a 
“…failure to respond to dynamic psychotherapy” (p. 68). It has been suggested that 
this is due to a difficulty engaging in introspective cognitive activity and directly 
communicating feelings (Ogrodniczuk, Piper, & Joyce, 2005). Difficulty in forming a 
therapeutic alliance, which is considered a key part of the therapeutic process, has also 
been noted in cases of alexithymia (Ogrodniczuk et al., 2011). 
Alexithymia has also been found to be related to poor treatment outcomes 
using a cognitive-behavioural treatment modality (Speranza, Loas, Wallier, & Corcos, 
2007; Ogrodniczuk, Piper, & Joyce, 2005). This may be due to less engagement in 
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treatment recommendations and homework tasks (Ogrodniczuk et al., 2011). Overall, 
it appears that alexithymia has negative physical and psychological health 
implications and is a negative prognostic indicator for psychological treatments.  
 
Experimental Research into Alexithymia 
As the alexithymia construct became more widely known, it was examined 
using laboratory-based experimental methods (Taylor & Bagby, 2004). In much of 
this research, alexithymia was conceptualised as a discrete typology and comparisons 
were made between groups that were inferred to represent high and low degrees of 
alexithymia. Low scores on the TAS-20 were considered representative of non-clinical 
levels of alexithymia and the TAS-20 score of 61 was established as the clinical cut-
off point to differentiate clinical levels of alexithymia from non-clinical levels. This 
cut-off score has been utilised widely in research on alexithymia (Bagby, Taylor, & 
Parker, 1994).  
Much of the early experimental research into alexithymia was aimed at gaining 
a greater understanding of the core features of the construct. For instance, consistent 
with the so-called hallmark feature of alexithymia involving difficulty identifying and 
verbally describing one’s feelings, it was found that individuals with high TAS-20 
scores are less able than controls to provide words to describe their subjective state 
when confronted with emotion-eliciting pictorial material (e.g., Roedema & Simons, 
1999) and provide less emotion-related verbal responses to vignettes of emotion 
provoking interpersonal situations (Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 
1990). Alexithymia was also found to be associated with a recognition memory deficit 
for emotional words but not neutral words (Suslow, Kersting, & Arolt, 2003; Luminet, 
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Vermeulen, Demaret, Taylor, & Bagby, 2006; Vermeulen & Luminet, 2009). In 
several studies it was found that groups with high TAS-20 scores demonstrate lower 
general verbal ability than groups with low TAS-20 scores (Lamberty & Holt, 1995; 
Suslow & Junghans, 2002; Suslow, Kersting, & Arolt, 2003). Parker et al. (2008) also 
found a positive correlation between verbal intelligence and TAS-20 scores. 
Kokkonen and colleagues (2001) found evidence of a negative association between 
the total TAS-20 score in adulthood and timing of speech development in childhood. 
Investigations of the second core feature or trait of alexithymia, which is 
difficulty discriminating between feelings and the bodily sensations of physical 
arousal, indicate that individuals with alexithymia may report subdued psychological 
indicators of emotional arousal while concurrently displaying intact physiological 
arousal in response to emotive stimuli (Luminet, Rimé, Bagby, & Taylor, 2004; 
Roedema & Simons, 1999; Stone & Nielson, 2001). It was suggested that 
physiological arousal sensations are not acknowledged by individuals with 
alexithymia as part of the emotional experience (Barsky & Klerman, 1983; De Gucht 
& Heiser, 2003; Kooiman, 1998). 
Finally, research examining the third proposed feature of alexithymia, 
involving diminished focus on inner experience and increased externally oriented 
thinking, supports the related idea that alexithymia may be associated with reduced 
imaginative processes. For example, Friedlander et al. (1997) investigated imaginal 
capacities in an autogenic relaxation exercise with guided imagery. Participants with 
higher TAS-20 scores reported less vivid imagery during the exercise than participants 
with low TAS-20 scores. Similarly, Taylor (2003) analysed the dream reports 
collected from students with either high or low TAS-20 scores when they were 
awakened in a sleep laboratory following REM sleep. The students with high TAS-20 
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scores had less overall dream activity with a significantly lower thematic units mean 
score than did students with low TAS-20 scores.  
Importantly, in addition to examining the defining features of the alexithymia 
construct, research on alexithymia has also been directed at investigating the 
performance of individuals with alexithymia on tasks requiring the conscious 
processing of emotional stimuli. The interest in this research was primarily due to the 
influential6 cognitive-developmental theory of alexithymia proposed by Lane and 
Schwartz (1987) which characterises alexithymia as an information processing deficit 
involving a difficulty forming conscious, conceptual representations of emotion (often 
referred to as a lack of ‘emotional awareness’).  
Relevant to the current thesis, some of this research has investigated whether 
alexithymia is associated with deficits in the ability to form conscious representations 
of non-verbal emotion-relevant concepts. As faces are considered a highly salient non-
verbal emotional cue (Darwin, 1872; Eimer & Holmes, 2007), a small number of these 
studies has investigated how individuals representing alexithymia, based on their 
TAS-20 scores, perform on tasks of facial emotion recognition. If one has difficulty 
forming fully explicit representations of emotion in alexithymia, then it follows that 
this would result in facial expression recognition deficits, given that the identification 
and naming of facial expressions involves conscious or explicit access to conceptual 
knowledge representations (Balconi & Lucchari, 2007; De Houwer & Moors, 2012; 
 
6 This conceptualisation was consistent with what has been considered the hallmark feature of 
alexithymia, that is, a striking inability to find appropriate words to describe emotions. Interestingly, 
Sifnéos (1988) initially proposed a disconnection between the limbic system and the verbal centres of 
the neocortex may result in alexithymia. 
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Herba et al. 2007; Neely, 1977; Shiffrin, & Schneider, 1977). A description and review 
of this literature now follows.  
 
Review of Facial Emotion Recognition Judgement Paradigms and Alexithymia  
Performance on tasks that require the naming of visually presented facial 
expressions rely on conscious access to stores of emotional knowledge (Balconi & 
Lucchari, 2007; De Houwer & Moors, 2012; Herba et al. 2007; Neely, 1977; Shiffrin, 
& Schneider, 1977). The classical emotion recognition task, developed by 
experimental psychologists, that involves the naming of target emotions, is generally 
referred to as the facial emotion recognition judgment paradigm. Typically, in this 
paradigm, a static photograph of a face expressing a ‘prototypical’ expression is 
presented for a given period. Participants are then asked indicate when they have 
recognised the stimulus and then to choose one verbal descriptive label that best 
describes the emotion depicted on the face from a set of multiple labels7. This task 
cannot be performed with above-chance accuracy using stimuli falling below the 
threshold of conscious awareness and so is considered an indicator of conscious 
information processing (De Houwer & Moors, 2012). 
The question of whether individuals with alexithymia are impaired in their 
ability to recognise facial emotion has been investigated in only a relatively small 
number of experimental studies using the traditional emotion recognition judgment 
paradigm. Given that the current cognitive-developmental models of alexithymia, that 
 
7 A limited literature has examined alternative contributors to decision time, such as individual 
differences in the level of subjective confidence in one’s performance on accuracy-based tasks  (e.g., 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). This research finds that individuals are unjustifiably 
confident in their decisions on tests of general knowledge (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977; 
Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980), cognitive ability (Pallier et al., 2002), and various social 
predictions (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990). 
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were described in the Part One of this thesis, posit that a deficit in the conscious 
awareness of emotion accounts for the underlying deficit in alexithymia, this paradigm 
should be informative as to the nature of the deficit in alexithymia. 
Following is a review of studies that have employed this task. Studies that have 
employed alternative tasks using facial stimuli, such as matching tasks (identifying a 
previously presented target face among distractors) or detection tasks (identification 
of an emotional expression among other sequentially presented expressions), will not 
be included in this Literature Review as these tasks rely largely on visuo-perceptual 
ability and working memory processes rather than conscious access to conceptual 
knowledge (McLellan, Johnston, Dalrymple-Alford, & Porter, 2008). Furthermore, 
the studies reviewed in this chapter are those that have employed normative samples. 
This is because a large number of studies have shown that depression and anxiety bias 
emotional information processing (Naranjo, Kornreich, Campanella, Noel, & 
Vandriette, 2011; Rossignol, Phillipot, Douilliez, Crommelinck, & Campanella, 2005) 
and increase response reaction time (e.g., Lynch et al., 2006) and therefore represent 
potential confounding factors which could affect emotion recognition judgement 
performance (Grynberg et al., 2012). 
This review will firstly turn to studies that report evidence of facial emotion 
recognition difficulties in alexithymia. In an early study on this topic, Parker, Taylor 
and Bagby (1993) examined facial emotion recognition in alexithymia using a 
participant sample allocated into groups based on clinical cut-off scores on the revised 
20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20: Bagby, Taylor & Parker, 1992). Nine 
slides depicting nine different posed facial expressions were projected onto a viewing 
screen for 25 seconds while participants identified the emotion in the photograph from 
a given list of nine emotion labels. The group with TAS-20 scores above the clinical 
 23 
cut-off score were significantly less accurate in their facial emotion recognition 
performance than the control group.  
A subsequent study by Jessimer and Markham (1997) examined facial emotion 
recognition in alexithymia by presenting 12 slides comprising two exemplars each of 
six different facial expressions (the stimulus presentation time was unspecified). 
Participants were allowed a 10 second response time to identify each of the displayed 
facial expressions. They found that participants with TAS-20 scores on or below the 
10th percentile, representing a low degree of alexithymia, were significantly more 
accurate at recognising facial expressions than those with those with higher TAS-20 
scores on or above the 90th percentile rank.  
These early studies appeared to provide some support for the idea that 
alexithymia involved difficulty in not only identifying one's subjective emotional 
state, but also in identifying the emotional states of others. Using a slightly different 
methodology, Lane and colleagues (Lane et al. 1996; Lane, Sechrest, Riedel, Shapiro, 
& Kaszniak, 2000) required participants whose TAS-20 scores were within the clinical 
range to complete the Perception of Affect Test (PAT), an untimed 140-item paper 
and pencil test comprised of four subtasks, one of which involved matching facial 
expressions with the appropriate verbal label. The group with clinical range TAS-20 
scores had significantly lower overall scores on the PAT than the control group. 
However, as performance on the subtasks were not analysed separately, conclusions 
cannot be drawn regarding facial emotion recognition ability and alexithymia.  
Montebarocci, Surcinelli, Rossi and Baldaro (2011) conducted a study on 
emotion recognition and alexithymia using the facial emotion judgement paradigm. 
They presented 42 photographic images of facial expressions for 10 seconds each to a 
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group of participants who scored above the clinical cut-off on the Italian version of 
the TAS-20 as well as an age-matched group of participants with scores below the cut-
off score who served as controls. After stimulus exposure, all participants were given 
unlimited time to select a verbal label from a list. After controlling for depression and 
anxiety, Montebarocci et al. found that the group with high TAS-20 scores were less 
accurate in their facial emotion recognition than controls.  
Jongen et al. (2014) also investigated facial emotion recognition among two 
groups of participants who were screened for psychiatric or neurological conditions 
and then divided into two groups based on their TAS-20 scores. While the group with 
the higher TAS-20 scores were assumed to represent alexithymia, their mean TAS-20 
score (54.8) was below the recommended clinical cut-off TAS-20 score (i.e. 61). 
Participants performed a facial emotion recognition test called the FEEL test (Facially 
Expressed Emotion Labelling; Kessler, Baveri, & Traue, 2002). Static photographs 
were displayed on screen for two seconds and then participants had unlimited time to 
choose the appropriate label from a list of emotion labels. The group with higher TAS-
20 scores achieved significantly lower scores on the FEEL test than the group with 
lower TAS-20 scores.  
Ihme el al. (2014a) investigated the relationship between TAS-20 scores and 
the ability to accurately label very brief (<100 milliseconds/ms) static displays of 
emotional facial expressions. Participants who were screened to exclude psychiatric 
or neurological conditions were shown emotional expressions determined to be just 
above the conscious perceptual threshold. Participants were given a long response 
window (7700 ms) to choose one of a list of multiple choice labels for the target 
expression. Responses were classified as true positives or false positives, and then 
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calculated as a sensitivity score. Results showed a negative relationship between TAS-
20 scores and labelling performance. 
Finally, in a second study published in the same year by Ihme et al. (2014b), 
participants with no history of psychiatric or neurological conditions were assessed 
for alexithymia using the TAS-20 and an observer-rater measure of alexithymia, the 
German version of the Toronto Structured Interview for Alexithymia or TSIA (Grabe 
et al. 2009). Static facial expression stimuli were shown for 1 second or 3 seconds, 
and participants then were allowed 7.2 seconds to label the emotion by pressing a 
button. Higher scores on the TAS-20 and the TSIA were associated with slower 
emotion recognition. 
In contrast to the studies described above, other studies have failed to find 
evidence that alexithymia is associated with facial emotion recognition difficulties. 
For instance, in an early study by McDonald and Prkachin (1990), 10 participants were 
assigned to an alexithymia group on the basis of their scores on the Shalling-Sifnéos 
Personality Scale (SSPS: Apfel & Sifnéos, 1979). An additional 10 participants who 
did not reach SSPS criterion for alexithymia acted as controls. These participants were 
shown 12 randomly ordered slides of actors posing one of six facial emotions (with 
each emotion category represented twice). The slides were presented for 10 seconds, 
followed by a 20 second period during which participants were instructed to select 
from a list of six emotions the one that best described the facial expression. McDonald 
and Prkachin (1990) did not find evidence of impaired emotion recognition in the so-
called ‘alexithymia’ group. However, their small sample size may have limited 
statistical power (power analyses were not conducted). Another limitation of this study 
derives from the use of the SSPS to select the groups, as this measure has since been 
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found to have poor validity and is no longer in use (Bagby, Taylor & Ryan, 1986; 
Bagby, Taylor & Atkinson, 1988). 
Using a larger stimulus set and the earlier 26 item version of the Toronto 
Alexithymia Scale (Taylor et al., 1985), Mann, Wise, Trinidad, and Kohanski (1994) 
presented 30 slides of five facial expressions (six items each condition) to 124 
participants. Stimuli were presented for 10 seconds each, with an additional 20 second 
period provided for participants to select an appropriate emotion label from a list of 
six emotions. Those in the highest third of the TAS distribution demonstrated less 
accurate facial emotion recognition performance than those in the lowest third. 
However, the authors failed to replicate these findings in a follow up study involving 
a relatively small sample and participants with a clinical history of substance abuse 
(Mann, Wise, Trinidad, & Kohanski, 1995). 
Finally, Pandey and Mandal (1997) presented 42 photographic images of facial 
expressions to 12 participants who scored above a clinical cut-off score of the Hindi 
version of the TAS-20 and 12 age-matched control participants who were screened for 
depression and other potentially confounding variables. These images were displayed 
for 10 seconds, during which participants selected a verbal label that described the 
facial expression from a list of verbal descriptors. They did not find differences in 
facial recognition accuracy among their clinical range TAS-20 group relative to 
controls. However, again the sample size was small.  
 
Methodological Issues 
Argueably, the studies that are reviewed above and that have produced both 
positive and negative findings contain a number of methodological shortcomings. Due 
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to these shortcomings, it is unclear whether alexithymia is associated with reduced 
facial emotion recognition ability. These methodological issues will be described 
below.  
The first shortcoming relates to participant samples and involves the 
assignation of the so-called alexithymia groups, as many of these groups have mean 
TAS-20 scores below the clinical cut-off criterion score. Generally, studies have used 
a median split as the basis for assigning participants to groups, and the median score 
of the participants assigned to the so-called alexithymia group has usually been below 
the TAS-20 clinical cut-off score of 61 (TAS-20 scores above 61 represent clinically 
relevant degrees of alexithymia). Further, it has been argued that the TAS-20 measure 
was developed to identify individuals with clinical levels of alexithymia 
characteristics and not to discriminate among individuals with scores at the lower end 
of the TAS-20 distribution (Lundh, Johnsson, Sundqvist, & Olsson, 2002). This may 
mean that research utilising groups selected from the lower range of the spread of 
TAS-20 scores may not accurately reflect relationships between alexithymia and 
behavioural performance measures.  
A further concern includes the failure to screen for co-morbid depression and 
anxiety. Most of the studies described above (with the exception of Ihme et al., 2014a; 
Ihme et al., 2014b; Jongen et al., 2014; Pandey & Mandal, 1997), did not screen for 
co-morbid conditions or equate groups on other demographic variables that are also 
known to affect facial emotion recognition performance, such as age (e.g., Chepenik, 
Cornew, & Farah, 2007; Sullivan, Ruffman, & Hutton, 2006), gender (e.g., Erwin et 
al. 1992), ethnicity (e.g., Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008) and years of education (e.g., 
Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). 
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Indeed, both studies by Mann et al. (1994; 1995) report that participants with 
higher TAS scores were significantly more depressed than participants with lower 
TAS scores. Since among the general population there may be an approximate four-
fold higher prevalence of depression among individuals with clinical level TAS-20 
scores compared to those with TAS-20 scores below the clinical cut-off score 
(Honkalampi, Hintikka, Saarinen, Lehtonen, & Viinamaki, 2000), and depression has 
been shown to impair emotion recognition (Asthana, Mandal, Khurana & Haque-
Nizamie, 1998; Persad & Polivy, 1993; Surguladze et al., 2004), the failure to control 
for depression in the above-mentioned studies (including Jessimer & Markham, 1997; 
Mann, Wise, Trinidad, & Kohanski, 1994; Mann, Wise, Trinidad, & Kohanski, 1995; 
McDonald & Prkachin, 1990; Parker, Taylor & Bagby, 1993) and equate groups on 
other relevant variables must be seen as a limitation of these studies (for further 
discussion, see Honkalampi et al., 2000).  
In addition to these problems relating to the selection of participants, there are 
further limitations relating to the experimental procedures in the research reviewed 
above. These limitations include the use of very small stimulus sets, very long stimulus 
presentation times, and lengthy participant response times. Specifically, findings from 
the aforementioned studies by Jessimer and Markham (1997), McDonald and Prkachin 
(1990) and Parker, Taylor and Bagby (1993) are limited by their use of stimulus sets 
comprising one or two items per emotion category. This issue raises the possibility of 
response prediction among participants but, more importantly, reduces the reliability 
of findings and ultimately the ability to generalise these findings to the general 
population (Rojahn, Mason, Lott, Esbensen & Smalls, 2001).  
Furthermore, the stimuli in most of these studies are presented for very long 
durations, such as 10 seconds (Mann et al., 1994; Pandey & Mandal, 1997) to 25 
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seconds (Parker et al., 1993), or the exposure time is unlimited (Jongen et al., 2014; 
Lane et al., 2000; Lane et al., 1996; Montebarocci et al., 2011). This is inconsistent 
with the time constraints of normal social interaction in everyday environments where 
emotional expressions are typically displayed briefly on the face for one-half to four 
seconds (Ekman & Friesen, 1982). Further, all these studies have allowed participants 
extensive or even unlimited time to respond, possibly because response latency has 
not typically been considered as an outcome measure (the exception being the study 
by Ihme et al., 2014b). Instead, this research has focused on recognition accuracy (e.g., 
responding ‘happy’ when the stimulus depicts a happy face), despite the fact that 
latency and accuracy are likely to reflect different facets of performance, and response 
latency may show group differences even when accuracy is equivalent (such as when 
accuracy is at ceiling level) across groups. Furthermore, response latency is likely to 
be a more sensitive measure of performance (see Collins, 1999; Collins, 2002; Collins, 
& Coney, 1998; Collins, & Cooke, 2005; Osgood, 1953; Shapiro, 1968; Wearing & 
Montague, 1970). 
Importantly, the lengthy stimulus presentation and response times allowed in 
most of the studies reviewed above means that timely facial emotion recognition is not 
evaluated, yet this is “the bedrock of all social interaction" (Crown, Feldstein, Jasnow, 
Beebe, & Jaffe, 2002, p.2). That is, it has been argued that the temporal aspect of facial 
emotion recognition plays a key role in a number of communication processes, such 
as the rapid interpretation of others’ attitudes and intentions (Baldwin, 1993; 
Tomasello, 1999), the communication of mood (Natale, 1978), determining the 
advisability of interacting with others prior to their facial expressions being “masked” 
or modified according to socially acceptable display rules (Ekman & Friesen, 1975), 
and the attainment of empathic attunement (Welkowitz & Feldstein, 1970). The fact 
 30 
that the ability to co-ordinate timing in social interactions emerges as early as four 
months of age may also underlie the importance of this skill for the development of 
social expertise (Oberman, Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 2009). 
A further concern regarding the methodology of the above-mentioned studies 
relates to the choice of stimuli, which may be considered highly artificial for several 
reasons. For instance, while these facial expression stimuli are often described as 
‘prototypical’ facial expressions, most have been selected from Ekman and Friesen’s 
(1976) Pictures of Facial Affect, which is a database of photographs of highly 
exaggerated facial expressions. Clearly, the definition of prototypical in the context of 
these studies refers to the level of intensity (i.e., strength or degree of expressiveness) 
depicted in the stimuli, with extreme expressions at 100% intensity viewed as 
‘prototypical’. However, given that in everyday life people encounter facial 
expressions that range widely in intensity, and they are most frequently likely to view 
expressions that are less intense than 100% displays, then stimuli at lower than 100% 
levels of intensity may be considered to better represent prototypical examples of 
facial expressions.  
Finally, and perhaps most crucially, it can be argued that the stimuli used in all 
of these studies are artificial because they have been limited to static images that lack 
the motion of real-life emotion messages, which are encoded on the face in highly 
dynamic muscle movements. While judgments about static facial emotion images are 
usually highly accurate (Ekman, 1982), it is unlikely that emotion recognition is based 
entirely on an analysis of the configural information that is captured in a static record 
of the face, and that the dynamic properties of facial muscle patterns are redundant to 
the human information processing system.  
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Indeed, several lines of evidence support the view that dynamic information 
contributes to facial emotion recognition. For instance, Bassili (1979) first examined 
the role of movement in facial emotion recognition using an adaptation of the classic 
point-light technique (Johansson, 1973). In Bassili's study, video recordings were 
taken of faces expressing emotion whilst covered with black make-up and reflective 
point lights. Recordings were played back so that visual information regarding facial 
appearance and structure was drastically reduced while dynamic information 
contained in light points was highlighted. Bassili found that the mean facial 
recognition accuracy by dynamic point-light displays was significantly greater than 
would be expected by chance. He interpreted these results as suggesting that the 
movement of the face alone provides sufficient information for facial expression 
recognition. While it is not clear from this study whether participants use motion 
information directly to identify facial expressions or whether motion information is 
used to form inferences regarding the configuration of the face, and that this 
information then forms the basis of emotion identification, a subsequent study by 
Bassili (1979) lends support to the former hypothesis by showing that dynamic point-
light displays of facial expressions are recognised more accurately than static point-
light displays.  
Other methods have also been used to systematically compare the difference 
in facial emotion processing based on static versus dynamic stimuli. For instance, 
using the traditional facial emotion recognition judgment paradigm, Werhle, Kaiser, 
Schmidt and Scherer (2000) found that dynamic displays of schematic facial 
expressions improved the recognition and discrimination of emotions relative to static 
schematic displays. However, the relatively low recognition accuracy of the static 
stimuli found in this study casts doubt on the generalisability of these results to real 
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faces (as mentioned previously, static faces are generally recognised with a high 
degree of accuracy). Indeed, Ambadar, Schooler and Cohn (2005) showed that 
emotions were recognised better from dynamic displays of truncated full video 
sequences showing a transition from neutral to emotional facial expressions relative 
to single static, multi-static or first-last sequences. Dynamic stimuli have also been 
found to facilitate other aspects of emotional processing. For example, Yoshikawa and 
Sato (2008) showed that dynamic presentations of emotional expressions elicited more 
intense subjective emotional experiences and spontaneous facial mimicry than 
corresponding static presentations. 
Research has also shown that patients with neurological and developmental 
disorders perform very differently on facial emotion recognition tasks when the 
stimuli are presented in static as compared to dynamic form. For instance, Humphreys, 
Donelly and Riddoch (1993) demonstrated that a prosopagnosic patient, who 
performed poorly on facial expression judgments using static photographs, was 
relatively good at such judgments when viewing dynamic point-light displays. 
Similarly, De Gelder, Vroomen, Poutois, and Weiskrantz (1999) reported that a 
blindsight patient, when presented with static and dynamic video images of facial 
expressions in his blind field, demonstrated significantly better covert recognition 
under dynamic conditions, indicating that a performance difference between the 
dynamic and static properties of the stimuli emerges even at very early stages of 
subcortical perceptual processing. Harwood, Hall and Shinkfield (1999) found 
participants with and without intellectual impairment recognise emotional faces 
significantly better from dynamic than static displays. Similarly, Gepner, Deruelle and 
Grynfeltt (2001) found that dynamic presentations of videotaped facial expressions 
facilitated better emotion recognition performance by children diagnosed with autism. 
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These performance dissociations suggest that separate neural substrates are involved 
in the processing of moving and static facial displays.  
Neuroimaging studies also suggest that different neural regions are activated 
during the processing of dynamic and static facial expressions. For instance, Kilts et 
al. (2003) found, in a positron emission tomography study, that the presentation of 
static facial expressions activated a motor, prefrontal, and parietal cortical network 
that has been shown to be involved in motor imagery. In contrast, the presentation of 
dynamic facial expressions activated more widespread neural networks, including 
emotion-related structures such as the amygdala. Similarly, LaBar, Crupain, Voyvodic 
and McCarthy (2003) carried out an fMRI study comparing neural activation in 
response to dynamic and static facial stimuli. Dynamic stimuli produced enhanced 
activation in limbic brain regions that play a primary role in emotion processes, while 
static images produce greater activation in motor and premotor cortices. Further, 
Arsalidou, Morris and Taylor (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of studies that (a) used 
dynamic faces and (b) specifically compared dynamic and static emotional faces. 
Areas of the middle temporal gyri, the superior temporal sulci and the amygdala were 
more active for dynamic than static faces. The authors concluded that dynamic facial 
stimuli elicit greater activity in regions associated with interpretation of social signals 
and emotional processing.  
While the failure to utilise dynamic facial expression stimuli is argued above 
to be a limitation of previous studies into facial emotion recognition ability in 
alexithymia, one recently published study by Starita, Borhani, Bertini and Scarpazza 
(2018) did employ moving stimuli when examining this topic. In Experiment 1, their 
participants were shown a static image of a facial expression at varying intensities of 
expression for 100 ms and asked to identify the emotion expressed in the stimulus by 
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making a forced choice button press. All participants had undergone screening for co-
morbid disorders and were allocated to a ‘High Alexithymia’ or ‘Low Alexithymia’ 
group based on TAS-20 scores above or below the TAS-20 cut-off score. The 
percentage of accurate identifications at each intensity level was used to calculate the 
point of subjective equality (PSE) involving an equal probability of identifying the 
facial expression as neutral or emotional. They found that the group with the TAS-20 
scores above the clinical cut-off had a higher PSE for fear compared to the group with 
the TAS-20 scores below the clinical cut-off, suggesting that clinical range 
alexithymia may be associated with difficulty with the recognition of static images of 
facial expressions of fear. 
In Experiment 2 of the same study, Starita et al (2018) recruited a new set of 
participants following the same procedure. Stimuli were morphed movies where facial 
expressions unfolded from 0 to 100% over an entire duration of 100 seconds. There 
were no group differences in reaction time or accuracy, which they interpreted to 
suggest that alexithymia is not associated with difficulty with the recognition of 
dynamic facial expressions (only static expressions, based on the results of their first 
study outlined above). However, the duration of the stimulus presentation times in this 
study raise serious concerns about their conclusions because previous research has 
found that a duration of 2,040 milliseconds is considered to most closely replicate the 
natural unfolding of a facial expression (see Sato & Yoshikawa, 2004). As the task 
parameters of Starita et al.’s study involved a far greater stimulus presentation time 
(equivalent to 100,000 milliseconds), this very slow presentation rate would have 
likely appeared highly artificial and produced a very low level of task difficulty. 
Therefore, this task may not have adequately assessed facial recognition performance 
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due to ceiling effects and may not allow inferences to be drawn about real-life facial 
recognition ability.  
The review above of the small number of studies conducted in the area of 
alexithymia and facial emotion recognition ability indicates that all these studies 
contain at least one identified methodological limitation. Given these limitations and 
the mixed results obtained, it is currently unclear whether alexithymia is associated 
with a deficit in the ability to consciously recognise and label facial expressions. 
 
Summary of Part Two 
Early research interest into alexithymia began with the development of a sound 
measuring instrument, the Toronto Alexithymia Scale, which allowed correlational 
and epidemiological studies to be carried out on the construct. A higher level of 
alexithymia was generally associated in these studies with poorer outcomes on socio-
emotional, psychological, and physical health outcome measures. Further, individuals 
identified as having alexithymia were found to respond poorly to psychological 
therapies. It currently remains unclear whether alexithymia can be improved through 
current treatments. 
The development of the TAS instrument to identify alexithymia also paved the 
way for investigations into alexithymia using experimental methodologies. Much of 
this laboratory-based research has employed methods derived from cognitive science 
to test the assumption that alexithymia reflects a deficit in the ability to consciously 
access emotion representations. A small number of these studies, which were reviewed 
above, examined the ability to identify and label facial expressions of emotion among 
individuals with high or low scores on the TAS-20. As the facial emotion recognition 
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tasks employed in these studies depend on the conscious processing of emotional 
stimuli, and alexithymia is considered to involve a failure to form fully conscious 
representations of emotion, it was assumed that these investigations should be 
informative as to the nature of the emotion deficit in alexithymia.  However, the extant 
research in this area is limited by methodological issues and mixed findings and it was 
argued that as a result of these limitations the research findings are inconclusive.  
 
PART THREE: The Modal Approach to Cognition 
 
Embodied Accounts of Emotional Knowledge 
The experimental study of facial emotion recognition ability in alexithymia 
has until recently been largely approached from a cognitive science perspective. This 
approach assumes that when performing a facial emotion recognition judgement task, 
the visual or perceptual properties of the facial stimulus are formed into an abstract 
internal cognitive representation. This representation is then assumed to undergo 
further information processing at a conscious level, involving accessing structurally 
independent semantic memory networks to provide further conceptual information, 
such as the relevant category name (see Bruce & Young, 1986; Fodor, 1981; Gallese, 
2001; Marr, 1982; Pylyshyn, 1984). The semantic network is considered separate from 
the brain’s modal systems which are responsible for action, perception, and emotion 
and involve activation in sensory-motor areas of the brain (Barsalou, 1999; Fodor, 
1975). The picture of the mind that is conveyed by classic cognitive science, and that 
has largely underpinned theory and research on alexithymia, does not consider 
sensory-motor areas to play a role in the facial emotion recognition process. However, 
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while the field of cognitive psychology has been dominated by traditional cognitive 
science for over 50 years, critics of this position argue, in what is referred to as the 
‘grounding problem’, that amodal theories cannot explain the complexity and meaning 
of many embodied experiences that have been well-documented in the social 
psychology and affective neuroscience literature.  
Various theories of embodied cognition exist under different designations, 
including the: direct matching hypothesis (Rissolatti et al., 2001); hot hypothesis 
(Wicker et al., 2003); shared manifold hypothesis (Gallese, 2003), unmediated 
resonance model (Goldman & Sripada, 2005); and shared circuits (Keysers & 
Gazzola, 2006). A basic tenent among all of these theories is that recognition does not 
rely solely on perceptual or cognitive internal representations, but that motor and 
somatosensory areas are also involved in the recognition process (see Decety & 
Chaminade, 2004; Gallese, 2003, 2008; Keysers & Gazzola, 2007). High-level 
cognitive processes are assumed to be based on partial reactivations (or simulations) 
of perceptual, motor, and emotion sub-systems. Observing goal-directed human 
actions causes the ‘re-instantiation’ of these modality-specific states that were 
captured during previous experiences. It is argued that this reactivation facilitates 
further cognitive processing such as the ability to identify and name observed  facial 
expressions, through the priming of the target  representation (e.g., Atkinson, 2007; 
Decety & Chaminade, 2003; 2004; Gallese, 2003; 2005; Goldman & Sripada, 2005; 
Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal et al., 2005; Winkielman et 
al., 2009). 
Findings supporting the notion of embodied experiences have been well-
documented. For instance, research participants are faster to verify sentences such as 
“open the drawer” when the response action required is a pulling motion rather than a 
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pushing one (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). Participants primed with the stereotype of 
elderly people subsequently walk more slowly than those who have not been so primed 
(Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). Findings from affective neuroscience research show 
that when reading verbs regarding actions performed with different parts of the body 
(e.g., leg, hand, face), the respective parts of the motor cortex are activated 
(Pulvermuller, 2005). These findings show a coupling between cognitive-level 
representations and perceptual, motor, and emotion sub-systems that seems 
inconsistent with the notion that knowledge is stored in a semantic network in the form 
of abstract symbols, separate from the brain’s modal, or sensory, systems (for 
extensive discussion, see Barsalou, 1999).  
The notion of a shared representational sub-system of perceptions, cognitions, 
motor actions, and emotions has been supported by the discovery of sensory-motor 
mirror neurons. The critical property of these neurons is that they are active both 
during the observation of a particular action by others and the execution of that same 
action by the self, thus providing the neural substrate of a perception action coupling 
(see Keysers & Gazzola, 2006).  
 
Action and Emotion Simulation 
Mirror neurons were first discovered whilst researchers recorded activity from 
single brain cells of the macaque monkey (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 
1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). The same neurons in the premotor cortex fired when the 
monkey manipulated an object and when it observed the experimenter manipulating 
an object, such as grasping a piece of food. Similar sensory-motor neurons were later 
discovered within the macaque prefrontal cortex and inferior-parietal cortex (Gallese 
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et al., 2002). This system of neurons was named the mirror neuron system (MNS) 
because it appeared that the observed action was mirrored or internally simulated 
within the monkey’s own motor system. Following these initial reports of mirror 
neurons in the macaque brain, researchers looked for evidence of an analogous 
mechanism in humans. As the ability to conduct single-cell recordings in humans is 
extremely limited, this was done using methods including transcranial magnetic 
stimulation, electroencephalography recordings (EEG) and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).  
Fadiga et al. (1995) used transcranial magnetic stimulation to stimulate mirror 
neurons in the motor cortex of healthy human participants whilst recording motor 
evoked potentials from participants’ hand muscles. Visual stimuli were presented 
under three different conditions: observation of an experimenter grasping objects; 
observation of objects; and detection of the dimming of a small spot of light. They 
found that the motor evoked potentials recorded from the hand muscles markedly 
increased during observation of the experimenter grasping objects compared to the 
other conditions, including the attention-demanding light dimming detection task. 
Further, the increase of motor evoked potentials occurred only in those muscles that 
were used to perform the observed movements. Similar results were obtained by 
Cochin et al. (1998), who displayed human movements to participants whilst 
recording their EEGs. As control conditions, moving and still objects were also 
presented. They found that the observation of human movements, but not that of 
objects, was associated with EEG activity in the precentral motor cortex.  
In a classic fMRI study, Buccino et al. (2001) presented participants with 
images of object-directed actions made with the mouth (e.g. biting an apple), hand 
(e.g. grasping a cup) and foot (e.g. kicking a ball). Observation of these different 
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actions produced somatotopically-organised activation of the premotor cortex. In 
other words, the observation of mouth actions, hand actions, or foot actions elicited 
activity within the pre-motor cortex in the same regions that are active when actually 
performing those actions. These findings suggest that whenever we observe someone 
performing an action, there is not only activation of various visual areas but also 
concurrent activation of the motor circuits that are recruited when we ourselves 
perform the same action. Although we do not necessarily overtly reproduce the 
observed action due to inhibition mechanisms, our motor system becomes active as if 
we were performing the action that we are observing.  
To date, there have been over 1,900 published papers on mirror neurons 
(derived from a PubMed search using: ‘‘mirror neuron’’ OR ‘‘mirror neurons’’), with 
most of these studies reporting the results of experiments on human participants. Some 
of these studies have employed action observation and execution tasks, analogous to 
those used in the original monkey investigations, to uncover mirroring activity 
(e.g., Chong et al., 2008, Gazzola & Keysers, 2009, Kilner et al., 2009; Molenberghs 
et al., 2012). Others have used tasks involving stimuli across a range of modalities, 
including auditory stimuli (e.g., Gazzola et al., 2006, Lewis et al., 2005; Tettamanti et 
al., 2005), somatosensory stimuli (e.g., Keysers et al., 2004; Schaefer et al., 2009), and 
Iacoboni visual stimuli (e.g., Molnar-Szakacs et al., 2006; Newman-Norlund et al., 
2010).  
According to review articles (see Fabbri-Destro & Rizzolatti, 2008; Keysers 
& Fadiga, 2008; Keysers et al., 2010; Cattaneo & Rizzolatti, 2009; Rizzolatti & 
Fabbri-Destro, 2010; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010), there is now compelling evidence 
for an equivalent mirroring system in humans. The putative human MNS comprises 
the frontal lobe regions of the pars opercularis within the inferior frontal gyrus and the 
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adjacent ventral premotor cortex, as well as the inferior parietal lobule (Rizzolatti, 
2005; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). The frontal regions are considered important for 
coding the goal of the action, motor planning, and execution (Gallese et al., 1996) 
while the parietal region is involved in body representation. 
While these regions correspond well with the macaque’s MNS, recent studies 
of humans reveal that widespread brain areas show shared activity during observation 
and execution of the same behaviour. Such evidence suggests that mirror neurons are 
present throughout the motor system, including the ventral and dorsal premotor 
cortices, the supplementary motor area and primary motor cortex, as well as different 
regions of the parietal cortex, including the superior parietal lobule and the 
supramarginal gyrus of the somatosensory cortex (Gazzola & Keysers, 2009). Other 
regions frequently implicated in a mirroring function include the superior temporal 
sulcus in the temporal lobe, and the cerebellum.. 
While widespread neural regions show mirroring activity, in a neuroimaging 
meta-analysis of 144 studies across a range of tasks, Molenberghs et al. (2012) 
concluded that neural activation could consistently be localised to the classical MNS 
regions of the inferior frontal gyrus, the inferior parietal lobe and the pre-motor cortex. 
They termed these regions the ‘core network’. Activation of the core network is 
thought to allow an internal represention or ‘simulation’ of others’ motor actions to be 
mapped onto one’s own motor circuitry. It has been proposed that the core network 
provides a direct understanding of the mechanics of simple actions (Iacoboni et al., 
1999; Maeda et al., 2002), as well as the learning of complex motor acts without 
practice (Buccino et al., 2004) through the mapping of these actions onto the 
observer’s motor system.  
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However, the activation of the core mirror neuron network does not simply 
entail a duplication of an observed action; rather, mirror neurons directly specify the 
goal of the action. This was demonstrated in a classic fMRI study by Iacoboni et al. 
(2005) where participants watched three types of stimuli: simple grasping hand 
actions; grasping hand actions with an intention (eg., grasping a cup and drinking from 
it); or scenes of objects.  The observation of intentional actions, compared to the other 
two conditions, yielded a significantly greater increase in activation in parts of the core 
mirror neuron system, particularly the inferior frontal gyrus and the premotor cortex. 
Thus, premotor neurons that are active during the observation and execution of an 
action, may not only be involved in action recognition, but also in understanding the 
“why” of an action, or in other words, the intention behind it (see Gallese et al., 2005).  
Further to this, parietal mirror neurons appear to discharge differently for a 
single motor act (i.e., grasping a cup) depending on the sequence of movements (i.e., 
bringing the cup to the mouth or placing the cup on a saucer). This property of parietal 
mirror neurons suggests that they discriminate identical motor acts according to the 
context in which these acts are embedded. Thus, mirror neuron parietal neurons not 
only code the observed motor act but also appear to allow the prediction of future 
actions, and henceforth the overall intention that is promoting the action. It has been 
suggested that the core network perception-action mirroring mechanism is the neural 
correlate of a basic form of mentalising ability (Gallese et al., 2005).   
While core network mirror neurons appear to assist with understanding the 
intention, goal and outcome of others’ actions, neuroimaging studies also indicate that 
activation may occur in other mirror neuron areas. These regions, which are referred 
to as the ‘extended network’, engage non-motor functions depending on the respective 
modality of the task and the type of stimuli used (for review see Molenberghs et al., 
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(2012). For instance, a process that is parallel to the observation of motor actions 
generally occurs when we observe another’s emotional facial expressions, involving 
additional activation of some of the emotion-related neural areas that are active when 
the same emotion state is experienced by the self (Molenberghs et al., 2012). For 
example, Carr et al. (2003) measured brain activity using fMRI while participants were 
either observing or imitating emotional facial expressions. They found the observation 
of emotional facial expressions activated the same brain motor regions that are 
activated during the imitation of emotional facial expressions, supporting the role of 
action representation for understanding the emotions of others. Importantly, however, 
Carr et al. (2003) also found that areas outside of the core mirror neuron system, 
particularly the anterior insula and the anterior cingulate cortex, were consistently 
activated during both the observation, and the imitation, of facial expressions. 
Similarly, Wicker et al. (2003) performed an fMRI study in which participants 
observed video clips showing facial expressions of disgust whilst inhaling aversive 
(disgust-producing) odorants themselves. Both conditions activated the same sites in 
the anterior insula and the anterior cingulate cortex, indicating that observing and 
expressing an emotion activate overlapping neural regions.  
Further, a study published by Calder et al. (2000) showed that a patient with 
Huntington’s Disease who had suffered damage to the insula was not only selectively 
impaired in recognising disgust in facial expressions and other modalities, but also 
selectively impaired in subjectively experiencing disgust as measured by the intensity 
of his reaction to emotion-provoking scenarios using a questionnaire that measured 
the experience of disgust and other emotions. While the interpretation of single case 
studies requires caution, this study appears to suggest that once an individual has lost 
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the capacity to experience and express a given emotion, they may not be able to easily 
recognise the same emotion in others.  
Research has also found evidence for a mirror phenomenon occurring in 
human pain-related neurons, consistent with a proposal by Craig (2003), based on his 
detailed anatomical observations, that pain is a homeostatic emotion that reflects the 
internal condition of the body. For instance, Hutchison et al. (1999) studied pain-
related neurons in the ACC of locally anesthetized awake humans (prior to excision 
of the ACC for the treatment of psychiatric disorder) and found that the same neurons 
responded to pinprick stimulation applied to the patient’s hand and observation of 
pinpricks being applied to the examiner’s fingers. Further, Singer et al. (2004) found 
that observing body parts in painful situations was associated with activity in the 
somatosensory cortex (body representation) region of the MNS while knowledge that 
a loved one was experiencing pain activated the somatosensory cortex, the insula and 
ACC. Singer et al. (2004) concluded that the insula and ACC mediate our empathic 
response to pain experienced by others. 
The studies outlined above suggest that emotion-related mirroring neurons in 
the insula and ACC allow a direct first-person understanding of others' emotions due 
to the activation of the same circuits responsible for our own emotional responses. The 
insula and ACC have strong neural connectivity both to the core MNS network, such 
as medial and premotor regions of the frontal lobes, and limbic structures such as the 
amygdala, suggesting they serve to relay action representation information to limbic 
areas that process emotional content (Carr et al., 2003). Further, fMRI studies indicate 
that the right anterior insula supports a conscious representation of visceral responses 
(e.g., Carr et al., 2003; Critchley et al., 2004). The frequent co-activation of the insula 
and ACC in task-based studies (Menon & Uddin, 2010), along with the strong bi-
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directional neural connections between them (Carr et al., 2003), has led to the 
suggestion that together these structures form a network that helps to generate 
heightened awareness or saliency of emotional stimuli through the integration of 
sensory and motor information from the mirror neuron system with somatovisceral 
signals from the internal milieu (see Critchley et al., 2004; Menon & Uddin, 2010).  
However, this may not be the case for individuals with alexithymia. Brain 
imaging studies have found different patterns of activation in certain neural structures 
among individuals with higher scores on the TAS-20. Specifically, Moriguchi et al. 
(2006) asked participants to observe hand-grasping movements and found greater 
activation in premotor and parietal regions of the mirror neuron system (MNS) among 
individuals with TAS-20 scores in the clinical range compared to those with scores in 
the normal range. Similarly, Karlsson, Naatanen and Stenman (2008) found greater 
activity in motor-related MNS regions as well as decreased ACC activity in 
individuals scoring above TAS-20 clinical cut-off levels compared to those below cut-
off when viewing emotion-eliciting video clips.  
Among typical populations, the insula and ACC network is the proposed 
mechanism that allows the perception of others’ emotions to generate a re-
experiencing of the relevant emotion in one’s self (see Carr et al., 2003; Critchley, 
Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004; Damasio et al., 2000; Singer et al., 2004). 
In other words, observing or imagining another person in a particular emotional state 
automatically activates the insula and ACC to form an emotion simulation of that same 
state in oneself (see Decety & Jackson, 2004; Gallese, 2001; Gallese & Goldman, 
1998; Preston & de Waal, 2002). These results fit nicely with the assumption that the 
function of the MNS is to decode and to understand other people’s actions (Carr et al., 
2003; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; but for Theory of 
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Mind (TOM) explanation see Decety, 2010; for critique of mirror neuron hypothesis 
see Hickok & Hauser, 2010).  
Further, Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, & Hess (2010) have put forward an 
embodied theory of facial emotion recognition, in their paper titled, The Simulation of 
Smiles (SIMS) model: Embodied simulation and the meaning of facial expression. This 
model draws upon neuroscientific work to provide a comprehensive embodied 
account of how individuals might recognise facial expressions through the activation 
of motor and “somatosensory” simulation processes. Niedenthal et al. (2010) describe 
how, as a result of eye contact, motor simulation is first generated in cortical motor 
regions, which contributes to the meaning of the expression. This motor simulation, 
along with learned knowledge and expectations about the meanings of facial 
expressions, is argued to generate a corresponding somatosensory simulation that 
includes attendant feelings for use in interpretation. Interestingly, one recent study by 
Fujiwara (2018) has confirmed that individuals with higher mean TAS-20 scores show 
reduced viewing preference for facial eye regions than those with lower TAS-20 
scores. If eye contact is a basic mechanism of embodied simulation (see Niedenthal et 
al., 2010), then reduced eye contact among individuals with alexithymia may be an 
indication that they experience dysfunctional or reduced activation of embodied 
simulation processes.  
Another proposed mechanism of embodied simulation is facial mimicry. This 
phenomenon has received considerable research attention. While the assumption that 
facial mimicry is an inherent part of the process of the re-experiencing of others’ 
emotions has generally been accepted among embodied or simulation theories, there 
is still some theoretical discussion regarding the function of facial mimicry and, in 
particular, whether it reflects the activation of underlying motor, emotional or 
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Dimberg (1982) first demonstrated that the mere presentation of angry and 
happy facial expressions often elicits facial muscle activity congruent with the 
observed facial expression. Since then, research has demonstrated that individuals 
across the human lifespan imitate the facial expressions of others (Doherty, 1998; 
Esteves, Parra, Dimberg, & Ohman, 1994; Lang, Greenwald, Bradfootnoteley, & 
Hamm, 1993; Lanzetta & Orr, 1986; Lundqvist, 1995; Lundqvist & Dimberg, 1995; 
Meltzoff, 1990; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1989; Meltzoff & Prinz, 2002; O’Toole & 
Dubin, 1968).  
This muscle activity is described as ‘facial mimicry’ (see Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999; Dimberg & Petterson, 2000; Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg, 
Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). Facial mimicry occurs spontaneously and rapidly in 
nonclinical individuals approximately 300–400ms after stimulus exposure (Dimberg 
& Thunberg, 1998). As these facial reactions are subtle (i.e., “micro-expressions”) and 
relative rapid, their occurrence is typically imperceptible to the human eye. Facial 
mimicry appears to be an automatic and unconscious process because it occurs without 
awareness or conscious control and cannot be completely suppressed. For instance, 
facial mimicry occurs when stimuli are presented subliminally (Bailey & Henry, 2009; 
Dimberg and Lundqvist, 1990; Dimberg et al., 2000). Facial mimicry also occurs 
following explicit instructions or incentives not to react (Belot et al., 2013; Dimberg 
et al., 2002; Korb et al., 2010).  
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Several competing explanations as to the mechanism underlying facial 
mimicry responses have been proposed. The classic view sees facial mimicry as an 
automatic, motor-mimetic and non-affective response (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; 
Hatfield et al., 1993; Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Niedenthal et al., 
2001; Preston & de Waal, 2003). This model assumes that the perception of facial 
expressions automatically activates the same behaviour in the observer, due to a 
perception-action neural link that is devoid of input from cognitive or affective 
processes. The view that facial mimicry comprises a simple expression matching 
mechanism appears to be supported by the finding that neonates automatically mimic 
facial movements, such as tongue protrusions (e.g., Meltzoff, 1990). This suggests that 
facial mimicry can occur by means of an innate, non-emotional motor matching 
mechanism (Moody & McIntosh, 2011)8. 
An alternative view is that facial mimicry reactions are affective responses 
rather than simple motor matching responses. This view accommodates findings that 
facial mimicry is altered by the observer’s affective response to contextual factors. For 
instance, it has been well noted in the extant literature that facial mimicry may not 
occur to the same degree in response to all facial expressions. Particularly in those 
studies where the social context is relevant to the task, smiles are generally mimicked 
more than frowns (e.g., Jakobs, Manstead & Fischer, 2001). Bourgeois and Hess 
(2008) found that anger was mimicked when it was directed at a common adversary, 
but mimicry did not occur when angry facial expressions were directed toward 
participants themselves. They suggested that facial mimicry is produced preferentially 
 
8 Oostenbroek et al. (2016) argue that previous studies reporting that neonates automatically 
mimic facial movements, such as tongue protrusions, have employed limited control conditions. An 
alternative theory is that tongue protrusion represents an associate learning processes that is an innate 
adaption for tracking predictive relationships (see Cook et al., 2014; Oostenbroek et al., 2016). 
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to in-group members or those in a co-operative relationship with the observer. 
Similarly, Gump and Kulik (1997) reported that participants who face the same 
external threat as a confederate (thereby increasing the affiliation between them) were 
more likely to mimic the confederate. Hess and Fisher (2014) theorise that these 
findings suggest that facial mimicry does not merely reflect a perceptual–motor 
matching mechanism, but rather it may occur as a reaction to an emotion signal. They 
argue that the occurrence of facial mimicry depends on the relational context between 
the expressor (i.e., the stimulus) and the observer.  
Facial mimicry studies also suggest that eye contact might trigger an emotional 
simulation of the perceived facial expression and its correspondent feeling for use in 
interpretation. In a classic study by Bavelas, Black, Lemery and Mullett (1986), a 
confederate feigned experiencing an injury and produced an apparent pained facial 
expression. They demonstrated that the pattern and timing of participants’ facial 
mimicry of the confederate’s pained facial expression was modified by whether the 
confederate made eye contact with participants, with greater and more rapid mimicry 
observed when eye contact was made. Consistent with this initial finding, Schrammel 
and colleagues (2009) demonstrated that, when viewing emotional expressions, 
participants displayed greater facial mimicry and reported greater congruent affect 
under conditions of eye contact relative to a no-eye contact condition, indicating that 
eye contact modulates the mimicry and intensity of an experienced emotion.  
Findings from several studies appear to directly support the related proposal 
that mimicry depends on the meaning that the perceiver infers from the emotional 
expression. For instance, Hess, Houde and Fischer (2014) presented participants with 
images of neutral faces that were accompanied by written emotion labels of sadness 
and happiness. While the participants did not report experiencing a congruent feeling 
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state (indicating that the emotion labels were not responsible for inducing emotion in 
the participants), they nevertheless exhibited facial mimicry congruent with the verbal 
labels in the photographs. Further evidence is provided by studies which show that 
participants mimic obscured parts of the face (e.g., mouth) when presented with a 
facial emotion stimulus (Blaison, Hareli, Strauss, & Hess, 2012; Hess, Herrera, 
Bourgeois, & Blairy, 1997). These studies suggest that observers mimic their 
interpretations of facial expressions rather than simply mirror the physical expressions 
of the face (Hess & Fischer, 2014).  
While at first glance the apparently automatic nature of facial mimicry is 
problematic for this account, Hess and Fischer (2014) argue that the notion of context, 
goals, and intentions playing a role in moderating the mimicry response does not 
preclude the idea that facial mimicry is an automatic process. Importantly, they state 
that facial mimicry may be instantiated as a goal-dependent automatic process. 
A somewhat different model of facial mimicry is proposed by Kavanagh and 
Winkielman (2016). They argue that facial mimicry reflects the operation of an 
implicit learning process that primarily serves to acquire the appropriate bodily and 
emotional responses to social situations (these behavioural responses are thought to 
include facial expressions, gestures, accents and mannerisms). Kavanagh and 
Winkielman (2016) argue that individuals are more likely to mimic in-group members 
(such as those they like or know) because they represent a better source of learning. 
They argue that findings showing that observers do not mimic outgroup members, in 
fact they may do the opposite and produce ‘counter-mimicry’, such as the production 
of a fear expression to an angry facial expression stimulus (for examples, see Lanzettta 
& Englis, 1989; Carr et al., 2014), is consistent with the idea that facial mimicry is 
based on environmental reward structures. Kavanagh and Winkielman (2016) further 
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argue that mimicry of out-group members may be costly due to the internalisation of 
potentially inappropriate responses that may indicate the wrong group membership. In 
this model, acquired knowledge is considered implicit and automatically reproduced 
with limited conscious control. Once learned, action-response contingencies would 
then be expected to be generalise to new situations where the original model is absent.  
Wang and Hamilton (2012) have posited a Machiavellian theory of mimicry 
which also emphasises that facial mimicry responses are modulated by social factors. 
This model suggests that individuals advance their social standing by strategically 
exploiting facial mimicry. According to these authors, facial mimicry is a flexible and 
sophisticated mechanism that is driven by an evaluation of the social features in the 
current interaction. While this theory can easily accommodate findings that 
individuals produce more facial mimicry when they have a goal to affiliate with others, 
this model does not account for the automatic aspects of mimicry (Kavanagh & 
Winkielman, 2016). 
Brain imaging studies have attempted to advance our understanding of the 
processes underlying facial mimicry. According to embodied simulation theories, 
facial mimicry is inherently involved in the reactivation of motoric, somatosensory, 
affective and reward-related systems that represent the meaning of the observed action 
(Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, & Hess, 2010). The neural substrates of these 
systems are recognised as containing cells that fire in response to the perception of 
human actions or behaviours in others and during the execution of the same behaviours 
in one’s self, in other words, mirror neuron systems. Previous research has examined 
whether mirror neuron structures are activated when participants either passively view 
or intentionally imitate (i.e., participants execute facial expressions themselves) facial 
expressions of basic emotions.  
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Typically, in these studies, anger and happiness is examined9. During the 
observation and execution of emotional facial expressions, common activation occurs 
in the core MNS regions, particularly the inferior frontal gyrus and the inferior parietal 
lobe, as well as extended MNS regions, such as the superior temporal sulcus, medial 
temporal gyrus, insula, anterior cingulate cortex, amygdala, and somatosensory cortex 
(see Carr et al., 2003; Dapretto et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2006; Leslie et al., 2004; van 
der Gaag et al., 2007).  
While these findings suggest the involvement of the MNS in imitative facial 
behaviour, most of this imaging research has examined either the perception (i.e., 
passive viewing) of facial expressions or the intentional, voluntary imitation of facial 
expressions. However, a small number of studies have directly examined the 
relationship between the occurrence of the spontaneous, involuntary (i.e., automatic) 
facial mimicry of others’ facial expressions and activity in the human mirror neuron 
system. Schilbach et al. (2008) investigated this topic using a time-sensitive approach 
that involved comparing data from two prior studies that used an identical 
experimental paradigm. This involved contrasting functional imaging (fMRI) data 
collected by Schilbach et al. (2006) with data from a study by Mojzisch et al. (2006), 
where zygomaticus (the muscle involved in smiling) and corrugator (the muscle 
responsible for frowning) muscular activity was measured using EMG. In both 
experiments (i.e., Mojzisch et al., 2006; Schilbach et al. 2006) participants were shown 
virtual characters (or ‘avatars’) on screen whose facial expressions unfolded over a 
 
9 The question of emotion specificity is a longstanding topic of debate in the emotion literature 
(Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986; Hess & Fischer, 2013; Larsen et al., 2003; Recio et al., 2017). 
Some emotion theories postulate the existence of discrete basic emotions. These are said to be 
characterised by distinct biological and behavioural markers, including universally recognisable facial 
expressions (e.g., Ekman, 1999). Other researchers propose that emotion is defined by broader, 
dimensional concepts, such as core affect or valence and arousal (e.g., Barrett, 2011; Russell, 2003; 
Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, & Barsalou, 2013). 
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brief 333ms duration. The authors found enhanced activity of the MNS in the time 
window in which automatic facial mimicry occurred. Differential neural activity 
related to facial mimicry in response to the perception of facial expressions was 
observed in the inferior frontal gyrus of the MNS, which is responsible for motor 
simulation. While the authors argued that the high level of activity in motor-related 
regions was suggestive of a perceptual–motor mechanism underlying facial mimicry 
phenomena, increased activation did also extend beyond to other brain areas. The 
cingulate cortex, which is known to be involved in emotional processing (Kelly, 
Martino, & Uddin, 2009), was also highly activated. This suggests that both motor and 
emotion simulation processes may be associated with facial mimicry.  
Interestingly, Schilbach et al. (2008) also found evidence of elevated activation 
in the hippocampus, a region involved in memory (Britton, Taylor, Sudheimer, & 
Liberzon, 2006). Schilbach et al. speculated that individuals may use memory to better 
understand the meaning of others’ facial displays. A slightly different interpretation, 
however, is that activation of the hippocampus during facial mimicry reflects the 
activation of implicitly learned behavioural response contingencies (Kavanagh & 
Winkielman, 2016). A limitation of Schilbach et al.’s (2008) study is that facial muscle 
activity and fMRI imaging were not measured in the same participants.  
 Likowski et al. (2012) and Rymarczyk et al. (2018) addressed this limitation 
by simultaneously measuring zygomaticus and corrugator EMG activity and the blood 
oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) signal using fMRI of participants while they viewed 
emotional facial expressions. In both studies, facial mimicry reactions correlated 
significantly with activity in regions of interest in prominent parts of the core MNS 
responsible for motor simulation (e.g., the inferior frontal gyrus) and emotion 
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processing (e.g., the insula). This evidence again suggests that both motor and 
affective MNS regions are involved in facial mimicry 
Two behavioural studies have also attempted to disentangle motor from 
affective accounts of facial mimicry. Moody et al. (2007) manipulated participants’ 
emotional state and found that this modulated their EMG facial mimicry responses. 
Specifically, participants who underwent a fear induction produced fear responses to 
angry faces while those that did not produced angry responses to angry faces. This 
study does not rule out the involvement of motor processes in facial mimicry, 
however, as it is possible that spontaneous affective reactions and imitated expressions 
can compete. Kandice et al. (2019) investigated the effect of manipulating the position 
of stimuli on facial mimicry. They presented happy and angry stimuli in an inverted 
position to examine whether participants would produce a typical response involving 
greater zygomaticus activity to inverted happy faces compared to inverted angry faces, 
and greater corrugator activity to inverted angry faces compared to inverted happy 
faces. The authors argued that if facial mimicry reflects a purely motor matching 
mechanism, then an absence of facial mimicry would be expected when faces were 
presented in the inverted condition, while if facial mimicry involves affective 
processes, then the EMG response should remain constant when stimuli are inverted 
(see Lipp et al., 2009). The results indicated that facial mimicry was not disrupted by 
inversion, suggesting it does not reflect a purely motor matching reflexive reaction. 
However, this result should be interpreted with caution as it remains possible that 
facial landmarks may have been inverted and translated onto participants’ faces.  
The facial mimicry findings reviewed above are consistent with brain imaging 
studies showing that activation within the MNS architecture can also be modulated by 
factors such as acquired conditions and learning. For example, food-related stimuli 
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(hand grasping of food) elicit greater activity in the MNS when participants are hungry 
than when satiated (Cheng, Meltzoff & Decety, 2007). Expert pianists show stronger 
activation in their MNS in response to the sight or sound of piano playing than non-
musicians (Bangert et al., 2006; Haslinger et al., 2005). Further, evidence based on 
neuroimaging data suggests that simulation is highly sensitive to the social 
significance of observed actions. Gros, Panasiti and Chakrabarti (2015) demonstrated 
that functional connectivity between the ventral striatum, a region associated with 
reward processing, and the inferior frontal gyrus, an MNS region involved in motor 
planning, was stronger when participants observed faces conditioned with high 
financial reward in a card game paradigm compared to those conditioned with low 
financial reward. These findings demonstrate that reward conditioning effectively may 
modulate the extent of cortical motor-based simulation in response to facial 
expressions observed in others.  
If facial mimicry is a functional mechanism of simulation processes (although 
according to Jabbi and Keysers (2008) facial mimicry may not be a necessary 
condition of simulation, due to a hypothesised ‘as-if loop’ mechanism), and simulation 
processes help us to understand the actions of others, then the occurrence of facial 
mimicry should be related to facial emotion recognition ability. Support for this idea 
comes from studies showing that preventing facial mimicry of facial expressions 
makes people slower to identify facial expressions. For instance, Niedenthal et al. 
(2001) found that participants who could mimic facial expressions were quicker to 
detect a change in happy and sad facial expressions that were morphed into a 
continuum than those whose facial mimicry was blocked due to holding a pen between 
their teeth. Similarly, Stel and van Knippenberg (2008) found that preventing facial 
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mimicry of facial expressions by explicit instruction resulted in slower facial 
expression recognition, although this was the case for women and not men.  
Other studies have assessed the relationship between facial mimicry and the 
accuracy of facial expression recognition, with somewhat mixed results. Oberman 
et al. (2007) blocked facial mimicry on the lower half of participants’ faces using a 
bite manipulation and observed poorer recognition accuracy for the expressions of 
happiness and disgust, but no difference in accuracy of recognition of sadness or 
fear. Ponari et al. (2012) replicated these findings, and further demonstrated that 
blocking facial mimicry in the upper face resulted in poorer recognition of anger. 
Kunecke et al. (2014) found a positive correlation between individual differences in 
corrugator facial mimicry and emotion recognition accuracy to identify dynamic facial 
expressions. Maringer, Fischer, Krumhuber and Niedenthal (2011) found that 
participants who were free to mimic a smile were better at differentiating false from 
true smiles than those for whom mimicry was blocked due to biting on a pen. 
Similarly, Rychlowska et al. (2014) found that those who were free to mimic were 
better able to judge false from true smiles than those whose mimicry was blocked due 
to wearing a mouthguard.  
In contrast, two studies have reported null findings in regard to facial mimicry 
and facial emotion recognition accuracy. Blairy, Herrerra and Hess (1999) constructed 
still photograph facial expression stimuli at 50% intensity of expression to avoid 
potential ceiling effects in decoding accuracy. However, these stimuli were 
presented for a relatively long 10 second exposure period. No significant 
correlations were found between emotion recognition accuracy and facial mimicry 
as measured using EMG. This may be due to the use of static stimuli, which have 
been found to elicit lower levels of facial mimicry (e.g., Yoshikawa and Sato, 2008). 
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However, Hess and Blairy (2001) asked participants to identify videoclips of 
dynamic facial expressions and again no evidence of a link between facial mimicry 
and facial emotion recognition accuracy was found.  
Overall, despite these mixed findings, there does appear to be some 
promising evidence that facial mimicry helps to aid the process of emotion 
recognition. However, the exact conditions under which this occurs, and how this 
process takes place, still needs to be examined. Furthermore, while there have been 
suggestions in the literature than individuals with the personality construct 
alexithymia have poor facial emotion recognition, to date only two published studies 
have examined facial mimicry in individuals with alexithymia. These two studies shall 
now be described. 
Sonnby-Borgstrom (2009) investigated the relationship between alexithymia 
and spontaneous facial mimicry. Electromyographic activity of the corrugator (frown) 
muscle and zygomaticus (smile) muscles were measured in response to the 
presentation of static photographic images of angry, happy, sad and neutral facial 
expressions. Participants were divided into two groups designated as ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
alexithymia based on a median split of TAS-20 scores, with an equal number of males 
and females in each group. Problematically however, they were not pre-screened for 
co-morbid conditions, such as depression, and the mean TAS-20 score (52.49) of the 
so-called High Alexithymia group fell below the clinical cut-off TAS-20 score of 61 
indicating that the ‘high’ alexithymia group did not have a mean TAS-20 score that 
represented clinical levels of alexithymia.  
Sonnby-Borgstrom found that both groups responded with similar zygomatic 
facial mimicry responses, but the group with the higher TAS-20 scores showed less 
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corrugator facial mimicry in response to angry facial stimuli than the group with the 
lower TAS-20 scores. Interpreting these findings from an embodied simulation 
account, they argued that individuals with alexithymia may employ an affect 
regulation strategy involving the goal of greater attention and response to positive 
stimuli and avoidance of negative stimuli to avoid amplification of their tonic negative 
emotional state. An alternative interpretation, similar to that put forward by Hess and 
Fisher (2014) in relation to findings in the general emotion literature that smiles tend 
to be mimicked to a greater degree than frowns (e.g., Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Jakobs, 
Manstead & Fischer, 2001), is that the occurrence of mimicry depends on the 
relational context that is established between the expressor (in experimental laboratory 
contexts, the ‘expressor’ may be represented by the direct gaze of facial expression 
stimuli) and the observer. While speculative, it may be possible that individuals with 
alexithymia respond to contextual factors differently from controls. While further 
research is required to establish why the individuals with so-called high TAS-20 scores 
demonstrated less corrugator mimicry than those with low TAS-20 scores in Sonnby-
Borgstrom’s (2009) study, the conclusions that can be drawn from this study are 
limited given that participants assigned to the high TAS-20 group had scores that fell 
below the established cut-off score for alexithymia.  
In the other study investigating alexithymia from an embodied cognition 
perspective, Scarpazza, Ladavas, and Cattaneo (2018) examined mimicry, or ‘rapid 
facial reactions’ amongst participants who were screened for co-morbidity of 
neurological, medical or psychiatric disorders including depression. They measured 
alexithymia using the Italian version of the TAS-20 and the alexithymia module of the 
structured interview for the Diagnostic Criteria for Psychosomatic Research (DCPR, 
Mangelli et al. 2006). Participants were allocated to a High Alexithymia (HA) group 
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if they returned a TAS-20 score above the clinical cut-off score of 61 and a score of 3 
or more on the alexithymia module of the DCPR, or to a low alexithymia (LA) group 
if their TAS-20 score fell below 39 and they returned a score of less than 3 on the 
alexithymia module of the DCPR. EMG readings were taken from the supercilii and 
zygomaticus muscles whilst participants viewed static pictures of fearful, happy and 
neutral facial expressions or objects (there was no description provided as to the types 
of objects depicted) which were presented in a randomised order. To disguise the main 
purpose of the experiment, which was to measure facial EMG, fake electrodes were 
also applied to the left leg, arm and shoulder as part of a cover story that activity from 
several muscles throughout the body would be measured. Participants then made 
gender judgements on each trial using a key press response (in the Italian language 
every object has either a masculine or feminine form). The real outcome measures in 
this aspect of the study were the timing and amplitude of facial muscle activation.  
In this study, both the HA and LA group showed congruent zygomaticus 
mimicry responses involving increased activation to happy faces, but this response 
was delayed in the HA group compared to the LA group. Further, while the HA group 
did not show an increased corrugator response to any of the facial expressions, the LA 
group showed greater corrugator mimicry responses to the expression of fear than the 
other expressions. Scarpazza and colleagues interpreted these findings as suggesting 
that the embodied communication system responsible for facial mimicry may be intact 
but dysfunctional (i.e. delayed) in the HA group when responding to happy faces and 
impaired in responding to fearful faces. They suggested that this may be due to hypo-
activation of the amygdala among individuals with alexithymia and offered evidence 
from the general literature to support the role of the amygdala in the processing of 
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fearful faces, and the lesser involvement of the amygdala in the processing of happy 
faces.  
The main limitation of their study is the use of static facial stimuli. Research 
reviewed earlier (see Part Two of the Introduction) suggests that findings generated 
from static stimuli may not generalise to real-life interactions. Further, regarding the 
methodology chosen by Scarpazza et al. (2018), it is currently unknown what effect 
the mixed randomization of trials within blocks (where fearful, happy and neutral 
facial expressions and objects are presented as stimuli within the block of trials), may 
have on facial mimicry response rates and amplitude compared to trials of blocked 
emotion categories, which are typically employed in research.  
The only other investigation of facial mimicry in alexithymia known to me was 
reported by Dawes, McDonald and Rushby (2013) in a conference abstract. While the 
full report of this study does not appear in a published journal, their results show a 
very interesting trend that is worthy of note. They divided 59 participants into two 
groups based on TAS-20 scores, with 36 participants scoring within the normal range, 
and 23 in the “moderate to high range” (they did not report cut-off scores and mean 
scores). Contrary to the results of Sonnby-Borgstrom (2009), they found that the 
higher scoring TAS-20 group showed greater corrugator activity to angry faces in a 
static stimuli presentation condition, and greater zygomaticus activity in a dynamic 
stimuli presentation condition, relative to the group with lower scores on TAS-20. The 
authors suggested that these results indicate that a higher level of alexithymia may be 
associated with increased facial mimicry or “hyper-mimicry”. Such a result raises the 
possibility that individuals with alexithymia could use a compensatory mechanism 
that increases their facial mimicry reactions. (In a similar vein, the notion of 
compensation has been proposed by Sucksmith et al. (2013) to explain how first-
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degree relatives of children with autism who show reduced neural responses in face 
processing areas such as the fusiform gyrus and the superior temporal sulcus may 
nevertheless perform equivalently to controls on emotion recognition tasks).  
It is not surprising, given the existence of just two published studies on facial 
mimicry among people with alexithymia, that there is a limited understanding of this 
topic. Furthermore, while the embodied simulation perspective is the dominant 
framework for interpreting findings on facial mimicry, an embodied perspective has 
not been integrated into theoretical proposals of alexithymia. Argueably, the most 
prominent theories of alexithymia are cognitive-developmental suppositions, notably 
Lane and Swartz’s (1987) Levels of Emotional Awareness model. This model was later 
revised by Lane, Ahern, Schwartz and Kaszniak (1997) to include neuroimaging 
findings. The revised model, referred to variously as the Blindfeel hypothesis or the 
Interoceptive Deficit Theory of Alexithymia posited that alexithymia results from a 
neural disconnection syndrome involving reduced activation of the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), a structure they thought was responsible for the interoceptive ability to 
consciously represent internal signals as feelings. There has been renewed scientific 
interest into interoception and alexithymia (e.g., Brewer, Cook, & Bird, 2016; Herbert, 
Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011; Longarzo et al., 2015; Trevisan et al., 2019). Interoceptive 
awareness and alexithymia shall be discussed further in the following section. 
 
Interoception and alexithymia 
Interoception is broadly defined as the ability to perceive one’s internal 
states. Lane, Ahern, Schwartz and Kaszniak (1997) first proposed that alexithymia 
involves an interoceptive deficit in ‘emotional awareness’, which refers to the ability 
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to be aware of one’s subjective feelings. Their proposal was supported by positron 
emission tomography (PET) data collected by Lane et al. (1996, 1997). In the 1996, 
1997 studies, participants were administered the Levels of Emotional Awareness 
Scale (LEAS: Lane et al., 1990), which is described as a psychometric measure of 
the capacity to be consciously aware of emotion (on the LEAS, respondents report 
how they and another would feel in emotion-evoking situations, with scoring based 
on the “degree of specificity” of the emotion terms used in their descriptive 
accounts). After completing the LEAS, participants underwent PET scanning to 
obtain measures of blood flow while happiness, sadness and disgust were induced by 
film and recall of personal experiences. The highest correlation between LEAS 
scores and blood flow was in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Based on these 
results, and with reference to findings from other studies that suggested that blow 
flow in the ACC increases as a function of conscious awareness of stimuli (Corbetta 
et al., 1990, 1991; Pardo et al., 1990; Bench et al., 1993; Petersen et al., 1988; Frith 
et al., 1991; Paus et al., 1993). Lane et al. (1997) proposed that the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) was the neuro-anatomical structure responsible for a lack of emotional 
awareness in alexithymia.  
Lane et al. (1997) theorised that alexithymia reflects a complete or partial 
neural disconnection between the ACC and associated limbic structures. They 
suggested that this may result from traumatic stress in childhood, which is then self-
modulated by directing attention away from internal states of painful affect. Lane et 
al. stated that once such patterns are established, they could be difficult to reverse, 
leading to a lack of associative pairing between bodily sensations of emotions and 
triggering events and the subsequent disuse of neural pathways.  
 63 
In support of Lane et al.’s (1997) proposal that alexithymia is underpinned by 
a dysfunction of the ACC, numerous morphological studies have confirmed that 
alexithymia is associated with reduced size of the ACC (see Berthoz et al., 2002; 
Borsci et al., 2009; Gundel et al., 2004; Karlsson, Naatanen & Stenman, 2008; 
Paradiso et al., 2008). Studies using fMRI have further documented reduced activation 
of the ACC among participants with high TAS-20 scores (e.g., Berthoz et al., 2002; 
Karlsson, Naatanen & Stenman, 2008). An EEG functional connectivity study has also 
shown that higher TAS-20 scores are associated with a decrease in connectivity within 
the neural network responsible for the processing of emotional information (see Craig, 
2009) involving regions of the ACC, insula and associated limbic system structures. 
Since Lane, Ahern, Schwartz and Kaszniak’s (1997) proposal, findings from 
neuroscience have indicated that it is the insula, in conjunction with the ACC, that is 
primarily responsible for interoception. The insula is engaged when individuals attend 
to internal bodily states such as pain, temperature and heart rate (Critchley, 2004; 
Peyron et al., 2000; Williams et al., 2000; Zaki, Davis & Ochsner, 2012), suggesting 
that the insula is involved in the perception of one's internal bodily state. Moreover, 
the insula is also involved in experiencing emotion10. The right anterior insula cortex 
is activated by a wide variety of emotion elicitation tasks and types of cues (Kober et 
al., 2008; Lindquist et al., 2011; Singer et al., 2004; Wager & Feldman Barrett, 2004; 
Wicker et al., 2003) and also correlates with participants' subjective ratings of their 
visceral awareness (Critchley, 2004).  
 
10 Interestingly, impaired insula functioning is also implicated in poor recognition of facial 
expressions of emotion. For instance, Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper and Damasio (2000) 
demonstrated that patients with lesions in the insula showed poorer performance in classifying facial 
expressions than patients without such lesions. Further, Calder et al. (2000) showed that a patient with 
Huntington’s Disease who had damage to the insula was impaired in recognising disgust in facial 
expressions. 
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Altered size and activity of the insula has been identified among individuals 
with high TAS-20 scores. For instance, Kano et al. (2003) reported reduced cerebral 
blood flow in the insula in those with high TAS-20 scores compared to those with low 
TAS-20 scores in response to angry faces. In a morphology study, Borsci et al. (2009) 
found a negative correlation between TAS-20 scores and the volume of grey matter in 
the insula. In an fMRI study by Reker et al. (2009) that assessed brain activity in 
response to masked images of facial emotion, TAS-20 scores were negatively 
correlated with insula activity. Reker et al. (2009) hypothesized that impaired 
interoceptive processing may be occurring in alexithymia. An fMRI study by Silani et 
al. (2008) also identified a strong negative association between TAS-20 scores and 
activity in the anterior insula during a task that required participants to assess their 
feelings in response to unpleasant pictures. These results were also interpreted as 
suggesting that alexithymia may reflect an impairment in interoceptive awareness.  
Apart from brain imaging, attention has turned to the broad question of 
individual differences in the interoceptive awareness of bodily signals. New 
theoretical models have emerged to explain the process of interoception. These include 
Quattroki and Friston’s (2014) oxytocin model of interoception, which conceives of 
the brain as employing Bayesian algorithms that continually update ‘internal models 
of the world’ based on sensory information. These expectations assign emotional 
affordance (or salience or meaning) to certain interoceptive signals, for example, 
heartbeat, or exteroceptive cues, such as eye gaze and facial expressions.  
While theorical models of interoception are being formulated, past research on 
interoceptive awareness has been somewhat negatively impacted by basic 
methodological and conceptual issues (see Trevisan et al., 2019). This was partly due 
to a lack of a coherent terminology, which created confusion as to how to define and 
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operationalise the different aspects of interoception. These terminological issues have 
now been clarified (see Murphy, Catmur & Bird, 2018). However, as many 
interoceptive processes operate beneath conscious awareness and control (e.g., cardiac 
cycles, respiration, salivation and digestive processes), measuring awareness of these 
signals remains difficult to quantify (Trevisan et al., 2019). It has also been noted that 
performance on these tasks is confounded by numerous factors, such as body mass 
index, blood pressure, and resting heart rate (Murphy, Brewer, Hobson, Catmur, & 
Bird, 2018).  
Perhaps not surprisingly then, research examining the relationship between 
alexithymia and the interoceptive awareness of body signals is mixed, with reports of 
negative associations  (e.g., Fiene, Ireland, & Brownlow, 2018; Herbert, Herbert, & 
Pollatos, 2011; Naring and van der Staak, 1995; Shah, Hall, Catmur, & Bird, 2016) 
and positive associations (e.g., Ernst et al., 2014; Scarpazza, Ladavas, & di Pellegrino, 
2015). Other studies report null findings (e.g., Christensen, Gaigg, & Calvo-Merino, 
2018; Zamariola, Vlemincx, Corneille, & Luminet, 2018). This issue may also be 
complicated by findings that individuals with alexithymia have an increased difficulty 
distinguishing between physical and emotional interoceptive signals (Brewer, Cook & 
Bird, 2017; Longarzo et al., 2014). It has been suggested that individuals with 
alexithymia may pay increased attention to their physical bodily sensations, leading to 
an amplification of such signals which may then interfere with their interpretation of 
emotional interoceptive information (e.g., Quattrocki & Friston, 2014; Longarzo et al., 
2015; Zeng, 2014).   
While there have been mixed findings in relation to the awareness of physical 
signals of interoception in alexithymia, research investigating the awareness of 
internal emotion states among individuals with alexithymia has been more consistent. 
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However, aside from brain imaging and electrophysiological methods, researchers 
must measure emotional processes that are available to conscious report, which is 
subject to bias and demand characteristics. Nevertheless, a variety of methods has been 
used to examine emotional awareness in alexithymia. For instance, using an emotional 
imagery exercise, Mantani, Okamoto, Shirao, Okada, and Yamawaki (2005) reported 
a trend among those with high TAS-20 scores to report lower intensity of emotions 
than those with TAS-20 scores below cut-off on a 10-point visual analog scale during. 
Laboratory studies by Luminet et al. (2004) and Stone and Nielson (2001) found that 
groups with high TAS-20 scores supplied fewer emotion-related words than controls 
to describe their response to emotion-eliciting slides (e.g., pictures of snakes to 
represent the emotion category of fear). Generally, these findings support the idea of 
an interoceptive deficit in perceiving emotional signals in alexithymia.  
One component of emotional awareness that has not been examined in relation 
to alexithymia concerns the interoceptive ability to perceive subjective emotional 
states corresponding directly to feedback signals produced from bodily changes in 
facial expressions. A discussion of the facial feedback literature will now follow. 
 
Facial Feedback Hypothesis 
The idea that facial expressions influence subjective feelings dates back to 
early works by Darwin (1872) and James (1884), who proposed that the outward 
expression of emotion affects the intensity of an emotional experience, with James 
arguing that bodily changes following the perception of an emotion-inducing stimulus 
is the emotion. James (1884) outlined in early discussions of his emotion theory how 
several types of bodily responses contributed to the feeling of various emotions. He 
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postulated these to be facial expressions (e.g., furrowed brow) and expressive behavior 
(e.g., hitting). Another type of bodily response that contributed to the feeling of 
various emotions was activity within the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous 
system, including heart rate, breathing rate, digestive activity etc. (For a more 
complete account of these early theories of emotion, see Dror, 2014).  
A substantial amount of research has since examined the idea, which is now 
referred to as the facial-feedback hypothesis, that the production of a facial expression 
elicits a corresponding change in one’s emotional experience. For example, Flack, 
Ekman and Friesen (2005) instructed participants to contract muscles relating to 
expressions of anger, happiness, sadness, and fear whilst rating their self-experience 
of each emotion. They found the ratings of emotion were significantly higher when 
producing the corresponding facial expression (for examples of similar findings, see 
Adelman & Zajonc, 1989; Andréasson, 2010; Davey, Sired, Jones, Meeten, & Dash, 
2013; Dethier, Blairy, Rosenberg, & McDonald, 2013; Dimberg, & Söderkvist, 2011; 
Duclos et al., 1989; Flack, 2006; Flack, Laird, & Cavallaro, 1999; Laird, 1974; Laird, 
1984; Laird & Bresler, 1992; Strack et al., 1988). 
Conversely, studies have also found that inhibiting facial expressions is 
associated with a reduction of emotional experience. For example, Davis, Senghas, 
Brandt and Ochsner (2010) found that patients who had been administered botulinum 
toxin (BOTOX) to their smile muscles experienced an attenuation of happiness to 
positive emotion-eliciting video clips. Preventing negative expressions is associated 
with a reduction in negatively valenced feelings (e.g., Bush, Barr, McHugo, & 
Lanzetta, 1989; Davis, Senghas, & Ochsner, 2009; Duclos & Laird, 2001; Laird et al., 
1994; van Swearingen, Cohn, & Bajaj-Luthra, 1999). Using a different type of design, 
Lewis and Bowler (2009) found that clinical participants who received forehead 
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BOTOX injections to prevent frowning reported lower anxiety and depression. 
However, other studies report that inhibiting facial expressions reduces physiological 
responses, but not feelings (Gross, 1998; Gross & Levenson, 1993, 1997). Findings 
relating to the facial expressions of surprise and disgust have been less consistent (for 
example, significant effects were reported by Lewis, 2012, while null effects were 
reported by Reisenzein, Studtmann, & Horstmann, 2013). Laird and Lacasse (2014) 
have suggested this may be due to surprise and disgust relying more heavily upon cues 
from other bodily responses, such as expressive behaviours or visceral feedback. In 
summary, while the facial feedback findings are not always consistent, particularly for 
emotions such as surprise and disgust (e.g., Reisenzein, Studtmann, & Horstmann, 
2013), adopting facial expressions has been shown to increase congruent emotional 
feelings, and preventing facial expressions has been found to inhibit feelings.  
Despite this, some researchers have raised the possibility that facial feedback 
effects are driven by demand characteristics (e.g., Cannon, 1927; Buck, 1980; 
Feldman-Barrett, 2006). Strack, Martin and Stepper (1988) introduced the first 
incidental facial feedback paradigm11, the pen-in-mouth procedure, to address the role 
of participant awareness. They measured participant’s ratings of the ‘funniness’ of 
cartoons while they either held a pen between their teeth, causing a contraction of the 
zygomatic muscle, consistent with smiling, or held a pen between their lips, which 
made it difficult to contract the zygomatic muscle. They found that participants judged 
cartoons as funnier while holding the pen between their teeth, suggesting that a 
 
11 Incidental paradigms, such as the pen-in-mouth technique, provide an indirect means of 
producing or inhibiting facial expressions. For instance, when participants hold a pen between their 
teeth, the same muscles used in smiling are activated. This means that it is not necessary to directly 
instruct participants to produce a smile, which may reduce demand characteristics by decreasing the 
likelihood of participants’ holding conscious expectations about the connection between their facial 
expressions and their subjective experiences. 
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positive facial expression led to a more positive evaluation of a stimulus. Since the 
original study, many subsequent studies have demonstrated that the pen-in-mouth 
procedure has the predicted effect on evaluative judgments (e.g., Arminjon, 
Preissmann, Chmetz, Duraku, Ansermet, & Magistretti, 2015; Bilewicz, & Kogan, 
2014; Blaesi, & Wilson, 2010; Chang, Zhang, Hitchman, Qiu, & Liu, 2014; Dzokoto, 
Wallace, Peters, & Bentsi-Enchill, 2014; Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 2007; Lobmaier, 
& Fischer, 2015; Sel, Calvo- Maringer, Krumhuber, Fischer, & Niedenthal, 2011; 
Merino, Tuettenberg, & Forster, 2015; Stel, van den Heuvel, & Smeets, 2008).  
Various other ways of disguising the intent of expression manipulations have 
also been employed to reduce the possibility of demand effects in research on the facial 
feedback effect. For instance, in an early study by Laird (1974), participants were told 
that they would be taking part in an experiment that aimed to measure the 
electromyographic (EMG) changes of facial muscles that accompanied perceptual 
tasks. Participants were interviewed following the task and those who identified the 
real purpose of the research, which was to examine whether facial expressions produce 
corresponding feelings, were excluded from the data analysis. The remaining 
participants reported feeling angrier when frowning and happier when smiling. Other 
cover stories used in these types of investigations to manipulate different facial 
expressions include pretending to study vowel pronunciations (Adelman & Zajonc, 
1989), contracting facial muscles in order to activate the cranial nerve system (Schnall 
& Laird, 2007) or investigating ways for paralysed people to learn to write with their 
mouths using a pen (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). The effective use of cover 
stories appears to indicate that facial feedback effects are not necessarily driven by 
demand characteristics, although this does not preclude the possibility that they 
sometimes are. 
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Debate was recently revived about demand characteristics affecting facial 
feedback effects after Wagenmakers et al. (2016) published a replication report based 
on the results of seventeen direct replication attempts, by independent psychology 
laboratories, of Strack, Martin and Stepper’s (1988) original pen-in-mouth study. 
Contrary to the findings of the original study, none of the seventeen replication 
experiments found evidence for the facial-feedback effect using the pen-in-the-mouth 
paradigm. This lead Wagenmakers et al. (2016) to question the validity of the pen-in-
the-mouth paradigm as a means of unobtrusively testing the facial-feedback 
hypothesis. 
However, Noah, Schul, and Mayo (2018) later sought to investigate whether 
the reason the facial feedback was absent in Wagenmakers et al.’s (2016) replication 
studies was due to the participants having a video camera directed at them. This aspect 
of the procedure differed from the original study where participants were not 
monitored, observed, or recorded. To test this hypothesis, Noah, Schul, and Mayo 
(2018) introduced two conditions: one without a camera (as in the original study), and 
one with a camera present during the experiment (as in the replication project). They 
found that the feedback effect was replicated in the condition where there was no 
camera and eliminated in the condition where a camera was present. Interestingly, 
Noah, Schul, and Mayo (2018) suggested that these findings indicated that monitoring 
or observing participants using a camera resulted in them reducing their reliance on 
internal cues when making judgements. They noted previous studies that have found 
people are more likely to disregard internal information and base their judgement on 
external cues when they are aware they are being observed (e.g., Steinmetz, Xu, 
Fishbach, & Zhang, 2016; Wiekens, 2009). 
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Admittedly, while a large amount of data supports the idea that inducing or 
inhibiting facial expressions produces corresponding changes in subjective reports of 
feelings, in many of the studies described above the effect sizes have been small. Laird 
and Lacasse (2014) note that in many facial feedback studies, most of the effects come 
from a subset of participants, while other participants are largely unaffected (see Laird 
& Crosby, 1974). They suggest that this may be due to individuals differing as to 
which sources of information they rely upon most heavily. Laird used the term ‘field-
independent’ to refer to those who are responsive to personal cues from their own 
bodily states, including facial expressions, actions and autonomic responses. In 
contrast, he used the term ‘field-dependent’ to describe those who rely more on cues 
from the social context, such as norms about situations, and social pressures (Laird & 
Berglas, 1975). For instance, field-dependent participants are more likely to feel 
hungry in response to external cues (Laird & Bresler, 1992), conform to pressure to 
change their attitudes (Comer, 1979) and be susceptible to demand characteristics 
(Kellerman & Laird, 1982) than field-independent individuals. There is some evidence 
that this individual difference in response to bodily versus external cues is stable over 
time (Bresler & Laird, 1983; Laird & Crosby, 1974) and consistent across a wide 
variety of behaviours (see Schnall, Abrahamson, & Laird, 2002; Schnall & Laird, 
2003; Schnall & Laird, 2007. See Laird & Bresler, 1992 for a review).  
Recently, Coles, Larsen, and Lench (2019) published a meta-analytic review 
generated from 138 experiments on the facial feedback effect. While they concluded 
that the results of the review provide cumulative evidence that facial feedback does 
influence emotional experience, generally only small effects were found for the 
moderators that featured in this research. For instance, studies that used procedures 
that limited participants’ awareness of the purpose of the manipulation (these were not 
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limited to the aforementioned pen-in-mouth paradigm) yielded effects of a similar 
magnitude to those studies that used protocols that did not limit participants 
awareness, confirming that facial feedback effects cannot be fully accounted for by 
demand characteristics. 
Coles, Larsen, and Lench (2019) also found no significant evidence of 
differences in the magnitude of the effects of facial expressions on discrete emotions 
versus dimensional12 levels of emotional experience (i.e., positive and negative 
valence). Moreover, while facial feedback studies typically do not compare facial 
feedback among discrete emotions, Coles, Larsen, and Lench (2019) found effects of 
a similar size (small to medium) among self-reports of happiness, sadness, anger, and 
disgust. The effect sizes for fear and surprise did not statistically differ from zero, 
however these estimates were based on relatively few effect sizes. These findings 
indicate that facial feedback effects may not significantly differ according to the type 
of discrete emotion measured. 
Evidence was found by Coles, Larsen, and Lench (2019) for larger effects in 
the presence of some types of stimuli (e.g., emotional sentences and imagery) than 
others (e.g., emotional pictures). They also found large amounts of heterogeneity 
within different stimulus types, suggesting that even within a group of studies using 
similar types of stimuli, the magnitude of facial feedback effects may be affected by 
other methodological choices, such as the stimulus presentation mode. These findings, 
 
12 Longstanding debate regarding the effects of facial feedback on dimensional versus discrete 
levels of emotional experience remain unresolved (Coles, Larsen and Lench, 2019). As this issue is 
arguably not of direct relevance to the current series of experiments and it is considered beyond the 
scope of this thesis, this debate will not be elaborated on here. 
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as with the study by Wagenmakers et al. (2016), demonstrate that minute differences 
in the experimental protocol might lead to significant changes in the outcomes. 
Coles, Larsen, and Lench (2019) concluded their meta-review by stating that 
given the large degree of heterogeneity in facial feedback effects, and the small effects 
that were found for the moderators featured in the studies they reviewed, that it 
appeared likely that other moderators of facial feedback effects exist that were not 
included in their analysis. They further acknowledged that a potentially important 
source of heterogeneity in facial feedback research may be individual differences in 
the degree to which people attend to their bodily cues. Unfortunately, Coles, Larsen, 
and Lench (2019) were not able to determine the magnitude of such an effect. This is 
because the 138 studies they examined in their meta-analysis did not assess individual 
differences in the degree to which people believe they attend to internal or external 
cues and use these cues to make judgements. In fact, as with the Wagenmakers’ et al. 
(2016) study, the researchers also did not directly consider how experimental 
procedures may influence the degree to which participants attended to bodily cues or 
situational cues (Coles, Larsen, & Lench, 2019).  
The view that individuals differ in their responsiveness to internal versus 
external cues overlaps conceptually with the personality construct of alexithymia. 
Individuals with alexithymia have characteristically been described as having reduced 
sensitivity to their bodily signals and reduced monitoring of their feeling states (e.g., 
Naring & van der Staak, 1995; Roedema & Simons, 1999). They are also characterised 
by a propensity to be guided by external cues or social norms (Parker et al., 1997; 
Zackheim, 2007). Unfortunately, the role of alexithymia as a potential moderator of 
facial feedback effects has not been given sufficient research attention.  
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Summary of Part Three 
Traditional cognitive science views emotion recognition as an abstract, 
inferential process that requires access to conceptual knowledge (also referred to by 
theorists as ‘emotion schemata’) stored in semantic memory. In contrast, embodied 
accounts of cognition consider emotion recognition to involve the sensory cortices and 
the brain systems responsible for action, perception and emotion. This claim is 
supported by research showing a coupling between cognitive-level representations and 
modal systems. Further support for embodied theories of cognition has emerged with 
the discovery of mirror neurons. The ‘core’ mirror neuron system comprises regions 
within the the medial prefrontal lobes and premotor area, inferior parietal lobe and 
inferior frontal gyrus. Mirror neurons in these areas facilitate action understanding by 
matching observed actions with their corresponding motor representations in the 
observer’s brain. These motor representations form an internal re-enactment (or 
‘simulation’) of the observed action from a first-person or ‘embodied’ perspective, as 
if the observer were performing the same action themselves. Motor-based simulation 
also appears to provide an understanding of the mechanics of an action, including the 
intention, goal and outcome. 
The human mirror neuron system is thought to represent not only the physical 
aspects of an action, but also the feelings and motivations associated with an action. 
This is hypothesised to occur through the activation of a partially separable ‘extended’ 
mirror neuron system. The extended MNS is represented by the insula and anterior 
cingulate cortex and other structures within the limbic system, such as the amygdala. 
This extended system is thought to mediate our capacity to process or understand the 
emotions of others through linking the actions, emotions, and intentions of others with 
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neural structures involved in the planning and experiencing of the same processes 
within one’s self.  
Embodied theories of cognition view facial mimicry and facial feedback as 
integral to the process of recognising others’ facial expressions. Facial mimicry refers 
to congruent facial expressions that rapidly occur in response to the observation of 
others’ facial expressions. While facial mimicry reactions appear to be automatic and 
unconscious because they occur spontaneously without awareness or conscious 
control and cannot be completely suppressed, they may be influenced by contextual 
and motivational factors. This suggests that facial mimicry is a goal-dependent 
automatic process. Facial feedback refers to the phenomenon of afferent feedback 
from the facial musculature inducing a corresponding emotion in the observer. Both 
facial mimicry and facial feedback are thought to facilitate our understanding of the 
observed facial expressions of others.  
Despite a growing literature on facial mimicry, just two published studies (i.e., 
Scarpazza, Ladavas, & Cattaneo, 2018; Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2009) have examined 
facial mimicry in alexithymia. What is still unknown is whether individuals with 
alexithymia can gain a first-person understanding of others’ emotional states. Further 
investigation of this issue, as well as an integration of existing theory of alexithymia 
with advances in our knowledge of the role of embodied cognition, forms the 





Experiment 1(a) - Alexithymia and Facial Emotion Recognition  
 
The ability to recognise emotion from facial expressions is considered 
essential to successful interpersonal functioning (e.g., Halberstadt, Denham, & 
Dunsmore, 2001; Lanciano & Curci, 2014; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). This is due to 
the valuable information facial emotion provides about others’ subjective feelings, 
intentions and motivations, as well as feedback about the effects of one’s own 
communication or behaviour on others (e.g., Blair, 2003; Feldman et al., 1991; 
Halberstadt, Denham, & Dunsmore, 2001). Accordingly, a wide range of research 
demonstrates that a greater ability to accurately read facial emotion messages is 
associated with better interpersonal functioning and improved outcomes in many 
psychological, social, and physical health domains (e.g., Austin, Saklofske, & Egan, 
2005; Ciarrochi et al., 2000; Day, Therrien, & Carroll, 2005; Elfenbein et al., 2007; 
Halberstadt, Denham, & Dunsmore, 2001; Halberstadt & Hall, 1980; Izard, Fine, 
Schultz, Mostow, Ackerman, & Youngstrom, 2001; Johnson, Batey, & Holdsworth, 
2009; Lanciano & Curci, 2014; Salovey & Mayer, 1990; for review Lanciano & Curci, 
2015; Mikolajczak, 2014; Yoo & Noyes, 2016). Conversely, poor facial emotion 
recognition skills are associated with deficits in interpersonal functioning (e.g., Bowen 
et al., 2013; Fairchild et al., 2009, 2010; Rowe, 1993; Rowe & Carton, 1995).  
While there is an obvious advantage to having a well-developed ability to 
recognise facial emotions, there are suggestions in the literature that individuals who 
meet criteria for alexithymia have difficulty recognising emotional expressions. The 
term alexithymia refers to a personality construct characterised by a limited awareness 
of one’s subjective or internal emotions. As stated, the question of whether this 
difficulty also extends to the recognition of external cues of emotion, specifically the 
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facial expressions of others, has been the subject of a small number of previous 
investigations. However, as outlined in detail in the Introduction of the current thesis, 
these studies are limited by methodological shortcomings and mixed results. Indeed, 
the methodological limitations may well account for some of the inconsistencies in 
research findings in this area. Further research is thus required to clearly establish 
whether individuals with alexithymia have difficulty recognising others’ facial 
expressions.  
As the shortcomings of previous studies into facial emotion recognition and 
alexithymia have already been described in Part Two of the Introduction, a brief 
summary of the points made there will now follow.  
Firstly, these studies have typically utilised static stimuli that fail to capture 
the motion of real-life facial expressions. Several lines of evidence support the idea 
that the temporal features of a facial expression contribute to the recognition process. 
For instance, dynamic stimuli have been found to improve the recognition and 
discrimination of emotions relative to static stimuli (Ambadar, Schooler & Cohn, 
2005; Schmidt & Scherer, 2000). They have also been shown to elicit higher levels of 
brain activation than static facial stimuli in several brain regions that play a primary 
role in emotion processes (LaBar, Crupain, Voyvodic, & McCarthy, 2003; Sato et al, 
2004; Yoshikawa & Sato, 2008) and elicit more intense subjective emotional 
experiences and spontaneous facial mimicry than corresponding static presentations 
(Yoshikawa & Sato, 2008). Research has also shown that patients with neurological 
and developmental disorders perform very differently on facial emotion recognition 
tasks when the stimuli are presented in static as compared to dynamic form, with these 
performance dissociations indicating that separate neural correlates are involved in the 
processing of dynamic and static facial displays (De Gelder, Vroomen, Poutois, & 
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Weiskrantz, 1999; Gepner, Deruelle & Grynfeltt, 2001; Harwood, Hall & Shinkfield, 
1999; Humphreys, Donelly & Riddoch, 1993).  
A second limitation of current research concerns the use of insensitive 
performance measures. Typically, participants have been allowed lengthy stimulus 
presentation and response times. This precludes the assessment of timely facial 
emotion recognition, which is key to successful social interaction (Crown et al., 2003).  
Thirdly, the stimuli utilised in previous research have been selected from 
Ekman and Friesen’s Pictures of Facial Affect database (Ekman & Friesen, 1975) and 
yet facial expressions at lower levels of intensity better represent prototypical facial 
expressions.  
Fourthly, participants have not been routinely screened for confounding 
variables known to impair facial emotion recognition performance, such as depression 
and anxiety (e.g., Surguladze et al., 2004).  
A fifth limitation in most of these studies is that the participants assigned to 
the ‘alexithymia’ groups often have TAS-20 scores below the clinical cut-off score of 
61, and thus represent sub-clinical levels of alexithymia. This means the 
generalisability of the findings from these studies is limited to populations with sub-
clinical or low levels of alexithymia.  
A final issue with the studies carried out in this area is that they have solely 
measured recognition accuracy (e.g., participants respond “happy” when the stimulus 
depicts a happy face) and have neglected speed of responses in making these 
judgements. Recognition accuracy and response latency are thought to capture 
different aspects of information processing (Heitz, 2014). In simple terms, accuracy 
requires access to stored knowledge and measures the level of difficulty in solving a 
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problem, while latency identifies how quickly and efficiently one can process 
information and solve such problems. These two dependent variables have been shown 
to yield different effects (e.g., Herzmann et al., 2009; Moore & Egeth, 1998; Moore, 
Yantis, Vaughan, & Handwerker, 2002; Mordkoff & Egeth, 1993; Santee & Egeth, 
1982). This suggests that speed and accuracy of performance are not interchangeable 
measures of the same underlying process but rather represent different aspects of 
processing.  
 A study by Ihme et al (2014b) appears to be the only published study of facial 
recognition and alexithymia that did not focus solely on accuracy of performance as 
an outcome measure. They measured, using fMRI, the brain responses of individuals 
with alexithymia while they were performing a facial emotion recognition task. 
Participants were shown a static image of a facial expression for one or three seconds, 
with a seven second response window allowed in which to identify and label the 
emotional expression.  
The fMRI data indicated that those with higher scores on the Twenty Item 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994) and the Toronto 
Structured Interview for Alexithymia (TSIA; Toronto Structured Interview for 
Alexithymia, 2009) showed increased brain activation in areas of the premotor cortex, 
a region responsible for motor-based simulation.  
The decision time data showed a significant association between scores on the 
TAS-20 and the TSIA and reaction times when labelling static images of negative 
emotional faces. However, there was no significant relationship between TAS-20 or 
TSIA scores and recognition accuracy performance. These findings parallel well 
established findings in other cognitive research that illustrate that latency may be a 
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more sensitive measure of group differences than accuracy (see Collins, 1999; Collins, 
2002; Collins & Coney, 1998; Collins & Cooke, 2005; Osgood, 1953; Shapiro, 1968; 
Wearing & Montague, 1970). 
With these factors in mind, the aim of Experiment 1(a) was to examine whether 
individuals with clinical level TAS-20 scores differ in their speed and/or accuracy 
relative to non-alexithymic controls on a task requiring them to identify dynamic facial 
expressions of emotion.  While the weight of previous evidence seemed to indicate 
that people with alexithymia experience some degree of difficulty recognising facial 
expressions, it was considered premature to draw firm conclusions regarding this 
possibility due to the various limitations in the previous research.  
The question of interest was whether participant groups differed in their mean 
level of performance Accuracy or their mean Decision Time (DT) latency on an 
emotion recognition task involving the presentation of facial images that morphed 
from neutral to full intensity in real time. Morphed facial expression stimuli were used 
in order to provide ecological validity and to increase the level of task difficulty and 
thus avoid ceiling effects, as has been previously found for static expressions of high 
intensity (e.g., Suzuki et al., 2006). While morphs allow a high level of stimulus 
control, they do involve a linear transition from neutral to intense expression that 
differs from the natural transition in physical and temporal changes during the 
unfolding of facial expressions. Nevertheless, a study by Sato and Yoshikawa (2004) 
that assessed the rate of change of morphing facial expression stimuli showed that 
morphing facial expressions that unfolded at a presentation speed of 2040ms were 
judged by raters as appearing highly naturalistic. 
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Prior studies in this area have typically utilised static stimuli that are devoid of 
the temporal cues that are integral to real life social exchanges and that aid recognition 
processes. Therefore, the use in the present study of stimuli containing dynamic 
temporal cues that are more relevant to real-life situations had the potential to reduce 
variability in performance across groups.  
Despite the inconclusive nature of previous research on facial emotion 
recognition and alexithymia, based on available evidence, it was predicted that groups 
with clinical level TAS-20 scores would perform significantly slower and less 
accurately relative to non-alexithymic controls on a task involving the identification 
of dynamic facial expressions. It was also expected that the group with mean TAS-20 
scores falling into the high range would be significantly slower and less accurate on 
the task than the group with mean TAS-20 scores in the moderate range.  
 
Experiment 1(a) - Method 
 
Participant Selection Measures 
Three selection measures were administered to potential participants. These 
measures were: 1) the Twenty Item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, 
Taylor, & Parker, 1994); 2) the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond 
& Lovibond, 1995); and 3) a brief personal information sheet comprising questions 
about the respondent’s demographic profile and their psychological and medical 
history (see Measures below). 
The TAS-20 is a self-report alexithymia measure consisting of 20 items that 
load onto three factors. Difficulty identifying feelings involves items that relate to one's 
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awareness of internal sensations and emotions, (e.g., “I am often confused about what 
emotion I am feeling"); Difficulty describing feelings, comprises items that address 
the process of putting internal states into words, (e.g., “It is difficult for me to find the 
right words for my feelings"); and Externally oriented thinking comprises items that 
address a preference for external events rather than internal feelings, ("I prefer talking 
to people about their daily activities rather than their feelings"). Each TAS-20 item is 
rated on a five-point Likert scale varying from ''strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly 
agree" (5). A TAS-20 total score is then calculated by summing all items (after reverse 
scoring designated items). Total scores may range from 20 to 100. A higher TAS-20 
score is inferred to represent a greater level of alexithymia. As mentioned, the TAS-
20 score of 61 represents the established clinical cut-off score (Taylor, Bagby & 
Parker, 1997). The TAS-20 has adequate construct validity and reliability (Cronbach's 
alpha = .81), internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .77) and a stable, replicable 
three-factor structure (Parker, Bagby, Taylor, Endler, & Schmitz, 1993; Bagby et al, 
1994).  
The 21-item short-form of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21; 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) comprises 21 self-report items designed to measure 
depression, anxiety, and stress in clinical and nonclinical groups. The DASS-21 
measures items relating to three subscales. These are: Depression (e.g., "I felt I wasn’t 
worth much as a person"); Anxiety (e.g. "I was worried about situations in which I 
might panic and make a fool of myself") and Stress (e.g., "I tended to over-react to 
situations"). The respondent indicates the degree to which each statement applied to 
them over the past week, on a scale ranging from 0 (did not apply to me at all) to 3 
(applied to me very much). Items are thus scored on a 4-point scale (0 –3), with DASS-
21 totals between 0 and 63 points. Higher scores are inferred to represent greater levels 
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of distress. A set of cut-off scores for defining mild/moderate/severe/extremely severe 
scores for each DASS sub-scale have been established. The clinical cut-off scores on 
the DASS-21 are: Depression (<9), Anxiety (<7) and Stress (<14). The alpha 
reliability coefficients for the DASS–21 subscales have been reported as .94 for 
Depression, .87 for Anxiety, and .91 for Stress (McDowell, 2006). The DASS-21 also 
has high reliability and convergent validity with other measures of anxiety and 
depression (Crawford & Henry, 2003). 
The personal information sheet was designed to obtain demographic 
information and relevant history of previous and/or present psychiatric or neurological 
disorders. Respondents were asked to provide their age, sex, ethnicity (Caucasian, 
Asian, Australian Aboriginal or Other-please specify), and number of years of 
university study.  Respondents answered yes or no to the following question: Have 
you ever suffered from uncorrectable visual difficulty (such as macular degeneration); 
head injury involving loss of consciousness; a neurological condition (such as 
epilepsy); a psychological condition (such as depression, bipolar disorder). 
 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the general student population of Murdoch 
University and the Murdoch University pool of underegraduate psychology students. 
All the participants who took part in this research did so in return for course credit or 
received $10 (AUD) reimbursement for their time and travel costs. This project was 
granted approval by the Murdoch University Human Research Ethics Committee. 
395 students were administered the participant selection measures described 
above. Respondents were considered ineligible for participation if they returned scores 
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in the clinical range on any of the subscales of the DASS-21 or reported a history of 
psychological or neurological conditions, head injury involving loss of consciousness, 
or uncorrectable visual difficulty.  
Respondents were invited to participate in the experimental phase of the study 
if they: i) returned a TAS-20 total score on or above the standardised clinical cut-off 
score of 61 recommended by Taylor, Bagby and Parker (1997) for determining the 
presence of alexithymia, or ii) scored below the standardised TAS-20 cut-off score of 
51, which is taken to indicate the absence of clinical range alexithymia (Taylor, Bagby 
& Parker, 1999). 
As the current experiment was largely an exploratory study, as many 
participants with TAS-20 scores in the clinical range as was available were recruited 
for the experiment in order to investigate effect sizes. While it was assumed that a 
minimum sample size of approximately 20 participants per condition would be large 
enough to detect significant effects (based on the sample sizes of previous studies on 
this topic),  a total of 61 respondents met the selection criteria and returned a TAS-20 
total score on or above the standardised clinical cut-off score of 61. 
This pool of 61 respondents with TAS-20 total score on or above the score of 
61 were allocated to one of two groups: i) a high ‘alexithymia’ group (HA); or ii) a 
moderate ‘alexithymia’ group (MA), based on a median split (TAS-20 = 64) of the 
spread of clinical range TAS-20 scores. The designation of a high and moderate 
clinical level ‘alexithymia’ groups allowed the examination of a broad range of TAS-
20 scores and addressed a potential limitation of previous studies whereby the mean 
TAS-20 scores of the so-called alexithymia groups often did not reach a clinical level.  
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Respondents with mean TAS-20 scores below 51 were selected to participate 
in the control group if they matched the HA and MA groups on demographic factors 
known to impact facial emotion recognition. These were age (Chepenik, Cornew, & 
Farah, 2007; Sullivan, Ruffman, & Hutton, 2006), gender (e.g., Erwin, Gur, Gur, 
Skolnick, Mawhinney-Hee & Smailis, 1992 ), ethnicity (e.g., Weisbuch & Ambady, 
2008), and years of education (e.g., Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). 
After applying these criteria, 96 students were selected for the experimental 
phase of Experiment 1(a). The total group comprised 73 females and 23 males aged 
between 19 and 36 years (mean age 22.1; SD, 2.9 years). They had a mean of 1.5 years 
of tertiary education (SD, 1.5). Of the total pool of participants, 29 participants were 
allocated to the HA group, 35 participants were allocated to the MA group and 32 
participants were selected for the control group. The mean TAS-20 score of the HA 
group was 68 (SD, 4), the mean TAS-20 score of the MA group was 62.2 (SD, 1.1) 
while the mean TAS-20 score of the control group was 37.9 (SD, 5.4).  
To ensure groups were equated on relevant demographic variables, a further 
series of statistical tests (see Table 1 below) were carried out to examine whether there 
were group differences in age, gender, education and ethnicity. No significant 
differences were found between the groups in these variables. This confirms that the 
three groups were matched on relevant demographic variables even though their TAS-






Table 1 Descriptive and Demographic Data of Participant Groups 
 Controls MA HA ANOVA Chi-sq 
 M    SD M   SD M   SD F      p χ2    p 
Age 22.1(2.8) 21.7 (1.7) 22.7 (6.6) .573  (ns)  
Tertiary Education (years) 1.4 (0.5) 1.6 (0.7) 1.5 (0.6) .796  (ns)  
Gender (males/females) 7 / 25 8 / 27 8 / 21  .857 (ns) 
Ethnicity (Caucausian/Asian) 27 / 5 29 / 6 25 / 4  .153 (ns) 
 
Stimulus validation 
Raw materials were a set of black and white photographs chosen from The 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Ohman, 1998). These 
photographs comprised frontal views of individuals displaying happy, sad, angry, 
fearful, and neutral facial expressions presented against a mid-grey background.  
A preliminary investigation of the validity of the emotional expressions 
depicted in the images was undertaken before assignment to the stimulus set. To this 
end, 40 participants who did not take part in the experimental phase of this experiment 
matched these photographs with one of the following labels: ‘happy’, ‘sad’, ‘angry’, 
‘fearful’, ‘neutral’, or ‘none of the above’. A minimum of 65% agreement was 
required to determine that the selected photograph was representative of the expected 
emotion. Applying this procedure, 50 facial photographic images were selected as raw 
materials for the current investigations (i.e. 10 happy, 10 sad, 10 angry, 10 fearful, and 
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10 neutral expressions). In each emotion category, half of the images were of male 
actors and half were of female actors.  
The average percentage (± SD) of ‘correct’ choices for each of the above 
emotion categories was as follows: Happy 97.5% (3.1%); Sad 91.5% (8%); Anger 
96% (4.1%), Fear 86.5% (4.5%), Neutral 88 % (9.9%). This degree of agreement in 
categorical judgments of facial expressions of emotion is in accordance with previous 
studies in which face stimuli were used (e.g., Ekman, 1984). 
 
Morph movie construction 
Morph movies served as stimuli in Experiment 1(a). These morphs were 
produced from the pool of pre-validated KDEF photographs (described above), with 
two photographs in each pair forming the morph end points. A neutral expression 
photograph was always positioned first in the pair followed by a full expression 
photograph to create a morph that started with a neutral face and progressively 
increased in expression intensity to full intensity. Prior to constructing the morphs, 
unwanted variation was removed from the photographs by editing them using 
Paintshop Pro so that the hair in one image of each pair was replicated in the 
corresponding image. All images were matched with respect to brightness and 
contrast. Then, following the procedure employed by Sato and Yoshikawa (2007), 
each morph was created by: 1) constructing 37 single interpolated images between the 
morph end points using computer-morphing software (Abrosoft Fantamorph, Version 
4); and 2) producing six replications of each of the two end point photographs.  
Each frame was then presented in succession for 40ms. This resulted in an 
entire morph sequence consisting of 51 frames, presented for a total stimulus duration 
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of 2040ms (i.e., 7 frames of the first photograph presented across a 280ms duration, 
37 interpolated frames presented across a duration of 1480ms, and 7 frames of the last 
photograph presented across a 280ms duration). This rate of change is consistent with 
the natural unfolding of facial expressions (Sato & Yoshikawa, 2004). All animation 




Experimental events were controlled by a program written in DirectRT 
(Version 2006.2) and implemented on an Intel Core 2 Duo Processor computer with 
Microsoft Windows XP operating system. The stimuli were presented on a BenQ 19-
inch LCD monitor.  
Decision time responses were collected by means of a dedicated custom-built 




Upon arrival at the laboratory all participants were given a general description 
of the experiment. They then provided written informed consent prior to the 
procedures. Participants were seated approximately 70cm from a computer screen. 
They were told that they would be shown moving images of faces on the screen and 
that each face would start with a neutral expression but then gradually change to one 
of a range of different emotional expressions. They were instructed to watch the face 
and as soon as they thought they could accurately recognise the emotional expression, 
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to press a button on the response box labelled ‘STOP’ with the index finger of their 
dominant hand, thereby stopping the movie as the facial expression stimulus unfolded 
from neutral to full expression. It was emphasized that while they should work as 
quickly as possible, they should wait until they could accurately recognise the emotion 
before pressing the button. The duration between the onset of the stimulus and the 
button press response was recorded. After the initial button press, participants were 
instructed to press one of four buttons on the keyboard to indicate their choice of 
emotion from a list of four given responses (‘anger’, ‘sadness’, ‘happiness’, ‘fear’).  
Trials consisted of a fixation cross presented for 500ms followed by the morph 
stimulus which remained on screen for 2040ms or until the participant responded. 
After the participant had indicated their choice of emotion category by a second key 
press, an inter-trial interval of 1500ms followed. Participants viewed 40 experimental 
trials, comprising 10 unique exemplars of each of the four stimulus categories. Stimuli 
were presented in a unique pseudorandom order for each participant, subject to the 
constraint that no more than two exemplars of each category were presented in a row. 
This was to avoid mood induction which might have had facilitation or inhibition 
effects on performance.  
Prior to the experimental trials, all participants were shown eight practice trials 
to familiarise them with the procedure. These practice trials used stimuli not viewed 
during the experimental trials. 
 
Research Design 
Two types of dependent variables served as measures of emotion recognition 
performance. The first was Decision Time (DT) calculated as the duration in 
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milliseconds (ms) between the onset of the morph stimulus and the STOP button press 
response on accurate trials. In preliminary analyses, four mean latency dependent 
variables were created, that were calculated as above for each of the separate emotion 
categories (Anger, Fear, Happy and Sad). However, a combined latency score 
(calculated as above) that averaged the latency scores across all the emotion categories 
was used for the main analyses. This combined mean score was referred to as Decision 
Time or DT (please see the Results section.) 
The second dependent variable was Percent Accuracy, calculated as the mean 
percentage of accurate forced-choice emotion category responses (e.g., responding 
‘happy’ on trials where the stimulus depicted a happy facial expression) when: i) 
decision times to press the stop button fell within the allocated 2040ms response 
window; and ii) a correct category choice was made, as indicated by a correct key-
press response involving keys 1-4 on the keyboard.  
Given that the main question of interest was whether facial emotion 
recognition would vary as a function of participant group, Participant Group (HA, 
MA, controls) was the only independent variable. 
 
Experiment 1(a) - Results 
 
Decision Time Data 
In preliminary analyses, a Pearson’s correlation between mean DT and the 
TAS-20 scores of participants in the two clinical range groups (HA, MA) revealed a 
significant negative correlation (r(62) = -.251, p = .046). This negative correlation 
confirmed that the choice of the median split to divide the TAS-20 scores into two 
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subgroups was appropriate (as, unexpectedly, Decision Time was shorter rather than 
longer for participants with higher TAS-20 scores). Group differences in mean 
Decision Time (DT) across the separate Emotion categories of Anger, Fear, Happy 
and Sadness as a function of Participant Group were then investigated using a series 
of One-Way between groups ANOVAs. These ANOVAs revealed significant group 
differences in each emotion category (Anger, F(2,93) = 49.72, p<.005; Fear, F(2,93) 
= 56.27, p <.005; Happy, F(92,93) = 39.88, p <.005; Sad, F(2,93) = 50.293, p<.005). 
Given these ANOVAs revealed general effects not limited to any particular emotion 
category, the combined emotion DT score was used in all further analyses.  
The mean Decision Time (DT) as a function of Participant Group condition is 
displayed in Figure 1. An inspection of the mean DTs shows that controls produced 
the fastest mean responses (1036ms, SD 111ms). The HA group took an average of 
1337ms to respond (SD 113ms), while the MA group were the slowest to respond 
(1445ms, SD 186ms). 
A One-way between groups ANOVA with Participant Group as the between 
groups independent variable, and Decision Time latency (DT) in milliseconds (ms) as 
the dependent variable, revealed a significant main effect of Group (F(2,93) = 70.851, 
p<.001), indicating a significant difference in DT among participant groups.  
The effect size was calculated using Cohen’s f was 0.6037, which indicates 
that a large proportion (60.37%) of the variability in the DT data can be attributed to 
Participant Group (Cohen, 1988).  
Planned contrasts indicated that DT was significantly slower for the two 
clinical range alexithymia groups (HA and MA) combined compared to the DT of the 
control group (t(78)=12.96, p = .001). A further planned contrast showed that the mean 
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DT of the HA group was significantly faster than that of the MA group (t(57) = 2.85, 
p = .006). 
 
Figure 1. Decision time latency data in Experiment 1(a) as a function of Participant Group 
(High Alexithymia (HA), Moderate Alexithymia (MA), or controls). Error bars represent standard 
errors. The Y axis starts at 950milliseconds (ms) mean DT. 
 
Percent Accuracy Data  
The mean Percent Accuracy data produced as a function of Participant Group 
are displayed in Figure 2. Controls were the most accurate, on average, with a mean 
accuracy rate of 93.6%. The MA and HA groups produced mean accuracy rates of 
89.4% and 89.3%, respectively. A one-way between groups ANOVA on this data 
revealed a significant main effect for Accuracy (F(2,93)= 3.486, p = .035).  
Cohen’s f was .0700, which indicates that a small proportion (7%) of the 
variability in the Percent Accuracy data can be attributed to Participant Group (Cohen, 
1988).  
Planned contrasts indicated that the percent Accuracy was significantly lower 




























the percent Accuracy of the control group (t(84)=3.32, p = .001). A further planned 
contrast showed no significant difference between the mean percent Accuracy of the 
HA group compared to the MA group (t(53) = .037, p = .971). 
  
Figure 2: Mean percent accuracy in Experiment 1(a) as a function of Participant Group (High 
Alexithymia (HA), Moderate Alexithymia (MA), or control. Error bars represent standard errors. The 
Y axis starts at 85% mean Percent Accuracy. 
 
Experiment 1(a) - Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 1(a) showed that individuals with TAS-20 scores in 
the clinical range responded less accurately than controls on a dynamic facial emotion 
recognition task. There was no difference in accuracy, however, between the two 
clinical range TAS-20 groups. The decision time data revealed some additional 
differences. Not only was a difference evident in decision latencies between the 
clinical TAS-20 groups and controls, the HA group were faster to identify and label 
facial expressions than the MA group (despite being as accurate). This is an 

























cautious responding by the MA group, or a strategy of favouring fast responses by the 
HA group. If this were the case, a speed versus accuracy trade-off should be apparent. 
Instead, the two groups with clinical range TAS-20 scores produced equivalent 
accuracy rates, and there is no evidence of a speed versus accuracy trade-off. This 
indicates that the HA group were able to produce a faster performance than the MA 
group without compromising their accuracy, albeit they were not as fast or accurate as 
controls. 
Previous studies relying on the use of accuracy as an outcome measure of facial 
emotion recognition ability have produced mixed findings. However, the results of the 
current experiment are in accord with a number of the studies that have found reduced 
accuracy in recognising facial emotion among participants classified as alexithymic 
relative to people who are not alexithymic (see Jessimer & Markham, 1997; Mann, 
Wise, Trinidad, & Kohanski, 1994; Lane et al., 1996; Lane, Sechrest, Riedel, Shapiro, 
& Kaszniak, 2000; Montebarocci, Surcinelli, Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 1992; Rossi, 
& Baldaro, 2011).  
As argued above, however, the timely recognition of facial expressions is 
essential to successful social interaction (Crown, Feldstein, Jasnow, Beebe, & Jaffe, 
2002). Ihme et al. (2014b) conducted the sole study that has examined the speed of 
facial emotion recognition among alexithymia participants and found greater effects 
for decision time latency than accuracy in response to static stimuli. The current 
results, using dynamic stimuli, similarly show that when making group comparisons 
between the HA and MA groups, a large effect was found for DT (i.e., Cohn’s F = 
60%) while only a small effect (i.e., Cohn’s F = 7%) was found for Accuracy. 
 95 
 In examining the identification and labelling of dynamic facial expressions, 
the current study is more applicable to real-life scenarios, as dynamic stimuli contain 
the temporal characteristics of real-life emotional exchanges that static stimuli do not.  
The current study also extends our understanding of alexithymia by revealing 
differences in the emotion recognition decision time of groups representing Moderate 
and High Alexithymia to identify facial expressions. It may be that the superior speed 
of recognition of the HA group, relative to the MA group, reflects differences in their 




Experiment 1(b) - Dynamic versus Static Facial Emotion Recognition in 
Alexithymia 
 
Experiment 1(a) found that the groups representing clinical levels of 
alexithymia demonstrated significantly less accurate performance than controls on a 
test of facial emotion recognition involving the identification and labelling of facial 
expressions. They were also slower to recognise facial expressions than controls. An 
unexpected finding was that the group with a higher degree of alexithymia, based on 
higher clinical level scores on the TAS-20, were faster (but as accurate) to identify 
facial expressions of emotion than the group representing a moderate degree of 
alexithymia, who had lower clinical level TAS-20 scores.  
While it might be argued that this finding could be associated with the MA 
group having some insight into their emotion recognition difficulty, and so they adopt 
a more cautious or slower response style, the findings did not support this. That is, this 
sort of strategy would be expected to result in greater accuracy for this group. This 
was not evident in the data. Similarly, if the HA group are less aware of their 
performance difficulty, it might be expected that they would respond quickly and yet 
have a higher error rate. This was clearly not the case, as both groups performed the 
task with an equivalent level of accuracy. In other words, differences in decision time 
between the two groups representing Moderate and High Alexithymia were not due to 
compromises in their degree of accuracy. 
Addressing the question of how groups perform under dynamic and static 
conditions helps to clarify this unusual pattern of results. As reviewed earlier, several 
studies have systematically compared the difference in facial emotion processing 
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based on the use of static and dynamic stimuli among typical populations. These 
studies have found that dynamic information improves facial recognition accuracy 
(Bassili, 1978, 1979; Bruce & Valentine, 1988; Wallraven, Breidt, Cunningham, & 
Bülthoff, 2008; Wehrle, Kaiser, Schmidt, & Scherer, 2000) and leads to judgments of 
higher emotion intensity and arousal (Weyers, Mühlberger, Hefele, & Pauli, 2006; 
Yoshikawa & Sato, 2008). In neuropsychological studies, the dynamic presentation of 
faces improved emotion recognition in adults and children with neurological or 
developmental disorders who were impaired at identifying emotional expressions 
from static displays (Back, Ropar, & Mitchell, 2007; Harwood, Hall, & Shinkfield, 
1999). Several studies have also reported stronger and more frequent facial mimicry 
reactions to dynamic as opposed to static expressions (Sato et al., 2008; Sato & 
Yoshikawa, 2007; Weyers et al., 2006). Facial mimicry reactions have been associated 
with a faster ability to recognise facial expressions (e.g., Niedenthal et al., 2001; Stel 
& Knippenberg, 2008). 
As well as being associated with performance differences on tasks of emotion 
processing as described above, there is firm empirical evidence from neuroimaging 
studies supporting the assumption that different neural pathways underpin responses 
to moving and static facial expression stimuli (Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2003; 
Humphreys, Donnelly, & Riddoch, 1993). For instance, Enticott, Johnston, Herring, 
Hoy, and Fitzgerald (2008) used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to 
investigate the association between mirror neuron system (MNS) activity and 
processing of facial emotion. They presented static photographs of facial expressions 
and dynamic video clips of unfolding facial expressions during a facial emotion 
recognition task while measuring motor-evoked potentials using electromygraphy. 
They found a positive correlation between increased motor-evoked potentials in the 
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premotor cortex and recognition accuracy in the static stimuli condition. This is 
consistent with the findings of Kilts, Egan, Gideon, Ely, and Hoffman (2003), who 
studied the impact of static and dynamic facial expressions on neural activation using 
positron emission tomography. They found that the presentation of static stimuli was 
associated with greater activity within the premotor and motor cortices than dynamic 
stimuli, and they interpreted this as a reflection of static stimuli being processed using 
motor simulation strategies. They also argued that their results suggest that emotion 
recognition using dynamic facial expressions involves a lesser reliance on motor 
simulation. In their words, “…differences in activation sites related to emotion 
perception in static and dynamic expressions implicate different mental strategies in 
solving the emotion conveyed by static and dynamic expressions…We suggest that 
static images of facial expressions represent degraded social stimuli and that their 
decoding for emotion content is accomplished by the covert motor simulation of the 
expression…This motor knowledge may provide the interpretive rules for recognising 
biological motion and anticipating future sequences of action…” (Kilts et al., 2003, 
p. 165). 
While the research described above has found static facial expressions produce 
greater activation of motor and premotor neural regions, numerous studies have found 
that dynamic facial expressions tend to elicit greater activity than static expressions in 
areas associated with social cognition and emotional processing. For example, La Bar 
et al. (2003) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare brain 
activation to static and dynamic facial expressions. They found that the dynamic 
stimuli activated affect-related mirror neuron regions of the brain, particularly the 
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amygdala13. Activation also increased in the superior temporal sulcus, which is 
considered to code biological motion and play a role in signalling intentions 
(Gallagher et al., 2000) and is directly connected to limbic and paralimbic regions, 
such as the amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex (Amaral et al., 1992).  
Similarly, in a series of three fMRI studies, Arsalidou, Morris, and Taylor 
(2011) examined brain activation in response to dynamic and static facial expressions. 
They found dynamic presentations elicited more activity in extended mirror neuron 
regions serving emotion processing, particularly the superior temporal sulcus and the 
amygdala. Arsalidou et al. interpreted their findings as suggesting that dynamic facial 
expressions elicit increased activity in neural regions that are critically involved in the 
interpretation of emotions.  
While the findings above suggest that static facial expressions are processed 
using motor simulation strategies subserved by motor and pre-motor MNS structures, 
and dynamic facial expressions are preferentially processed using extended MNS 
affect-related regions, different results have been found in brain-imaging studies of 
people with alexithymia. Intriguingly, two neuroimaging studies have found that 
individuals with TAS-20 scores in the clinical range produced greater activation in 
motor-related neural structures than controls. Moriguchi et al. (2006) found the 
observation of hand movements was associated with greater activation in premotor 
and parietal regions of the mirror neuron system among individuals with TAS-20 
scores above the clinical cut-off compared to those with scores below the TAS-20 
clinical cut-off. Further, Karlsson, Naatanen and Stenman (2008) examined brain 
 
13 While early studies implicated the amygdala in fear processing (e.g., Morris et al. 1999; 
Phan et al. 2002), recent studies show the involvement of the amygdala in a wide range of emotions 
(for further discussion, see Britton et al. 2006; Carter & Pelphrey, 2008; LaBar et al. 2003; Taylor et 
al. 2009). 
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activity in response to the viewing of video clips containing emotion-eliciting content 
and found that individuals with clinical range TAS-20 scores had greater activation of  
motor-related MNS regions along with decreased activity in emotion-related regions, 
such as the anterior cingulate cortex, compared to those with TAS-20 scores in the 
normal range. These findings raise the possibility that alexithymia is associated with 
a tendency to rely on motor simulation rather than affect-laden simulation to process 
emotional cues. 
Given the above-mentioned findings that dynamic and static stimuli 
presentation conditions activate different neural regions (e.g., Enticott et al., 2008; 
Kilts et al., 2003; LaBar et al., 2003; Sato et al., 2004; Yoshikawa & Sato, 2006) and 
are associated with performance differences on behavioural tasks (e.g., Ambadar, 
Schooler & Cohn, 2005; Werhle et al., 2000), Experiment 1(b) compared the facial 
emotion recognition performance of two groups with clinical level TAS-20 scores and 
a control group under dynamic and static stimulus conditions. It was anticipated that 
this might assist in inferring the type of processing strategy adopted by the participant 
groups. Further, based on the neuroimaging research outlined above, a possible 
explanation for the faster recognition speed observed among the HA group compared 
to MA group in Experiment 1(a) is that the HA group further utilise a compensatory 
motor-based simulation strategy to improve their performance on facial emotion 
recognition tasks.  
Therefore it was hypothesised that if a static stimulus presentation condition 
encourages both groups to adopt motor simulation strategies, and the HA group 
recruits this motor-based strategy to enhance their facial emotion recognition 
performance, then the static condition would reduce the decision time advantage of 
the HA group over that of the MA group. In other words, there would be no difference 
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in DT between the groups representing High and Moderate Alexithymia in the static 
condition, while a difference in DT would be found between the HA and MA groups 
in the dynamic condition.  
A further aim of Experiment 1(b) was to confirm the findings of Experiment 
1(a). The Dynamic condition of Experiment 1(b) was identical to that of Experiment 
1(a). Therefore, it was predicted that the results of Experiment 1(a) would be 
replicated in the Dynamic condition of the current experiment. Specifically, it was 
predicted that the alexithymia groups would be slower and less accurate to recognise 
facial expressions than controls. It was further predicted that while the MA group 
would be slower to recognise facial expressions than the HA group 
 
Experiment 1(b) - Method 
 
Participants 
Fifty-five students enrolled at Murdoch University took part in this 
experiment. None of these participants had taken part in Experiment 1(a). This new 
group comprised 42 females and 13 males. As seen in Table 2, the total group had a 
mean age of 21 years (SD, 4.8 years) and ranged in age between 17 and 44 years. The 
total group had a mean of 2.2 years of tertiary education (SD, 1.4).  
These participants were recruited and allocated to three groups using the same 
selection methods detailed in Experiment 1(a). Briefly, they were administered the 
TAS-20 and screened for mood disorder using the DASS-21 and an information sheet 
comprising questions about the respondent’s demographic profile and their 
neuropsychological and neurological history. Respondents were considered ineligible 
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for participation if they returned scores in the clinical range on any of the subscales of 
the DASS-21 (i.e., Depression (<9), Anxiety (<7) and Stress (<14)) or reported a 
history of psychological or neurological conditions, head injury involving loss of 
consciousness, or uncorrectable visual difficulty.  
While the target sample size was set at approximately 20 participants per group 
(see the Method section of Experiment 1(a) for further detail), this target was not met 
for the HA group during the recruitment period. Nevertheless, as effect sizes in 
Experiment 1(a) for differences between alexithymic participants and controls were 
large, recruitment was halted when all available sources were exhausted in the 
expectation that the sample size in this experiment was sufficient to detect differences 
between groups.  
The participant groups consisted of 17 ‘High Alexithymia’ (HA) participants, 
22 ‘Moderate Alexithymia’ (MA) participants and 16 controls. The mean TAS-20 
score of the HA group was 66.4 (SD, 1.58), the mean TAS-20 score of the MA group 
was 62.3 (SD, 1.0) while the mean TAS-20 score of the control group was 43.6 (SD, 
11.07).  
Statistical tests (see Table 2 below) were carried out to examine whether there 
were group differences in age, gender, education, and ethnicity. No significant 
differences were found between the groups in these variables. This confirms that the 






Table 2 Descriptive and Demographic Data of Participant Groups 
 Controls MA HA ANOVA Chi-sq 
 M    SD M   SD M  SD F      p χ2    p 
Age 21.6 (5.5) 20.4 (3.7) 22 (4.7) 1.016 (ns)  
Tertiary Education (years) 2.5 (1.4) 2 (1.6) 2.3 (1.3) .705 (ns)  
Gender (males/females) 15 / 7 13 / 10 15 / 5  .429 (ns) 
Ethnicity (Caucausian/Asian) 17 / 5 17 / 6 17 / 3  .668 (ns) 
 
Procedure 
The experimental procedure was almost the same as that of Experiment 1(a). 
Participants were presented with the identical block of trials comprising the same 40 
experimental stimuli that were presented in dynamic form in Experiment 1(a). In these 
trials, the morph stimulus unfolded in a dynamic fashion over a 2040ms duration. 
Participants also viewed an additional block of trials, that were not presented in 
Experiment 1(a), where the same 40 stimuli were presented in static form at 100% 
intensity of facial expression over a duration of 2040ms. Within the static and dynamic 
blocks of trials, trials were presented in a unique pseudorandom order (where no more 
than two exemplars of each emotion category were presented consecutively) for each 
participant. This was to minimise mood induction effects (see Experiment 1(a) for 
details). Prior to each block of trials, participants received 8 practice trials using 
stimuli that did not appear in the experimental trials. The static and dynamic blocks of 
trials were administered to participants in a counterbalanced fashion to prevent the 




The same two dependent variables as those employed in Experiment 1(a) 
served as outcome measures of emotion recognition in Experiment 1(b). These were 
Decision Time (DT) and Percent Accuracy (See Experiment 1(a) for details). 
Participant Group (HA, MA, control) was a between groups independent variable and 
Stimulus Presentation (Dynamic, Static) was a repeated measures independent 
variable. 
 
Experiment 1(b) - Results 
Decision Time Data 
The mean DTs produced as a function of Stimulus Presentation Condition 
and Participant Group is displayed in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Decision time data in Experiment 1(b) as a function of Stimulus Presentation 
Condition (dynamic, static) and Participant Group (High Alexithymia (HA), Moderate Alexithymia 



































The data were subjected to a mixed ANOVA, with Stimulus Presentation 
condition (Static, Dynamic) as the within-subjects factor and Participant Group (HA, 
MA, control) as the between-subjects factor. The mixed ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of Group (F(2,52) = 34.7, p<.001). An inspection of the means 
shows that, like Experiment 1(a), controls produced the fastest responses, with an 
overall mean DT of 846ms. The HA group produced an overall mean DT of 984ms. 
The MA group produced the slowest overall mean DT of 1166ms.  
 A significant main effect was also found for type of Stimulus Presentation 
(F(1, 52) = 740.95, p< .001). That is, participants were faster to recognise static than 
dynamic stimuli, with an overall mean DT of 607ms for the static stimuli and an 
overall mean of 1390ms for the dynamic stimuli. This finding was expected, as the 
dynamic stimuli unfolded over time from neutral to full expression during the entire 
stimulus exposure duration of 2040ms whereas in the static condition the image was 
presented at full intensity of expression for the entire stimulus presentation time.  
The mixed ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction between Group and 
Stimulus Presentation (F(2,52) = 4.128, p = .022). This indicates that the mean 
decision times to recognise facial expressions differed according to Participant Group 
and Stimulus Presentation conditions. Please refer to Figure 3 above for the Participant 
Group means in the Dynamic condition.  
To clarify the significant interaction between the two variables, testing of 
simple effects were conducted, involving One-way ANOVAs comparing Participant 
Group in the separate Dynamic and Static conditions. This was followed by planned 
contrasts comparing group differences in the Static and Dynamic conditions 
separately. 
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An analysis of simple effects in the Dynamic Stimulus Presentation condition 
only using one way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Group (F(2,52) = 34.351, 
p <.001), indicating significant differences in mean DT between the groups in the 
dynamic stimuli presentation condition (See Figure 4). Planned contrasts showed that 
the mean DT of both alexithymia groups combined (HA and MA) was slower than 
that of controls in the Dynamic condition (t(34) = 6.7, p <.005). A second planned 
contrast showed that the mean DT of the MA group was significantly slower than that 
of the HA group in the Dynamic condition (t(31) = 4.68, p <.005). This pattern of 
results is consistent with results found for groups in DT in Experiment 1(a). 
An analysis of simple effects in the Static Stimulus Presentation condition was 
also computed using a One-way ANOVA. This revealed a significant mean effect of 
Group (F (2,52) = 9.112, p =<.001), indicating that groups also differed in DT under 
static conditions (see Fig 3). Planned contrasts showed that, in the Static condition, 
the mean DT of the combined alexithymia groups (HA and MA) was significantly 
slower than the mean DT of the control group (t(34) = 3.85, p = <.005); however, there 
was no significant difference in the mean DT of the MA and HA groups (t(29) = 1.9, 
p = .062). 
 
Accuracy Data  
An inspection of the overall means shows that controls were the most accurate, 
at 91.77%. The HA group produced a mean accuracy rate of 88.97%. The MA group 
were the least accurate, at 87.27%. 
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Figure 4: Mean percent accuracy in Experiment 1(b) as a function of Participant Group (High 
Alexithymia (HA), Moderate Alexithymia (MA), or control). Error bars represent standard errors. The 
Y-axis starts at 85% mean Percent Accuracy. 
 
Due to violations in the assumption of equal variances in the Percent Accuracy 
data, the Welch test was carried out with the analysis confirming the ANOVA results. 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Group (F(2,52)= 
16.5, p = <.001), indicating a significant difference among participant groups in 
Percent Accuracy on the recognition tests, averaged across the Stimulus Presentation 
Conditions. Please see Figure 4 for the mean Percent Accuracy produced as a function 
of Stimulus Presentation Condition and Participant Group. 
The overall mean accuracy rate in the Dynamic condition was 89.4% and in 
the Static condition it was almost equivalent at 89.5%. Not surprisingly, the main 
effect of Stimulus Presentation (F(1,52) = 1.882, p=.176) was non-significant, 
indicating that the Dynamic and Static stimuli presentation conditions did not produce 





























The Group by Stimulus Presentation interaction (F(2,52) = 1.5, p = .233) was 
non-significant, indicating that Performance Accuracy did not differ for Group 
according to the Stimulus Presentation condition.  
Planned analyses of simple effects in the Accuracy Percent data in the 
Dynamic Stimulus Presentation condition using one way ANOVA revealed a 
significant effect of Group for Percent Accuracy (F(2,52)=6.743, p = .002), indicating 
that groups differed in their accuracy of facial emotion recognition under dynamic 
conditions. A planned contrast performed on the Dynamic condition data revealed the 
mean Accuracy for the HA and MA groups combined was significantly lower than the 
mean Accuracy of the control group (t(40) = 3.98, p <.005). A second planned contrast 
comparing the mean Accuracy of the HA and MA groups in the Dynamic condition 
was non-significant (t(29) = 1.031, p = .311). This was the same pattern of results as 
was found in the Accuracy data of Experiment 1(a). 
Analyses of simple effects in the Accuracy Percent data in the Static Stimulus 
Presentation condition using one way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of group 
(F(2,52) = 4.461, p = .016), with groups differing in their facial emotion recognition 
accuracy under Static conditions. A planned contrast analysing the Static condition 
data indicated that the combined Percent Accuracy of the HA and MA groups was 
significantly lower than the mean Percent Accuracy of the control group (t(52) = 2.66, 
p = .010). A second contrast that compared the mean Percent Accuracy of the HA and 




Experiment 1(b) - Discussion  
 
Experiment I(b) found that the groups representing moderate and high clinical 
range levels of alexithymia were slower than controls to recognise and label facial 
expressions under dynamic conditions. A significant difference in DT was also found 
between the clinical range TAS-20 groups, with the HA group faster to recognise 
facial expressions than the MA group. These findings replicate the results of 
Experiment 1(a) using a different group of participants.  
In addition, this experiment introduced a static condition and found that in 
response to static images of facial expressions, the MA group were again the slowest 
group to recognise facial expressions. While under static conditions the combined DT 
of the MA and HA groups was significantly slower than that of controls, there was no 
significant difference found in the mean DT of the HA group compared to that of the 
MA group. Together these findings show that group differences in DT are more 
pronounced in dynamic conditions than static conditions.  
The accuracy data of Experiment 1(b) showed that both groups with TAS-20 
scores in the clinical range were less accurate in their recognition of facial expressions 
than controls in response to dynamic faces. In contrast to the DT data, which did reveal 
a group difference in performance between the two groups representing alexithymia 
under dynamic conditions, there was no difference in accuracy under dynamic 
conditions between the two groups representing clinical range alexithymia. This again 
replicated the results of Experiment 1(a).  
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When presented with static images of facial expressions, the HA and MA 
groups were less accurate than controls, however no difference in accuracy was 
evident between the HA and MA groups.  
The findings of the current experiment, that is, the clinical level TAS-20 
groups differed under dynamic conditions using latency as an outcome measure but 
not under static conditions or when using the outcome measure of accuracy, arguably 
underscore the necessity of utilising dynamic stimuli and measuring participants’ 
decision time where possible in future studies on this topic. This is firstly due to the 
broad rationale of ecological relevance, as in everyday life nuances in facial 
expressions are indeed dynamic and need to be identified in a timely fashion. 
Secondly, the use of dynamic stimuli and DT as an outcome measure produced greater 
sensitivity to group differences in performance than static stimuli and an accuracy 
measure. This is in direct contrast to previous studies on facial emotion recognition 
and alexithymia that have almost exclusively relied on static stimuli and the use of 
accuracy as an outcome measure14.  
The main question of Experiment 1(b) was to investigate group differences in 
facial emotion recognition latency under different stimulus presentation conditions in 
order to elucidate the unusual findings in Experiment 1(a), where the HA group was 
faster to recognise dynamic facial expressions than the MA group even though their 
accuracy was not significantly different. By introducing a static condition, it was 
possible to examine emotion recognition in dynamic and static conditions.  
 
14 As previously mentioned, the exception to this has been one study by Ihme et al. (2014b) 
which, consistent with the argument put forward here, found a significant correlation between TAS-20 
scores and performance latency, but not accuracy, among participants with a mean TAS-20 score of 43 
(SD 10.7). 
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In line with the results of the present experiment, where the HA and MA 
groups differed under dynamic conditions but not static conditions, previous research 
suggests that static images of facial expressions are more likely to be processed using 
a motor simulation strategy than dynamic facial images (Enticott et al., 2008; Kilts et 
al., 2003). There is also evidence to suggest that individuals with alexithymia have 
greater activation of motor-related MNS regions than controls (Karlsson et al., 2008; 
Moriguchi et al., 2006). While speculative, if the HA group use motor simulation to 
improve their performance, and under static conditions that encourage participants’ 
use of motor simulation processes no difference is found in DT between the HA and 
MA groups, while a difference in DT is found between these groups under dynamic 
conditions, this may suggest that the HA group rely on motor simulation to a greater 
extent than the MA group. This prediction was consistent with the findings of the 
current experiment. A significant difference in DT emerged between the MA and HA 
groups under dynamic conditions but no difference in DT was found between these 
groups under static conditions. 
This leads to the question of why the HA group might be more likely to adopt 
a compensatory processing strategy on the task than the MA group? Firstly, while 
higher TAS-20 scores imply a greater deficit in the capacity to process emotional 
material, individuals with high TAS-20 scores are also likely to have a preserved 
awareness of this deficit. This has been previously noted by Lundh et al. (2002) and 
Taylor, Bagby & Parker (1997), who argue that a higher score on the TAS-20 self-
report measure of alexithymia, involving the endorsement of items such as “I have 
feelings I can’t quite identify”, or “I am often confused about what emotion I am 
feeling”, paradoxically requires a preserved awareness of a lack of awareness. 
Secondly, in Experiments 1(a) and 1(b) there was no attempt to disguise the nature of 
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the test, so participants were all aware that their facial recognition was being tested. 
Such an awareness may prompt the use of a compensatory mechanism to enhance 
emotion recognition. The findings of Experiment 1(b) support the idea that a motor 
simulation mechanism may be a candidate for this role.  
This now concludes the experimental chapters examining the speed and 
accuracy of facial emotion recognition in alexithymia. In the next experimental 
chapter, alexithymia and the discrimination of facial expressions of emotion will be 
explored.  
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Experiment 2(a) - Facial Emotion Discrimination and Alexithymia under 
Conditions of Low Task Difficulty 
 
A small body of research, which was reviewed in Part Two of the Introduction, 
has attempted to examine whether alexithymia is associated with diminished facial 
emotion recognition, with inconclusive results. A major aim of the first two 
experiments in this series of studies was therefore to clarify the equivocal findings of 
the extant literature using several methodological improvements. Experiment 1(a) 
compared the speed and accuracy of performances of controls and two groups who 
had clinical range TAS-20 scores when viewing dynamic facial expression stimuli. 
This experiment found that the groups with TAS 20 scores in the clinical range 
performed more slowly and less accurately than controls. Then, Experiment 1(b) 
examined speed and accuracy over both static and dynamic conditions. Again, under 
dynamic conditions, the groups with clinical level TAS-20 scores (HA and MA 
combined) were slower and less accurate to recognise facial emotions than controls. 
In addition, while the HA group performed faster on the task than the MA group, no 
difference in accuracy was found between the HA and MA groups. Under static 
conditions, the clinical TAS-20 groups (HA and MA group combined) performed 
significantly slower and less accurately than controls, and no differences were found 
between the HA and MA groups in either DT or accuracy.  
Of the limited number of extant studies that have examined facial emotion 
recognition and alexithymia, those that have revealed poorer performance among 
individuals with higher TAS-20 scores compared to those with lower TAS-20 scores 
have generally viewed their results as evidence of a deficit in the ability of people with 
alexithymia to form explicit representations of emotional knowledge (see Jessimer & 
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Markham, 1997; Mann, Wise, Trinidad, & Kohanski, 1994; Lane et al., 1996; Lane, 
Sechrest, Riedel, Shapiro, & Kaszniak, 2000; Montebarocci, Surcinelli, Parker, 
Taylor, & Bagby, 1992; Rossi, & Baldaro, 2011). This interpretation is consistent with 
the model of alexithymia proposed by Lane and Schwartz (1987; 1997) which 
continues to be the leading theoretical conceptualisation of alexithymia. This is 
primarily a cognitive-developmental model, derived from an integration of Piaget’s 
(1971) theory of cognitive development combined with Werner and Kaplan’s (1963) 
conceptions of symbolisation and language development. In this model, alexithymia 
is viewed as reflecting a limited ability to transform emotional material from implicit 
form (i.e., procedural, sensorimotor) to explicit form (i.e., conscious thought) through 
language or other representation mode. It is argued that this results in impoverished 
emotion schemata or conceptual stores of emotional knowledge. Consistent with the 
term ‘alexithymia’ (which literally is translated as ‘no words for feelings’), this failure 
in the structural integration of emotion and language is also thought to result in the 
core defining feature of the alexithymia construct – that is, difficulty identifying and 
verbally describing one’s feelings.  
This proposed deficit presents a difficulty when interpreting research that 
examines the recognition of facial expressions. The reason for this is that the testing 
procedure itself that has been adopted in these studies relies upon linguistic processes. 
This means it is unclear whether any performance deficits are due to difficulty with 
the recognition process, involving conscious access to emotion representations in 
conceptual knowledge, or difficulty assigning the appropriate verbal label to the facial 
expression. All of the studies in this area that were outlined in the Introduction, as well 
as Experiment 1(a) and 1(b) of the current thesis, employ a ‘traditional judgement 
paradigm’, where participants are presented with a facial expression stimulus and 
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asked to choose the appropriate verbal label for each target facial expression using a 
list of emotion words (e.g., fear, anger, happiness, sadness). However, as mentioned, 
given that the hallmark characteristic of alexithymia is considered to be a difficulty 
finding words to describe emotion (Taylor et al., 1997) it is especially important to 
assess facial emotion recognition using a task that assesses recognition of facial 
emotions in a manner that reduces reliance on lexical processes. 
An early study by Lane et al. (1996) attempted to investigate whether 
alexithymia is exclusively a verbal deficit or is associated with nonverbal performance 
deficits in facial expression recognition. Participants in their study were administered 
the TAS-20 and the Perception of Affect Test (PAT), an untimed 140-item paper and 
pencil test comprised of four subtasks which require matching verbal and non-verbal 
emotional stimuli with verbal and non-verbal emotional responses. One of the subtests 
on the PAT requires the participant to match facial expressions with photographs of 
emotive scenes and so removes the requirement for verbal labelling or responding. 
They found that the group with TAS-20 scores in the clinical range had significantly 
lower overall scores on the PAT than the control group, suggesting that they had 
poorer general ability to process emotional information. However, performance on the 
task was analysed based on an overall score averaged across the subtests. Individual 
subtest scores were not reported, including the relevant non-verbal subtest described 
above. This means that firm conclusions cannot be drawn regarding non-verbal 
emotion recognition ability and alexithymia.  
An alternate method to study non-verbal facial recognition is via a 
discrimination task. This type of task has typically been employed in studies on facial 
emotion processing to exclude the possibility that deficits in performance are due to a 
problem with knowing or applying the verbal labels used to describe emotion, as 
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opposed to difficulty with the recognition process itself (for examples of studies 
employing discrimination tasks in research on schizophrenia see Fervaha, Foussias, 
Agid, & Remington, 2015; Rukiye et al., 2016; Surguladze et al., 2012, or in bi-polar 
disorder see Benito et al., 2013). This type of discrimination task has not been utilised 
previously in relation to alexithymia.  
The aim of Experiment 2(a) was therefore to examine whether the poorer 
performance demonstrated by individuals with alexithymia on facial emotion 
recognition tasks, as seen in Experiments 1(a) and 1(b), would be evident when 
discriminating facial emotions using a response that does not require verbal labelling. 
This task required participants to make speeded judgements as to whether two 
expressions presented simultaneously on a computer screen belonged to the same or 
discrepant emotion categories, without the necessity of naming the emotion depicted 
in the stimuli. Differences in speed and accuracy on the task between groups 
representing high and moderate clinical levels of alexithymia and a control group were 
explored. 
Experiments 1(a) and 1(b) found differences in the speed and accuracy of facial 
emotion recognition among two groups with TAS-20 scores within the clinical range 
relative to controls with TAS-20 scores in the normal range. Differences in DT were 
also found between the HA and MA groups under dynamic conditions. Based on these 
results, it was expected that if the reduced recognition ability among groups 
representing alexithymia that was evident in Experiments 1 (a) and 1(b) is not due to 
a verbal deficit in naming emotions, then in the current experiment, the performance 
of groups with clinically high scores on the TAS-20 should be slower and less accurate 
than that of controls on a discrimination task which did not require verbal labelling. 
Based on the pattern of results of Experiments 1(a) and 1(b), it was further predicted 
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that, if the deficit in facial emotion recognition was not due to a problem in naming 
emotions, then the HA group would produce a better discrimination performance than 
the MA group.  
 
Experiment 2(a) - Method 
 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the psychology department and the general 
student population of Murdoch University following the same recruitment and 
selection method described in full in Experiment 1(a). Briefly, potential participants 
were administered the identical selection measures described in Experiment 1(a), and 
those with scores in the clinical range on any of the subscales of the DASS-21 (i.e., 
Depression (<9), Anxiety (<7) and Stress (<14)) or or reported a history of 
psychological or neurological conditions, head injury involving loss of consciousness, 
or uncorrectable visual difficulty were  considered ineligible for participation in the 
experimental phase of the research.  
All participants who took part in this research received course credit or $10 
(AUD) reimbursement for their time and travel costs. This project was granted 
approval by the Murdoch University Human Research Ethics Committee. 
A total of 74 individuals (27 males, 47 females) took part in this study. This 
was based on a target sample size of 20 participants per study. None of these 
participants took part in any of the other experiments in this series of investigations. 
Participants were between 17 and 43 years of age (with a mean age of 22 
years, 𝑆𝐷, 4.3 years) and had a mean of 1.5 (SD, 0.6) years of tertiary education. 
Participants were allocated to three groups: HA (n = 22), MA (n = 23) and controls (n 
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= 29). Participants were allocated into the HA and MA group based on a median split 
(TAS-20 = 64) of the total pool of TAS-20 scores that were above the clinical cut-off. 
The mean TAS-20 score of the HA group was 67 (SD, 2), the mean TAS-20 score of 
the MA group was 63 (SD, 1) while the mean TAS-20 score of the control group was 
42 (SD, 11).  
To ensure participants were matched on relevant demographic variables, a 
further series of statistical tests (see Table 3 below) was carried out to examine 
whether there were group differences in age, gender, education and ethnicity. No 
significant differences were found between the groups in these variables. This 
confirms that the three groups were matched on relevant demographic variables.   
Table 3 Descriptive and Demographic Data of Participant Groups in 
Experiment 2(a) 
 
Controls MA HA ANOVA Chi-sq 
 
M    SD M    SD M   SD F     p 
 
χ2    p 
Age 22.5 (5.6) 21.6 (3.3) 21.9 (3.9) .255 (ns) 
 
Tertiary Education (years) 1.6 (0.8) 1.4 (0.5) 1.4 (0.5) 1. 3 (ns) 
 
Gender (males/females) 10 / 19 10 / 13 7 / 15 
 
.742 (ns) 





50 facial photographic images were selected from the pool of pre-validated 
photographic images from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (Lundqvist, D., 
Flykt, A., & Ohman, A; 1998). These images comprised 10 happy, 10 sad, 10 angry, 
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10 fearful, and 10 neutral expressions. Within each of these emotion categories, half 
of the photographs depicted males and the other half females. 
 
Procedure 
After hearing a brief description of the experiment, all participants provided 
written consent to take part in the experiment. They were then seated in front of a 
computer monitor. They were asked to read the following instructions that appeared 
on screen: “You are about to see a series of images of faces depicting certain 
emotional expressions on the computer screen. Two images will be presented 
simultaneously and your task is to decide whether the faces in the images depict the 
SAME or DIFFERENT emotional expressions, and to indicate your choice by pressing 
the either the SAME or DIFFERENT response button on the response box as quickly 
as possible.”  
 
Figure 5: A representative example of the stimuli used in Experiment 2(a). The two images at the top 




Participants were presented with 100 experimental trials. Each of the 40 
photographic items in the stimuli pool was presented 5 times, resulting in a total of 
200 items which were randomly divided into 40 ‘same’ trial pairs and 60 ‘different’ 
trial pairs, subject to the constraint that no one actor could appear in both items of a 
pair. The order of stimulus presentation was randomised across participants. To avoid 
habituation and drowsiness, participants had a short rest period halfway through the 
trials. Prior to the experimental trials, participants were given 20 practice trials to 
familiarise them with the procedure and to emphasise the need to make quick 
responses. These practice trials used photographic images not viewed during the 
experimental trials. 
At the beginning of each trial, a centrally placed fixation cross was presented 
for 500ms. The fixation cross was then replaced by two stimuli that were presented 
simultaneously on screen for 3500ms or until the participant made a key press. The 
3500ms stimulus presentation duration was chosen as it is consistent with the time 
period in which emotional expressions are typically displayed on the face (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1982). The commencement of the inter-trial interval was set to 3500ms after 
the onset of the stimulus, so that if a participant made a response before the trial timed 
out a blank screen was presented for the additional interval required to take the total 
trial duration to 3500ms. This was done in order to prevent the possibility of 
unmotivated participants moving through trials quickly. After stimulus presentation, 
a blank screen was shown for 500ms before the next trial started. 
The participant indicated their response on each trial by pressing one of two 
buttons on a response box. The keys were positioned 4cm apart in a horizontal row. 
The markings of the response keys (labelled ‘same’ or ‘different’) were 
counterbalanced among participants. The index fingers of both hands were used to 
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respond so that half the participants used the index finger of their dominant hand to 
indicate a same response and the other half used the index finger of their dominant 
hand to indicate a different response. No feedback was provided to participants after 
any trials. 
The independent variable for this study was Participant Group (HA, MA or 
control). The dependent variables were: 1) response latency (in milliseconds) to 
correctly identify whether the stimuli depicted the same or different facial expressions 
(i.e., decision time latency; DT) and 2) percentage of accurate responses (Percent 
Accuracy), calculated as the percentage of trials where reaction times fell within the 
allocated 3000ms response window and a correct discrimination response was made. 
 
 
Experiment 2(a) - Results 
 
Decision Time Data 
The mean DTs produced as a function of Participant Group in Experiment 2(a) 
are presented below in Figure 6.  
A One-Way ANOVA comparing Group (control, MA, HA) revealed a non-
significant main effect (F(2¸71) = 2.446, p<.094), indicating that there was no 
significant difference among groups in mean DT. The control group’s mean DT was 
991ms (SD, 304ms), the HA had a mean DT of 1034ms (SD, 245ms) and MA had a 
mean DT of 1172ms (SD, 338ms). A planned contrast revealed that the mean DT of 
the HA and MA groups combined did not differ significantly from the mean DT of 
controls (t(57) = 1.5, p = .125).  A further planned contrast showed there was no 
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statistically significant difference in the mean DT of the HA group compared to that 
of the MA group (t(40) = 1.57, p = .124). 
 
Figure 6: Decision time latency data in Experiment 2(a) as a function of Participant Group 
(High Alexithymia, Moderate Alexithymia, or control). Error bars represent standard errors. The Y-
axis starts at 500ms mean DT. 
 
Percent Accuracy Data 
The mean Accuracy Percent data produced as a function of Participant Group 
in Experiment 2(a) are presented in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Mean percent accuracy data in Experiment 2(a)as a function of Participant Group 
























































A One-way ANOVA yielded a non-significant between group difference in the 
Accuracy Percent, F(2,71) = 1.972, p =.147. Each group’s accuracy was very similar 
(controls at 67.4% (SD, 8.1%), MA group 64.2% (SD, 8.47%) and HA group 63.6% 
(SD, 5.3%)). Unsurprisingly, planned contrasts did not find a significant difference 
between the mean Accuracy of the two alexithymia groups combined (HA and MA) 
and controls (t(71) = 1.97, p = .052). A second planned contrast also indicated there 
was no significant difference in the mean Accuracy of the HA and the MA groups 
(t(40) = 1.57, p =.124) 
 
Experiment 2(a) - Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2(a) did not reveal differences in group performance 
in either decision time latency or accuracy on the facial emotion discrimination task. 
At face value, these results may be interpreted as evidence that individuals with 
alexithymia have intact facial emotion recognition. These results raise the possibility 
that the performance difficulty in alexithymia, that was evident in Experiments 1(a) 
and (b), lies with the verbal labelling of emotion. This is because on the discrimination 
task, which has a reduced lexical requirement, there was no difference in performance 
between the groups representing alexithymia and controls.  
However, while in theory the discrimination task removes the emotion 
labelling requirement as the source of the poor performance found in the groups 
representing alexithymia, it is possible to perform well on a simple test of facial 
emotion discrimination using relatively shallow information-processing strategies. 
For example, such a task may be performed using a basic pattern-matching approach 
(Hess & Blairy, 2001) where the presence of upturned corners of the mouth and 
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wrinkles around the corners of the eyes can be quickly interpreted as signalling 
happiness, whereas the eyebrows drawn together may signal anger.  Such strategies 
could potentially allow participants to perform this task without requiring access to 
emotion representations stored in conceptual knowledge. In a study by Cook et al. 
(2013), alexithymia participants were able to accurately discern same or different 
images of facial expressions (rather than emotion categories), suggesting they were 
able to perform well on a task requiring lower level perceptual processing of emotional 
stimuli. Therefore it is possible that the alexithymia groups adopted a pattern-matching 
strategy which allowed them to perform at a similar level of proficiency as controls. 
Indeed, it is also possible that all the participant groups employed this strategy.  
One means of addressing the issue of performing facial emotion discrimination 
tasks using a pattern-matching approach is to increase the level of task difficulty in 





Experiment 2(b) - Facial Emotion Discrimination and Alexithymia under 
Conditions of High Task Difficulty 
 
Experiment 2(b) sought to examine whether increasing task difficulty using 
facial expression stimuli depicting more subtle emotional expressions would produce 
differences in the speed and accuracy of facial expression discrimination among 
individuals with clinical range TAS-20 scores relative to controls.  
An earlier study by Parker, Prkachin, and Prkachin (2005) studied alexithymia 
and facial emotion detection under conditions of low and high task difficulty. Their 
participants were presented with static photographic images of neutral, sad, angry, or 
fearful faces from the highly expressive Ekman and Friesen’s (1976) Pictures of Facial 
Affect database. They were asked to respond “yes” on trials where they detected an 
emotion on the target face. The stimuli were presented under slow (3 sec) or rapid (1 
sec) exposure conditions. They found that alexithymia was negatively related to 
performance in the rapid condition but not in the slow condition. Parker, Prkachin, and 
Prkachin (2005) interpreted their findings as suggesting that individuals with 
alexithymia possess intact rudimentary cognitive representation of emotion concepts, 
and that performance deficits emerge under conditions of high task difficulty, when 
demands are placed on elaborate processing capacity.  
 Significantly, Parker et al.’s (2005) study was the first study to measure 
temporal factors (stimulus exposure) in relation to alexithymia. However, the task 
parameters of both the slow and rapid exposure conditions in their study resulted in 
very high average discriminability accuracy. That is, participants exceeded 90% 
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discrimination accuracy (more specifically, they achieved 96% accuracy in the slow 
condition and 92% in the rapid condition). This indicates that even in the rapid 
exposure condition this was a relatively easy task. Importantly, the task parameters 
were unlikely to place large demands on processing capacity. Participants were not 
required to name emotions, or discriminate between two emotional expressions, but 
simply to respond if they detected an emotion. It was quite possible for this task to be 
accomplished using pattern recognition strategies, for example, to look for knitted 
brows and so forth.  
Using a more effective method of ensuring the level of task difficulty, 
Experiment 2(b) of the current experimental series aimed to examine whether high 
task difficulty would affect emotion discrimination performance in people scoring 
within the clinical range on the TAS-20 relative to controls. Rather than limiting 
stimulus exposure time, in the present experiment the intensity of emotional 
expression in the stimuli was reduced and then, consistent with all previous studies in 
the current series of experiments, decision time and accuracy rate were used as 
response measures. It was anticipated that this increase in task difficulty would 
minimise reliance on the use of simple pattern recognition strategies and encourage 
participants to process the emotion depicted in the stimuli using information 
processing strategies that required access to conceptual forms of emotional 
knowledge.  
Importantly, reducing the intensity of the stimulus allowed the examination of 
facial expression discrimination using faces depicting milder intensities of emotion. A 
further aim of this study was to produce greater ecological validity, given that in 
everyday life people process a wide range of emotional expressions, including signals 
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that are less intense than full-blown facial expression displays of emotion (see 
Surgladze et al., 2004; Lynch et al., 2006).  
It was anticipated that increasing task difficulty as described above would 
produce significant differences in emotion discrimination speed and accuracy 
performance among the participant groups, with groups with clinical range TAS-20 
scores performing more slowly and less accurately than controls. Differences in the 
speed and accuracy of facial emotion discrimination between the HA and MA group 
were also explored and consistent with Experiment 1(a) and 1(b) it was predicted that 
the HA group would be faster but not more accurate to discriminate between same and 
different facial expressions.  
 
Experiment 2(b) - Method 
 
Participants 
All participants were recruited from the Murdoch University Psychology 
Department or the general population of students of Murdoch University. All 
participants received either course credit or $10 reimbursement for time and travel 
costs. Murdoch University Ethics Department granted approval of this project. 
Sixty-five individuals (43 females and 22 males) took part in Experiment 2(b). 
This was based on a target sample size of 20 participants per group. None of these 
participants took part in any of the other experiments in this series. Participants were 
between 17 and 44 years of age (mean age of 21 years, SD 4.7 years), and had a mean 
of 2.2 years (SD, 1.4 years) of tertiary education.  
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All participants were allocated into groups according to their TAS-20 scores 
using the same selection methods detailed in Experiment 1(a). Respondents with 
scores in the clinical range on any of the subscales of the DASS-21 21 (i.e., Depression 
(<9), Anxiety (<7) and Stress (<14)) or or reported a history of psychological or 
neurological conditions, head injury involving loss of consciousness, or uncorrectable 
visual difficulty were excluded from participation. The three resulting groups 
consisted of 20 participants representing high ‘alexithymia’ (HA), 23 participants 
representing moderate ‘alexithymia’ (MA), and 22 control participants. Participants 
were allocated into the HA and MA group based on a median split (TAS-20 = 64) of 
the total pool of TAS-20 scores that were above the clinical cut-off. The mean TAS-
20 score of the HA group was 68 (SD, 3), the mean TAS-20 score of the MA group 
was 62 (SD, 1) while the mean TAS-20 score of the control group was 46 (SD, 11).  
Table 4 Descriptive and Demographic Data of Participant Groups 
 
Controls MA HA ANOVA Chi-sq 
 
M    SD M   SD M  SD F    p 
 
χ2    p 
 
Age 21.6 (5.5) 20.4 (3.7) 22 (4.7) .497 (ns) 
Tertiary Education (years) 2.5 (1.4) 2 (1.6) 2.3 (1.3) .626 (ns) 
 
Gender (males/females) 15 / 7 13 / 10 15 / 5 
 
.429 (ns) 




A series of statistical tests (see Table 4 above) tested whether groups differed 
on the demographic variables of age, gender, education, and ethnicity. No significant 
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differences were found between the groups, indicating that the groups were matched 
on these variables.  
 
Stimuli 
The same 50 facial photographic images used in Experiment 1(a) were selected 
as raw materials for the current experiment. Using the computer program Abrosoft 
Fantamorph (Version 4), a series of intermediate expressions differing in intensity by 
25% steps was constructed based on the neutral face (0% intensity) and emotional 
facial expression (100% intensity) of the same actor. This resulted in a set of 3 
(intensity steps: 25%, 50%, 75%) x 4 (emotions: happy, sad, angry, fearful) x 4 
(actors). To establish low intensity simuli that were still recognisable, still photographs 
of these images were presented to 10 participants who did not take part in the 
experimental studies. Pilot ratings revealed that morphed photographs at the 25% 
intensity of expression were recognised correctly as conveying the intended emotion 
at levels ranging from just slightly above chance to 75% correct. This range of 
percentage correct scores is in accordance with previous studies in which degraded 
facial expression stimuli were created (Blairy, Herrera & Hess, 1999; Bould, Morris, 
& Wink, 2008; Oberman et al., 2007).  
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Figure 8: A representative example of a stimulus at neutral or 0% intensity, 25% intensity 
and 100% intensity. 
 
Procedure 
Apart from changes to the intensity of emotional expressions in the 
experimental stimuli, all aspects of the procedure of Experiment 2(b) was identical to 
that of Experiment 2(a). The stimuli in Experiment 2(b) were all 25% intensity of 
expression. 
 
Experiment 2(b) - Results 
  
Decision Time Data 
The Decision Times produced as a function of Participant Group in 
Experiment 2(b) are presented in Figure 9. An inspection of the mean DTs showed 
that the control group produced the fastest mean DT, which was an average of 2727 
(SD, 814ms). The HA group produced an average DT of 2826 ms (SD, 563ms) and 
the MA group had the slowest average DT of 3451ms (SD, 338ms). A One-way 
between groups ANOVA with Participant Group (High Alexithymia, Moderate 
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Alexithymia, or control) as the independent variable, and Decision Time latency (DT) 
as the dependent variable revealed a significant main effect of group (F(2,62) = 6.993, 
p = .002). This reflects a significant difference in DT among participant groups.  
 
 
Figure 9: Decision time latency data in Experiment 2(b) as a function of Participant Group 
(High Alexithymia, Moderate Alexithymia, or control). Error bars represent standard errors. The Y-
axis starts at 2000ms mean DT. 
 
Planned contrasts were performed. These revealed that the HA and MA groups 
combined were significantly slower to discriminate facial expressions than controls 
(t(62) = 2.2, p =.029), and the MA group was significantly slower to discriminate 
facial expressions that the HA group (t(62) = 2.9, p = .005).  
 
Percent Accuracy Data 
The mean Accuracy Data as a function of Participant Group in Experiment 
2(b) are presented below in Figure 10. The mean percentage of correct emotion 
discrimination responses for each group showed that the control group produced the 


























63.8% (SD, 8.5%) accuracy and the HA produced the lowest accuracy, at 59.3 (SD, 
4.7%).   
 
 
Figure 10: Mean percent of accurate discrimination responses in Experiment 2(b) as a function 
of Participant Group (High Alexithymia, Moderate Alexithymia, or control). Error bars represent 
standard errors. The Y-axis starts at 45% mean Percent Accuracy. 
 
 
A One-way between groups ANOVA with Participant Group (HA, MA or 
control) as the independent variable, and Percent Accuracy as the dependent variable, 
revealed a significant main effect of group (F(2,62) = 4.1, p = .021). That is, there was 
a significant difference in Percent Accuracy among Participant Groups.  
Follow up planned contrasts revealed that there was a significant difference in 
discrimination accuracy between the HA and MA groups combined compared to 
controls (t(37) = 1.8, p =.081), and the HA group were significantly less accurate on 
the task than the MA group (t(27) = 2.48, p = .021).  
Overall, these data show that the HA group produced the least accurate 
























Experiment 2(b) - Discussion  
Experiment 2(b) examined whether group differences in mean DT and 
accuracy would be found between groups in facial discrimination under difficult task 
conditions. It was hypothesised that the performance of participant groups with scores 
within the clinical range on the TAS-20 would be slower than controls. When stimuli 
were presented at full intensity (100%) of expression in Experiment 2(a), no group 
differences in speed or accuracy were found. It was argued that this task was so easy 
that it could be performed using simple pattern-matching strategies that do not 
necessarily tap deeper information processing ability requiring access to conceptual 
stores of emotional knowledge. For this reason, in Experiment 2(b), the stimuli were 
presented in degraded form at 25% intensity of full emotion expression.  
Under these changed conditions, overall group performance was slower and 
less accurate, as would be expected (the overall mean DT was 1729ms slower in 
Experiment 2(b) than in Experiment 2(a), with an overall mean DT of 1,272ms in 
Experiment 2(a) compared to 3,001ms in Experiment 2(b). The overall mean accuracy 
rate was 28.2% less in Experiment 2(b) than in Experiment 2(a). In Experiment 2(a) 
the overall mean accuracy was 90.7% while in Experiment 2(b) it was 62.5%. Despite 
using different samples in the two experiments, all methodological aspects of these 
experiments were the same apart from intensity of emotional expressions. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that reducing the emotion intensity in the facial stimuli increased 
the level of task difficulty in Experiment 2(b) compared to Experiment 2(a). Future 
studies could test this assumption more directly using a repeated measures design. 
The hypothesis of this experiment that, under the more difficult task conditions 
significant differences in DT and Accuracy would emerge between the clinical level 
TAS-20 groups and controls, was confirmed. Further, the hypothesis that the HA 
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group would be faster but not more accurate than the MA group, was partially 
supported as significant differences were also found between the HA and MA groups 
in both the DT and Accuracy of their facial expression discrimination performance. 
However, contrary to expectations based on the results of Experiment 1 (a) and (b), 
the HA group were found to be significantly less accurate than the MA group. These 
results demonstrate that the emotion recognition deficit associated with alexithymia 
does not solely reflect a language-based (naming) deficit because the groups with 
clinical level TAS-20 scores did not perform as well as controls on a task that did not 
require them to name the emotion15. Together, the results of Experiment 2(a) and 2(b) 
show that differences attributable to alexithymia are apparent under difficult task 
conditions which may require information processing strategies that provide timely 
access to conceptual knowledge of emotion representations.  
Returning to the results of Experiment 2(b), the MA group were the slowest to 
respond on the task, whereas the HA group were the least accurate on the task. As the 
MA group achieved an accuracy rate of 63.8% while for controls the accuracy rate 
was 64.5%, this raises the possibility that they have intact conceptual representations 
of emotional expressions but take longer to accurately discriminate between various 
emotional expressions. Their performance in the current experiment may reflect a 
difficulty with quick or efficient access to this knowledge under speeded or 
challenging conditions. It may also be that under conditions in which it is difficult to 
discriminate emotions, the MA group adopted a cautious response style involving 
 
15 A caveat to this interpretation is that while the discrimination task reduces reliance on lexical 
processing, it may be impossible to completely eliminate the contribution of language to conceptual 
knowledge of emotion categories, as language is thought to lead to the more precise or differentiated 
knowledge of concepts (see Barrett, 2006). 
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slowing down their decision times in order to produce more accurate discrimination 
choices.  
In contrast, the HA group responded more quickly on the task than the MA 
group, but they were less accurate than controls or the MA group (the HA produced 
an average accuracy rate of 59.3%). There are several possible explanations for this 
finding. Firstly, the HA group may have been unaware that they were performing with 
relatively low accuracy and so did not adjust (i.e., decrease), their speed of responding, 
as appears to have been the case for the MA group. It is possible, for instance, that the 
5.2% lower accuracy produced by the HA group compared to controls was not 
clinically significant in terms of representing a real or noticeable difference in the 
groups’ level of accuracy that might be discernible to the HA group.  However, given 
the task was difficult due to the degraded stimuli (at only 25% intensity of full 
emotional expression) and it was performed under speeded conditions, it seems likely 
that the HA group were aware of their difficulty in making accurate facial expression 
discriminations.  
It has been noted in the literature that individuals with alexithymia have some 
preserved awareness of their emotion deficits, particularly as the endorsement of self-
report items on the TAS-20 (particularly for those HA participants in the current 
experiment who scored at the higher end of the clinical range) necessitates an 
“awareness of a lack of emotional awareness” (see Lundt et al. 2002; Parker et al. 
1997). This suggests that participants with clinical level TAS-20 scores do have an 
awareness that tasks such as the facial discrimination task are tapping an ability in 
which they are deficient (i.e., the ability to rapidly access conceptual knowledge of 
emotion). For these reasons, it is unlikely that the HA group focused on speed of 
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responding due to being unaware they were making facial emotion discrimination 
errors. 
There is an alternate explanation for the pattern of results in the current 
experiment involving the HA group producing faster, but less accurate, facial 
discriminations than the MA group. This pattern is like that found in Experiments 1(a 
and b), where the HA group were faster, under dynamic stimuli conditions, to 
recognise facial expressions than the MA group. 
It was argued in Experiment 1(b) that findings involving faster recognition by 
the HA group relative to the MA group may be interpreted as being due to the 
enhanced recruitment of motor simulation processes, which may be prompted by a 
preserved awareness of emotion deficits among individuals with alexithymia. It was 
suggested that the HA group may be more reliant on such a strategy than the MA 
group in order to compensate for deficient facial emotion recognition skills on tasks 
that tap emotional processing (see Lundt et al., 2002; Parker et al., 1997). 
Arguably, the recruitment of motor simulation processes may also account for 
the faster speed of facial expression discrimination in the HA group relative to the MA 
group in the current experiment. Simulation processes are more likely to be adopted 
under difficult conditions where tasks cannot be performed using simple processing 
strategies but rather require the conceptual processing of a stimulus (Kan et al., 2003; 
Niedenthal et al., 2005; Solomon & Barsalou, 2004). The process of simulation has 
also been found to facilitate the speed of emotion recognition to a greater extent than 
accuracy and could account for the faster, but not less accurate, performance of the 
HA group relative to the MA group under dynamic conditions in Experiment 1 (see 
Stel & Knippenberg, 2008). This facilitation is thought to occur via the rapid and 
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automatic priming of corresponding emotion representations in conceptual memory 
(e.g., Atkinson, 2007; Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal et al., 
2005; Winkielman et al., 2009.) While speculative, the difficult task conditions of 
Experiment 2(b) involving degraded stimuli may have prompted the use of a 
compensatory motor-based strategy among the HA group, resulting in the facilitation 
of their latency, but not accuracy, to discriminate facial expressions, relative to the 
MA group.  
A caveat is appropriate here regarding the interpretation of the findings relating 
to the MA group producing more accurate responses than the HA group, and the HA 
group producing faster responses than the MA group. This interpretation should be 
approached in a cautious manner because this sort of pattern in the data may be 
indicative of the presence of a biased response style among these groups, with the HA 
group simply favouring speed over accuracy and the MA group favouring accuracy 
over speed.  
Despite this caution, the results of this experiment confirm that individuals 
with alexithymia do experience difficulty recognising facial expressions. This was 
assessed using a discrimination task that does not confound the ability to recognise 
facial expressions with the verbal ability to name these expressions. A real-life 
implication of the findings of Experiment 2(a) and 2(b) is that, while individuals with 
alexithymia may have intact discrimination ability in circumstances involving full-
blown displays of facial expressions, they may experience more difficulty making 
these interpretations in real life scenarios where facial expressions are often subtle or 
ambiguous and change fleetingly. They may also experience poor confidence in their 
discrimination ability under such difficult conditions. In the next chapter, alexithymia 
and facial mimicry will be further explored.  
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Experiment 3(a) - Alexithymia and Facial Mimicry 
 
One proposed means of understanding another individual’s emotional state is 
by simulating their facial expressions using our own emotion systems (Niedenthal, 
Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). When an individual views 
another’s facial expression, they often unintentionally produce congruent facial 
muscle activity that is almost indiscernible to the eye (Dimberg & Petterson, 2000). 
For instance, when viewing a happy expression, there is often enhanced activity in the 
zygomaticus facial muscle of the observer that is responsible for smiling16. When 
observing an angry face, there may be increased activity in the corrugator muscle that 
is involved in frowning. This is known as facial mimicry. According to current 
literature, the mirror neuron system (MNS) provides the neural basis for facial 
mimicry (Likowski et al., 2012; Molenberghs et al., 2012; Rymarczyk et al., 2011; 
Rymarczyk et al., 2018; Tramacere & Ferrari, 2016). This is a network of sensori-
motor neurons that fire when an individual performs a goal-directed action and when 
they observe the same or a similar action performed by others (e.g. picking up a cup 
of tea).  
The ‘core’ mirror neuron system comprises regions within the premotor area, 
inferior parietal lobe and inferior frontal gyrus (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Likowski 
et al., 2012; Mukamel et al., 2010). Mirror neurons in these areas facilitate action 
understanding by matching observed actions with their corresponding motor 
representations in the observer’s brain (Rizzolatti et al., 2001). These action 
 
16 Hereafter zygomaticus muscle facial mimicry and corrugator muscle facial mimicry will be 
referred to as smile and frown facial mimicry, respectively. 
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representations are an internal re-enactment, or ‘simulation’, of the observed action 
from a first-person or ‘embodied’ perspective, as if the observer was performing the 
same action themselves. Internal motor-based simulations of certain actions may 
represent not only the motor aspects of an action, but also the underlying intentions 
motivating that action (Gallese et al., 2008).  
The observation of facial expressions may also activate an internal 
represention or simulation of emotion. This involves partial activation of the 
visceromotor emotion response system corresponding to that emotion. For example, 
when viewing a fearful facial expression the observer may experience heightened 
alertness, an increase in breathing rate, the release of stress hormones, a decrease in 
skin temperature, ‘goose bumps’ or hair standing on end, and activation of the facial 
muscles responsible for the expression of fear (Niedenthal, 2007). Alternatively, when 
viewing an angry face, the observer may experience a rise in blood pressure, some 
activation of the muscles in the hands used to strike, as well as facial mimicry 
involving the muscles involved in frowning (Niedenthal, 2007).  
Emotion-relevant simulation such as this is thought to rely on an ‘extended’ 
mirror neuron system that is activated in brain imaging studies according to the 
modality of the task and stimuli (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Likowski et al., 2012; 
Mukamel et al., 2010; Molenberghs et al., 2012; Rymarczyk, Zurawski, Jankowiak-
Siuda, & Szatkowska, 2018). This system is served by a variety of neural structures, 
including the insula, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and parts of the limbic system, 
such as the amygdala (Kircher et al., 2013; Likowski et al., 2012; for review see 
Menon & Uddin, 2010; Molenberghs et al., 2012; Rymarczyk et al., 2011; Rymarczyk 
et al., 2018).  
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Facial mimicry is argued to play a key role in the simulation process (Dimberg, 
Andreasson, & Thunberg, 2011; Likowski et al., 2012; Rymarczyk et al., 2018; Wood, 
Rychlowska, Korb, & Niedenthal, 2016; Tramacere & Ferrari, 2016). Facial mimicry 
is considered to be a goal-directed automatic mechanism that facilitates the quick and 
effortless recognition and understanding of others’ action, feelings and intentions 
through an internal re-enactment or simulation process (e.g., Murata et al., 2016). This 
simulation is argued to prime conceptual knowledge associated with the target 
emotion, such as the emotion name and its accompanying meanings (see Gallese, 
Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Wood, Rychlowska, Korb, & Niedenthal., 2016). The 
simulation account has been largely supported by findings that blocking facial 
mimicry impairs the speed of recognition of facial expressions of emotion (e.g., 
Niedenthal et al., 2010; Stel & Knippenberg, 2008). Although some studies (e.g., 
Blairy, Herrerra & Hess, 1999; Hess & Blairy, 2000) have failed to find evidence of a 
positive correlation between facial mimicry and facial emotion recognition accuracy, 
these null results may reflect the possibility that accuracy is a less sensitive 
performance measure than latency (for examples, see Collins, 1999; Collins, 2002; 
Collins, & Coney, 1998; Collins, & Cooke, 2005; Osgood, 1953; Shapiro, 1968; 
Wearing & Montague, 1970). 
As facial mimicry is assumed to contribute to the ability to recognise facial 
emotions, and part of the overall aim of the current thesis was to study the ability to 
recognise facial emotion in alexithymia, the facial mimicry responses of two groups 
representing clinical levels of alexithymia and a control group were examined in 
Experiment 3(a). Currently, there are two published studies that have measured facial 
mimicry in groups representing alexithymia. These studies are outlined below.  
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Sonnby-Borgstrom (2009) presented static facial photographs to a group 
representing alexithymia (although this group had a mean TAS-20 score of 52.49, 
below the clinical cut-off score of 61) while participants’ facial mimicry responses 
were measured using EMG. Sonnby-Borgstrom found no group differences in smile 
facial mimicry and reduced frown facial mimicry in participants with so-called ‘high’ 
TAS-20 scores relative to controls (who had a lower mean TAS-20 score of 36.71). 
This was interpreted by Sonnby-Borgstrom as a strategy adopted by individuals with 
alexithymia to avoid negative emotions.  
In the other published study on this topic, Scarpazza, Ladavas, and Cattaneo 
(2018) measured facial mimicry responses using facial EMG to static photographs of 
facial expressions among a group with clinical range TAS-20 and Diagnostic Criteria 
for Psychosomatic Research (DCPR; Mangeli et al. 2006) scores compared to a 
control group. The group representing alexithymia produced equivalent smile facial 
mimicry responses relative to controls, although these responses were delayed, and 
they did not produce frown facial mimicry responses. Scarpazza et al. (2018) 
suggested that the findings were due to hypo-activation of the amygdala in people with 
alexithymia.  
In summary, the two published studies on facial mimicry and alexithymia 
outlined above found the group representing alexithymia produced reduced frown 
facial mimicry responses and similar levels of smile facial mimicry relative to 
controls. Both studies employed static stimuli. Only Scarpazza, Ladavas, and Cattaneo 
(2018) used the TAS-20 clinical cut-off score in the selection of participants.  
One further relevant investigation of facial mimicry in alexithymia appears as 
a conference abstract authored by Dawes, McDonald, and Rushby (2013). While the 
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mean scores of their groups were not provided, the group with “high to moderate” 
TAS-20 scores showed a reversed pattern involving greater frown facial mimicry to 
static pictures, and greater smile facial mimicry in a dynamic stimuli presentation 
condition, relative to a group with lower scores on the TAS-20. There is currently no 
available published work on facial mimicry among individuals with clinical levels of 
alexithymia using dynamic facial expressions. The exclusive use of static facial stimuli 
in the two previous published works in this area means that findings relate to 
laboratory situations using artificial static images and have limited generalisability to 
real life situations where facial expressions typically unfold in a dynamic fashion. Yet, 
the dynamic presentation of facial emotion stimuli has been found to elicit more 
pronounced facial mimicry responses than static presentations, particularly for happy 
stimuli compared to angry stimuli (Weyers et al., 2006; Sato et al., 2008; Rymarczyk 
et al., 2011). Dynamic facial expressions not only better represent real-life social 
interactions but also arguably constitute a more powerful medium for the 
communication of emotion cues than static presentations. Clearly, further 
investigation of facial mimicry among alexithymia populations using dynamic facial 
emotion stimuli is justified.  
In view of this, in the current study the occurence of smile and frown facial 
mimicry responses in participant groups with TAS-20 scores in the moderate and high 
clinical ranges and in the normal range (the control group) were measured while they 
viewed dynamic displays of facial emotion. This investigation addressed the overall 
aim of the present thesis, to investigate emotion recognition in alexithymia from a 
broad theoretical perspective that included ‘embodied’ simulation-based methods and 
frameworks.  
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Given Sonnby-Borgstrom (2009) and Scarpazza, Ladavas, and Cattaneo 
(2018) found that the groups representing alexithymia produced reduced frown facial 
mimicry relative to controls, it was hyothesised that the alexithymia (HA and MA 
combined) groups in the current experiment would produce less frown facial mimicry 
than controls in an Angry Expression condition.  
Further, as Dawes, McDonald, and Rushby (2013) reported in their conference 
abstract that the group with “high to moderate” TAS-20 scores produced greater frown 
facial mimicry in a dynamic stimuli presentation condition relative to a group with 
lower TAS-20 scores, which is somewhat consistent with the unusual pattern of results 
found in Experiments 1(a), 1(b) and 2(b) of this series of experiments, where the HA 
group produced a faster and more accurate emotion recognition and discrimination 
performance than the MA group, it was hypothesised that the HA group would 
produce more frown facial mimicry than the MA group.  
While Sonnby-Borgstrom (2009) and Scarpazza, Ladavas, and Cattaneo 
(2018) did not find evidence for group differences in smile facial mimicry, a Happy 
Expression condition was also included. This was because these previous studies 
relied on static images of facial expressions and dynamic facial emotion stimuli elicit 
more pronounced smile facial mimicry responses than static presentations (Weyers et 
al., 2006; Sato et al., 2008; Rymarczyk et al., 2011). It was expected that group 
diffences would also emerge in smile facial mimicry with the alexithymia groups 
producing less smile facial mimicry than controls. It was also expected, based on the 
findings of Experiments 1(a), 1(b) and 2(b), that the HA group would produce more 
smile facial mimicry than the MA group. 
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Consistent with the general facial mimicry literature and the findings of 
Sonnby-Borgstrom (2009) and Scarpazza, Ladavas, and Cattaneo (2018), it was also 
hypothesised that all groups would demonstrate more smile facial mimicry than frown 
facial mimicry. 
 
Experiment 3(a) - Method 
 
Design 
This experiment was conceived of as a Group (HA, MA, control) by 
Expression (neutral, smile, frown) mixed factors design. The rationale for the 
inclusion of the neutral stimulus condition was that, a priori, it was of interest to 
observe whether mimicry would occur indiscriminantly in the context of viewing a 
neutral facial expression. Incongruent responses (e.g., a smile produced to a frown) 
were also assessed given there are some reports of ‘counter-mimicry’ in the literature 
(see Beall, 2008; Carr et al., 2014; Lanzetta & Englis, 1989). The dependent variables 
for the current experiment were Occurrence of Facial Mimicry, defined as the 
Percentage Occurrence of visible muscle movements referred to in the Facial Action 
Coding System17 (FACS; Ekman, & Friesen, 1978) as Action Units or AU12 
 
17 The facial action coding system (FACS; Ekman, & Friesen, 1978) was chosen to measure 
the occurrence of facial mimicry in the current series of experiments over the use of electromyography 
(EMG) for the following reasons: 1) It is difficult to eliminate artifacts that can distort the EMG signal, 
2) the use of electrodes in facial EMG is generally not a comfortable experience for the subject and so 
does not reproduce experiences in the real world, and 3) facial EMG is best used to identify positive 
and negative affect, or variation in pleasant and unpleasant valance, and not discrete emotions. Systems 
like FACS are generally considered better for the detection of discrete emotions (for discussion, see 
Read, 2017). 
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(signifying a smile) and AU4 (signifying a frown) (see below for further detail), and 
Latency of Facial Mimicry, defined as the Speed of Onset of AU12 and AU4.  
 
Measures 
The following questionnaires were used as psychometric screening measures: 
20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994); 21 item 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), which comprises 21 
self-report items designed to measure depression, anxiety, and stress in clinical and 
nonclinical groups, and a self-report question sheet designed to obtain demographic 
information (age, sex, ethnicity, and the number of years of university study) and 
relevant history of previous and/or present psychiatric or neurological disorders. 




A total of 73 individuals (22 males, 51 females) took part in Study 3(a). None 
had participated in any of the other studies in this series of experiments. Participants 
were between 18 and 49 years of age (mean age 25.7 years, SD, 8.6) with a mean of 
1.8 years of tertiary education (SD, 0.9). All participated in return for course credit or 
received $10 (AUD) reimbursement for their time and travel costs.  
 The same method as described in Experiment 1(a) of the present thesis 
was used to recruit, screen, and allocate participants to two groups with TAS-20 scores 
in the clinical range for alexithymia and a control group. Briefly, 395 students were 
administered the measures described above. Respondents who returned a TAS-20 total 
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score on or above the standardised clinical cut-off score of 61 recommended by 
Taylor, Bagby and Parker (1997) were invited to participate in the experimental phase 
of the study. These participants were allocated to a high ‘alexithymia’ group (HA) or 
a moderate ‘alexithymia’ group (MA) based on a median split of the total pool of TAS-
20 scores that were above the clinical cut-off score of 61. A further group of 
respondents, who scored below the standardised TAS-20 cut-off score of 51 (Taylor, 
Bagby and Parker, 1999) were considered as potential control group participants. 
Participants were selected to participate in the control group if they matched the HA 
and MA groups on several demographic factors (as shown in Table 5).  
Respondents were considered ineligible for participation if they returned 
scores in the clinical range on any of the subscales of the DASS-21 (i.e., Depression 
(<9), Anxiety (<7) and Stress (<14)) or or reported a history of psychological or 
neurological conditions, head injury involving loss of consciousness, or uncorrectable 
visual difficulty.  
A target sample size of 20 participants per group was determined based on the 
approximate sample size of previous facial mimicry studies. However, further 
participants were available and so were recruited to the current experiment. After 
applying the selection and exclusion criteria above, the three participant groups 
comprised: 22 high ‘alexithymia’ (HA) participants, 23 moderate ‘alexithymia’ (MA) 
participants and 28 controls. The mean TAS-20 score of the HA group was 67.5 (SD, 
2.2), the mean TAS-20 score of the MA group was 62.4 (SD, 1.2) while the mean 
TAS-20 score of the control group was 34 (SD, 8.1).  
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A series of statistical analyses revealed no significant differences among 
participants on the demographic factors of age, tertiary education, gender, and 
ethnicity (see Table 5 below).  
Table 5 Descriptive and Demographic Data of Participant Groups 
 Controls MA HA ANOVA Chi-sq 
 M     SD M    SD M   SD F     p x2   p 
Age 28.1 (8.8) 24.4 (8.2) 24.1 (8.3) 1.76  ns  
Tertiary Education (years) 2.1 (0.9) 1.6   (1.0) 1.6 (1.0) 2.84  ns  
Gender (males/females) 6 / 22 6 / 17 10 / 12  1      ns 
Ethnicity (Caucausian/Asian) 26 / 2 18 / 5 17 / 5        3.87  ns 
 
Stimuli 
Twenty-four morphing movies of facial expressions were presented as stimuli. 
The total set of movies consisted of eight movies, each comprised of: a neutral face 
morphing into a happy face; a neutral face morphing into an angry face, and a neutral 
face morphing into another neutral face. The raw materials for these video clips were 
32 photographs chosen from the pool of pre-validated images of The Karolinska 
Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF: Lundqvist, Flykt, & Ohman, 1998). Of these 
photographs, 8 depicted a happy expression, 8 depicted an angry expression, and 16 
were neutral. These photographs were arranged into pairs, with one neutral image of 
an actor matched with: one happy image of the same actor; one angry image of the 
same actor; and one neutral image of a different actor of the same gender. This resulted 
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in a total of 24 pairs (comprising 50% male actors and 50% female actors). The two 
photographs in each pair formed the morph end-points.  
Prior to constructing the morph movies, unwanted variation was removed from 
these photographs by retouching them using Paintshop Pro (e.g., the hair in one image 
of each pair was replicated in the corresponding image). Then, following the procedure 
employed by Sato and Yoshikawa (2007), each morph was created by: 1) constructing 
37 single interpolated images between the morph end points using computer-morphing 
software (Abrosoft Fantamorph, Version 4); and 2) producing six replications of each 
of the two end-point photographs.  
Each frame was presented in succession for 40ms. This resulted in an entire 
morph sequence consisting of 51 frames, presented for a total stimulus duration of 
2040ms (i.e., 7 frames of the first photograph presented across a 280ms duration, 37 
interpolated frames presented across a duration of 1480ms, and 7 frames of the last 
photograph presented across a 280ms duration). This rate of change is consistent with 
the natural unfolding of facial expressions (Sato & Yoshikawa, 2004).  
All animation clips were digitized to 698 X 931 pixels and saved as 
compressed, high-resolution .avi files. 
 
Apparatus 
Experimental events were controlled by a program written in DirectRT 
(Version 2006.2) and implemented on an Intel Core 2 Duo Processor computer with 
Microsoft Windows XP operating system. The stimuli were presented on a BenQ 19-
inch LCD monitor.  
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To film participants’ faces, a video camera (Samsung DV Digital Camcorder) 
was located under the computer monitor and adjusted so that the participant’s face was 
in full view. The video camera was hidden inside a 3-sided wooden box which was 
painted black internally and set behind a tinted piece of glass, allowing the camera to 
see out but making it impossible to see inside the box. The video camera recorded 
participants’ full faces at the rate of 25 frames per second.  
 Philips Combo DVD/VCR using DVD+R video recorder was used for 
recording. Instead of a chin rest, which might have restricted movement of the lower 
face, a large square timber frame was constructed. An LED device connected to the 
serial parallel port was positioned inside the timber frame, out of view of the 
participant, so that the camera filming the participant’s face also recorded the LED 
display and allowed relevant information about trial events (i.e., stimulus onset and 
trial number), to be embedded in each video frame for post data collection analysis.  
 
Procedure 
This project received ethical clearance from the Murdoch University Human 
Research Ethics Committee, and all participants provided written informed consent. 
Participants were tested individually in purpose-built computer cubicles in a quiet 
laboratory. At the beginning of the experiment, it was explained that they would be 
performing a computer task that involved watching a series of moving faces on the 
computer. The facial expressions of participants were video recorded over the course 
of the stimulus presentation and coded according to the Facial Action Coding System 
manual (Ekman, & Friesen, 1978). 
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To preserve the spontaneity of participant’s facial expressions, they were not 
told that their faces would be video recorded. Instead, a cover story was employed 
suggesting that they would be taking part in a memory task. Participants were then 
instructed to sit in the cubicle and align their faces with a timber frame that was set up 
at the entrance to the cubicle. While it was explained to them that the purpose of this 
part of the procedure was to ensure that their eyes remained at a constant distance from 
the screen, the real purpose was to reduce artefacts in the data, such as the participant 
turning their face away from camera. The timber frame was considered to have less 
impact on participants’ ability to produce facial expressions than a chin rest. 
Participants then viewed the following instructions on the computer screen:  
“This experiment is a test of memory for faces. You are about 
to see a series of faces presented on the computer screen. Your task is 
to simply observe the faces and try to remember the TYPE of FACIAL 
EXPRESSION depicted on each face. LATER you will be shown some 
of these faces again and asked to answer some questions about them. 
Please stay relaxed but keep your eyes on the computer screen at all 
times to ensure you attend fully to the images being presented. You are 
not required to make a response during this part of the task; you simply 
watch the faces on screen. Please press the MIDDLE button on the 
response box to start the experiment”. 
Participants then viewed 48 trials consisting of two presentations of each 
morph movie. Trials were presented randomly within three fixed blocks of each 
emotion category. The three blocks of trials (happy, angry, and neutral) were 
administered in a counterbalanced order. However, to minimise carry-over mood 
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effects from the emotion trials, the neutral trials always appeared in the middle block. 
The order of the happy and angry blocks was counterbalanced among participants so 
that half saw the angry trials first and the other half saw the happy trials first.  
In each trial, a centrally placed fixation cross was first presented for 500ms. 













Figure 11. Representative examples of participants’ facial reactions to the dynamic facial 
expression stimuli in Experiment 3(a). The top left figure presents a frown facial mimicry response 
(central portions of the brows are lowered, and brows pulled together) in response to the presentation 
of an angry morph movie. The bottom right figure presents a smile facial mimicry response (lip corners 
are elongated and angled up and cheeks raised) in response to the presentation of the happy morph 
movie. The participants featured in these images gave permission for photographs from the video 
footage collected in Experiment 3(a) to be included in this thesis. 
 
AU 4 (Brow 
Lowering) 
AU 12 (Lip Corner 
Pulling) 
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Participants were then debriefed in full as to the purpose of the study and 
informed that they had been covertly video recorded. Permission to use the digitised 
video file for analysis and to publish images from the video footage in this thesis was 
requested. In all cases, permission was granted and written consent was obtained. 
Participants were then questioned as to whether they had been aware that their faces 
had been video recorded. All participants stated that they had been unaware of the 
video recording. Finally, participants were asked not to discuss the covert aspect of 
the procedure with other potential participants.   
 
Video data 
Facial expressions of participants were analysed using the Facial Action 
Coding System developed by Ekman and colleagues (FACs; Ekman, & Friesen, 
1978). FACs describes visible facial muscular movements in terms of Action Units 
(AUs). Two AUs were coded corresponding to the targeted muscles in Study 3(a). 
They were AU12 for Zygomaticus major (the lip corner puller, which signifies a 
smile), and AU4 for Corrugator supercilii (the brow ‘lowerer’, which signifies a 
frown). See Figure 11 for representative examples of participants’ smile and frown 
facial mimicry reactions.  
Video data was coded following the scoring parameters employed by 
McIntosh (2006). In accordance with this scoring system, target AUs (AU12, AU4) 
were coded as a facial mimicry response if it was evident that: 1) there was a fast rise 
in facial muscle activity; 2) the AU was of relatively small magnitude; 3) the AU was 
sustained for over 100ms; and 4) the AU occurred within the time window of 100ms 
to 3000ms. 
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Video data was coded by the author of this thesis, who is an experienced FACS 
coder. Following Ekman, Friesen, and Ancoli, (1980), a second coder, who was 
trained by the primary coder for reliability purposes, coded 30% of trials. This was 
due to the time-intensive nature of the coding. Coders made binary judgements about 
whether the target AU was active within the specified time window. Both coders were 
blind to the category of the emotional expression depicted in the stimuli on each trial 
(apart from the neutral trials, which were always presented in the middle block of 
trials). The inter-coder reliability for the scoring of this measure was calculated as the 
number of AUs on which both coders agreed multiplied by two (number of coders) 
and divided by the total number of AUs coded by both coders. This revealed an 
agreement ratio of 88% between coders. This level of inter-coder reliability reflects a 
satisfactory level of similarity among coder ratings (Ekman, Friesen, & Ancoli, 1980) 
and allows confidence in the assumption that the coding was reliable for the broader 
data set. 
 
Experiment 3(a) - Results 
 
Data analysis commenced by examining whether participant groups differed 
in the amount of facial mimicry they produced. This was defined as the percentage 
occurrence of AU12 (signifying a smile) and AU4 (signifying a frown), in the three 
trial conditions (neutral, congruent, incongruent). Preliminary analyses indicated that 
the percent occurrence of facial mimicry among the participant groups was extremely 
low across the neutral trial condition (ranging from 0 - 1%). Incongruent response 
rates were also extremely low (ranging from 0 - 1.2%). While facial mimicry 
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commonly occurs on a relatively low proportion of trials (Sato & Yoshikawa, 2007; 
Yoshimura et al., 2015), these very low rates of facial mimicry responses in the neutral 
stimulus and incongruent response conditions of the current experiment rendered the 
statistical analyses of those conditions invalid. Thus, the neutral and incongruent 
response conditions were excluded from further analysis. These results did provide 
useful information however, in suggesting that, in the context of the current 
experiment, facial mimicry involved mainly congruent reactions. 
Then, a 3 x 2 mixed factors design was computed, with Group (HA, MA, 
Control) as the between-groups variable and Expression (Happy, Anger) the within-
subjects variable. The Dependent Variable was the Percent Occurrence of Congruent 
Facial Mimicry (referred to as facial mimicry), which was calculated as 100*(the total 
number of congruent trials where target AUs occurred/the total number of trials per 
condition). Measurement of the Latency of congruent Facial Mimicry commenced 
after the onset of dynamic changes in the stimuli, instead of the latency after stimulus 
onset, because the first 240ms of the stimulus presentation displayed a single image 
depicting a neutral expression.  
Analysis of whether participant groups differed in the speed of onset of 
congruent facial mimicry responses was not undertaken as there were insufficient 
observations to permit reliable statistical analysis. For example, in one condition the 
percent occurrence of facial mimicry was below 2% across the 48 trials. Hence, facial 
mimicry latencies were omitted from further statistical analysis. 
To address whether there were group differences in the Percent Occurrence of 
Congruent Facial Mimicry in the Happy and Anger data, a mixed design ANOVA was 
performed (with Participant Group and Expression Type as between group and repeat 
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measures independent variables, respectively). The mixed model ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect for Group, F(2, 70) = 10.81, p = <.001. Here, the Percent 
Occurrence of Congruent Facial Mimicry responses differed according to Participant 
Group. Participants in the control group engaged in the highest number of mimicry 
responses (i.e. Mean 24.2% of trials, SD 3.4%) whereas the HA group produced facial 
mimicry responses on 12.6% (SD 3.4%) of trials. The MA group produced the lowest 
proportion of facial mimicry (i.e. on 4.9% of trials (SD 1.8%).  
The mixed model ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect for 
Expression type, F(1,70) = 10.541, p = .002, in which mimicry occurred more 
frequently in the Happy condition than the Anger condition at 10.6% of trials for the 
Happy condition (SD 14.38%) relative to 4.04% of trials in the Anger condition (SD 
8.6%). 
There was also a trend towards an interaction between the two independent 
variables (Expression Type and Group interaction), F(2,70) = 2.761, p = .07. (Please 
see Figure 12 for The Mean Percent Occurrence of Congruent Facial Mimicry 
produced in Experiment 3(a) as a function of Expression Condition and Participant 
Group Condition). In the Happy condition, controls produced the highest amount of 
facial mimicry (i.e., Mean 17.93% of trials, SD 3.29%), while the HA group produced 
facial mimicry on 9.23% of trials (SD 2.44%). The MA group produced fewer mimicry 
responses (i.e., Mean 2.99% of trials, SD 1.42%). In the Anger condition, controls 
again produced facial mimicry on the greatest number of trials (i.e., Mean 6.29%, SD 
1.9%), while the HA group produced facial mimicry on 3.41% of trials (SD 1.8%). 
The MA group produced the least amount of facial mimicry, that is, 1.91% of trials 




Figure 12: The Mean Percent Occurrence of Facial Mimicry in Experiment 3(a) as a function 
of Expression Condition (Happy, Angry) and Participant Group (High Alexithymia, Moderate 
Alexithymia, or controls). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
While the interaction of Expression Type and Group approached, but did not 
achieve, significance (p = .07), it nevertheless formed part of the original research 
focus of this study. Therefore, the hypotheses that group differences would emerge in 
each Expression condition were explored further in the analysis of simple effects using 
a one way between groups ANOVA and a series of planned contrasts. This was to 
ascertain whether there were group differences in the amount of congruent facial 
mimicry produced in the Happy and Anger Expression conditions, when analysed 
separately.  
This analysis revealed a significant effect for Group in the Happy condition 
F(2,70) = 8.40, p = .001. The first planned contrast revealed the occurrence of smile 
facial mimicry for the two alexithymia groups combined (MA and HA) was 













































contrast revealed that the HA group produced significantly more smile facial mimicry 
than the MA group (t(33) = 2.2, p = .034).  
A one way between groups ANOVA indicated that there was no significant 
group difference in facial mimicry in the Anger condition (F(2,70) = 1.806, p = .172). 
Two planned contrasts were non-significant. These indicated there was no significant 
difference in frown facial mimicry between the HA and MA groups combined versus 
that of controls, or between the HA and the MA groups (t(70) = 1.74, p = .07; t(70) = 
.54, p =.551, respectively). 
 Planned t-tests were also carried out to analyse the difference in Happy and 
Anger facial mimicry within each group. These comparisons revealed that controls 
produced 11.6% more mimicry responses in the Happy condition than in the Frown 
condition, and this difference was significant (t(27) = 2.755, p = .01). There was also 
a significant difference in the occurrence of facial mimicry for the different 
expressions in the HA group, with 5.7% more mimicry in the Happy condition than 
the Anger condition, (t(21) = 2.187, p = .04). In contrast, there was no significant 
difference in mimicry responses in the MA group, with only 1% more mimicry in the 
Happy condition than the Anger condition (t(22) = .641, p = .528).  
In summary, participants made significantly more congruent facial mimicry 
responses to smiles than frowns. As well, the groups differed in the percent occurrence 
of facial mimicry responses in the Happy condition, but there were no group 
differences in facial mimicry in the Anger condition. Furthermore, controls produced 
the highest number of facial mimicry responses, followed by the group with the 
highest TAS-20 scores (HA), who produced a higher mean number of facial mimicry 
responses than the group with lower TAS-20 scores (MA). While HA and controls 
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produced more congruent facial mimicry of smiles than frowns, the MA produced 
equivalent smile and frown facial mimicry reactions, and these were at a very low rate.   
 
Experiment 3(a) - Discussion  
 
In the current study, facial mimicry of smiles or frowns was very low or absent 
on neutral trials (0% - 1%). This suggests that facial mimicry did not occur 
indiscriminantly to the faces presented. There were also very low levels of incongruent 
mimicry on the emotion trials (for example, smile mimicry produced in response to 
angry facial stimuli). This is consistent with previous research using FACS coding of 
the percent occurrence of facial mimicry trials. More specifically, Yoshimura, Sato, 
Uono, and Toichi (2015) found low occurrence rates of less than 2% for incongruent 
facial mimicry of smiles in their Anger condition as measured by FACS. Similarly, 
Sato and Yoshikawa (2007) found incongruent smile facial mimicry using FACS on 
less than 3% of trials. Overall, the rates of facial mimicry found in the current study 
are generally consistent with these studies. This confirms that the data for the current 
experiment is interpretable, as the very low rates of facial mimicry to neutral and 
incongruent facial expressions is consistent with extant research. 
In regard to the occurrence of congruent facial mimicry in this experiment, the 
control group produced congruent smile facial mimicry in the Happy condition on 
17.93% of trials. This is similar to the percent occurrence of smile facial mimicry 
found in previous FACs scored studies. For example, Yoshimura et al. (2015) found 
controls produced smile facial mimicry on 14% of trials and Sato and Yoshikawa 
(2007) found smile mimicry in their control group on about 30% of trials.  
 159 
In the current study, frown facial mimicry was produced by controls on 6.29% 
of trials whereas Yoshimura et al. (2015) and Sato and Yoshikawa (2007) found frown 
mimicry occurred on about 12 % of trials. The slightly lower rates in the current study 
may be due to methodological or procedural differences relating to details such as the 
stimulus presentation (i.e., 2040ms in the current study versus 1520ms in these 
previous studies) or mode of trial presentation (ie., the use of blocked expression trials 
in the current study versus randomised expression trials in the previous studies 
mentioned).  
Turning to consideration of the relationship between alexithymia and facial 
mimicry, the results of the present experiment showed that participant groups differed 
in the amount of congruent facial mimicry produced when viewing dynamic facial 
expressions of emotion. Overall, controls produced a greater amount of facial mimicry 
than the groups with clinical range TAS-20 scores. This is consistent with EMG 
studies on facial mimicry and alexithymia using static stimuli by Sonnby-Borgstrom 
(2009) and Scarpazza et al. (2018) who found groups representing alexithymia 
produced less facial mimicry than controls, although their results were moderated by 
the Expression condition (described in further detail below). Interestingly, in the 
current study, the group with the highest TAS-20 scores (HA), produced overall more 
mimicry than those with TAS-20 scores that were lower (MA) but still within the 
clinical range. This is a novel finding as prior studies have not examined the difference 
in facial mimicry performance between groups with TAS-20 scores in the moderate 
versus high clinical range. A similar reverse pattern was evident in the data of 
Experiments 1(a and b) and 2(b) of the current thesis, albeit with different 
methodologies that examined recognition and discrimination performance.  
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A further major finding of Experiment 3(a) is that groups performed differently 
in the different Expression conditions. The HA group and controls produced greater 
amounts of mimicry in the Happy condition than the Anger condition. In contrast, the 
MA group produced equivalent, but low, amounts of smile and frown facial reactions 
in both Expression conditions. Their mean level of facial mimicry was very low (under 
4%).  
There was also a difference in the amount of facial mimicry produced among 
all groups in the Happy condition. Controls produced the greatest amount of smile 
facial mimicry responses. The HA group produced the next highest amount of smile 
facial mimicry. The MA group produced the least amount of smile facial mimicry. 
This could be interpreted as inconsistent with the findings of Sonnby-Borgstrom 
(2009), who reported equal levels of smile facial mimicry EMG responses to happy 
faces among controls and a group representing alexithymia. However, their 
‘alexithymic’ group had TAS-20 scores below the clinical range, which may account 
for the difference. The current finding is certainly inconsistent with Scarpazza, 
Ladavas, and Cattaneo (2018), who found that a group with clinical range TAS-20 
scores produced equivalent (but slower) smile facial mimicry EMG responses to 
controls when viewing static images of happy faces. 
However, these studies employed static facial images and the current 
investigation employed dynamic facial stimuli. Research demonstrates that dynamic 
facial expression stimuli tends to elicit more pronounced smile facial mimicry than 
static happy stimuli among typical populations (Rymarcyk et al., 2011, 2016; Weyer 
et al., 2006). Dynamic stimuli, particularly happy faces, have also been found to 
increase activation within the insula, ACC and amygdala, which are referred to as the 
extended mirror neuron system, to a greater extent than static stimuli (e.g., Arsalidou, 
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Morris, & Taylor, 2011; Kilts et al., 2003; LaBar et al., 2003). However, brain imaging 
studies of individuals with alexithymia have shown that these structures are smaller or 
less active (eg Berthoz et al., 2002; Borsci et al., 2009; Gundel et al., 2004; Kano et 
al., 2003; Karlsson, Naatanen & Stenman, 2008, Paradiso et al., 2008; Reker et al., 
2009; Silani et al., 2008). Impaired ability to effectively recruit these extended 
emotion-relevant structures may account for the reduced smile facial mimicry in the 
current study among groups representing alexithymia compared to controls.  
At face value, such an explanation does not account for the unusual pattern 
that was evident in the data where the HA group produced more smile facial mimicry 
than the MA group. As noted previously, a similar pattern was evident in Experiments 
1(a and b) and 2(b) of this thesis (using different methodologies), where the HA group 
produced faster facial emotion recognition and discrimination performance than the 
MA group. While one interpretation put forward for these findings was that the MA 
group may have been more cognisant of their deficits and so responded more 
conservatively (in this case, slowly) on the experimental tasks, it was argued that 
conditions that encourage slower responding are typically associated with greater 
accuracy rates. This effect is known as the speed versus accuracy trade off. A speed 
versus accuracy trade off did not emerge in the data of Experiments 1(a and b) of this 
thesis. Rather it was argued that the results are more compatible with the idea of the 
HA group using a compensatory strategy to improve their task performance. 
 In Experiment 2(b) of this thesis, the HA participants were also faster to 
perform a discrimination task than the MA group. While this data did show possible 
evidence of participants adopting a biased response style, it was argued that the faster 
responses and low accuracy of the HA group relative to the MA group may reflect the 
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facilitation of their speed in responding to facial emotion via a compensatory 
mechanism.  
Motor simulation was put forward as a possible candidate for this mechanism 
via enhanced action perception mapping of the observed action. Such a mechanism 
would potentially provide greater knowledge of what the observed other is ‘doing’ but 
not an enhanced understanding of what the other is ‘feeling’. This idea is consistent 
with the findings of Dawes, McDonald, and Rushby (2013), who reported a reversed 
pattern of higher facial mimicry or “hyper-mimicry” among a high TAS-20 scoring 
group compared to a low TAS-20 scoring group. As this data was published only as 
conference abstract, the authors did not provide an explanation for this finding. More 
broadly, brain imaging studies by Karlsson, Naatanen, and Stenman (2008) and 
Moriguchi et al. (2006) suggest that relative to people with TAS-20 scores in the non-
clinical range, individuals with TAS-20 scores in the clinical range demonstrate 
greater activity in motor-related MNS regions, such as the motor and pre-motor cortex, 
along with decreased affect-related extended mirror neuron activity, when viewing 
emotion-eliciting video clips. These findings support the view that greater levels of 
facial mimicry observed in the HA group relative to the MA group in the current study 
may reflect increased motor-related activity in the MNS.  
In contrast to the pattern of results in the Happy condition, all groups produced 
low levels of facial mimicry in response to dynamic angry faces and there were no 
significant differences among participant groups in the amount of frown facial 
mimicry they produced. This differs from the findings of Sonnby-Borgstrom (2009), 
who did find group differences in the level of frown facial mimicry produced, with the 
so-called alexithymia group producing significantly less frown facial mimicry than the 
control group. Scarpazza, Ladavas, and Cattaneo (2018) also found, consistent with 
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Sonnby-Borgstrom (2009), group differences in frown facial mimicry in a group with 
TAS-20 scores above clinical levels compared to controls, with their high TAS-20 
group producing frown facial mimicry at floor levels.  
Even so, the results of the current study are more in keeping with the general 
facial mimicry literature, where angry facial expression stimuli generally elicit very 
low levels of EMG responses to angry faces and stronger facial mimicry responses are 
produced to happy faces (Rymarcyk et al., 2011; Weyer et al., 2006). While it is not 
entirely clear why individuals are generally more likely to mimic happiness than anger 
(Rymarcyk et al., 2016), it has been suggested that facial mimicry may not be an 
exclusively automatic reaction but rather depends on a number of goal-directed or top-
down factors (Hess & Bourgeois, 2010; Hess & Fischer, 2014). This includes 
moderation by the goals, attitudes or intentions of the observer (e.g., Bourgeois & 
Hess, 2008; Hess & Fisher, 2014; Likowski et al., 2008) 
A potential explanation for Scarpazza, Ladavas, and Cattaneo (2018) and 
Sonnby-Borgstrom’s (2009) findings of overall greater levels of frown facial mimicry 
than in the current study may be because their participants simultaneously performed 
a gender categorisation or emotion-irrelevant task. This may have reduced any 
potential social relevance of the stimuli and led to greater levels of frown facial 
mimicry responses being produced. While in Experiment 3(a) a social context was not 
a feature of the task (as participants were told instead that the task was a memory test), 
the fact that they viewed the angry faces on screen might have created some social 
relevance. For instance, the angry facial expressions might have been interpreted to 
some extent as if they were being directed toward the participants. This may have 
reduced frown facial mimicry in groups to floor levels. 
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In any case, furthering our understanding of top-down or motivational factors 
relating to facial mimicry and alexithymia and, more specifically, exploring 
differences in performance following manipulation of the instruction given to 




Experiment 3(b) - Alexithymia, Facial Mimicry, and Instructions to Adopt 
an Emotion 
While, in some instances, intentional effort is required to identify the feelings 
of others, simulation theories posit that an observer also understands others’ emotions 
through the quick and effortless activation of an embodied representation of that same 
state in oneself (see Decety & Jackson, 2004; Gallese, 2001; Gallese & Goldman, 
1998; Preston & de Waal, 2002). When viewing others’ facial expressions of emotion, 
facial mimicry is considered integral to the simulation process. It is thought to be 
related to activation of corresponding perceptual, motoric and/or emotional 
simulations of the target emotion in the observer (see Decety & Jackson, 2004; 
Goldman, 2006).  
Facial mimicry is thought to primarily facilitate the speed of facial emotion 
recognition through the priming of conceptual schemata or emotion knowledge (see 
Dimberg, Andreasson, & Thunberg, 2011; Likowski et al., 2012; Rymarczyk et al., 
2018; Wood, Rychlowska, Korb, & Niedenthal, 2016; Tramacere & Ferrari, 2016). 
As Experiments 1(a and b) and 2(b) in this series of investigations showed poorer 
facial emotion recognition or discrimination among groups representing clinical levels 
of alexithymia (MA, HA) compared to controls, Experiment 3(a) investigated whether 
facial mimicry is also disrupted in alexithymia. The rationale for this was that facial 
mimicry is thought to feed into the facial recognition process via the activation of an 
internal simulation of the observed emotion. Therefore, it was argued that disruption 
of facial mimicry amongst people with alexithymia may contribute to their difficulty 
recognising facial emotions.  
In Experiment 3(a), dynamic angry and happy facial expressions were 
presented to two groups with TAS-20 scores in the clinical range (MA, HA) and a 
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control group under passive viewing conditions. This involved the use of a cover story 
where participants were told that the task was a test of memory, meanwhile their faces 
were covertly video recorded. Under these conditions, the HA group and controls 
produced more smile facial mimicry in response to dynamic happy faces than frown 
facial mimicry in response to dynamic angry faces. The MA group produced similarly 
low levels of facial mimicry to dynamic happy and angry faces. When comparing 
group performance in the different Expression conditions, there were significant 
differences among groups in facial mimicry responses to dynamic happy faces, but 
not to dynamic angry faces. Controls produced more smile facial mimicry than the 
clinical range TAS-20 groups. Importantly, the HA group produced more smile facial 
mimicry than the MA group. This is counterintuitive, but it is in keeping with the 
general pattern of findings in the current experimental series.  
Previous research findings of differences in the occurrence of facial mimicry 
in response to static angry and happy faces has been attributed to the influence of 
contextual or motivational factors (Hess & Bourgeois, 2010; Hess & Fischer, 2014). 
Interestingly, facial mimicry is generally considered to be an automatic, fast, reflex-
like mechanism that is beyond voluntary control. Supporting this claim, research has 
shown that facial mimicry may occur in response to subliminally presented static 
emotional expressions and that these mimicry responses occur rapidly within 
approximately 400 milliseconds of stimulus onset (e.g., Bailey, & Henry, 2000; 
Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg et al., 2002). Further, findings that neonates 
and non-human mammals automatically mimic facial movements, such as tongue 
protrusions, also suggest that facial mimicry occurs automatically as an innate, reflex-
like mechanism that is largely outside of conscious control (e.g. Meltzoff, 1990). 
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However, despite evidence that facial mimicry is an automatic process, 
research has also demonstrated that it is affected by several top-down or controlled 
processes. For instance, smiles tend to be mimicked more than frowns, particularly in 
studies where the social context is relevant to the task (e.g., Jakobs, Manstead & 
Fischer, 2001). This has been explained as being due to the influence of social or 
cultural variables relating to the expression of emotion (Hess & Bourgeois, 2010) or 
other motivational factors (Hess & Fischer, 2014). Smiles may be more likely to be 
mimicked because they promote affiliation by signalling the intent to co-operate with 
others, are socially rewarding, improve well-being, and have low social cost 
(Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Hess & Bourgeois, 2010; Hess & Fischer, 2014). In 
contrast, frowns are more likely to be mimicked when they are directed toward a 
common adversary or outgroup member than when they are directed toward ingroup 
members (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008). This suggests that facial mimicry can be modified 
by relational factors in a social context.  
Along similar lines, angry faces have also been shown to produce reduced 
facial mimicry among individuals with a history of physical abuse (Reichmann-
Decker et al., 2009) and counter-mimicry of fearful expressions among children (Beall 
et al., 2008) and those primed with a fear induction procedure (Moody et al., 2007). 
These findings suggest that facial mimicry is also influenced by the personal 
experience, motivation and intentions of the perceiver (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 
2001).  
Furthermore, facial mimicry appears to depend on the meaning that the 
perceiver infers from the emotional expression. For instance, participants produce 
facial mimicry congruent with written labels of emotion that accompany images of 
neutral faces (Hess, Houde & Fischer, 2014). Research also shows that participants 
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may mimic obscured parts of the face (e.g., mouth; Blaison, Hareli, Strauss, & Hess, 
2012; Hess, Herrera, Bourgeois, & Blairy, 1997). These findings suggest that 
observers mimic their interpretations of facial expressions rather than simply 
mirroring the physical expressions of the face. Hess and Fischer (2014) have argued 
the evidence that facial mimicry is modifiable by top-down factors is reconcilable with 
the idea that facial mimicry is an automatic process. They argue that facial mimicry 
may be instantiated as a goal-dependent automatic process that is activated according 
to motivationally based behavioural preparation programs. Yet relatively little 
research has been carried out on the role of facial mimicry with respect to motivational 
factors.  
Generally, in facial mimicry studies, participants ‘passively view’ the stimuli 
and often minimal instruction is provided, or an unrelated cover story is devised 
regarding the true purpose of the experiment. This was the approach in Experiment 
3(a) of this thesis (for further examples see Dimberg et al., 2000; Sato & Yoshikawa, 
2007). The only relevant exceptions, to my knowledge, are the three studies below, 
which will now be described. 
The first two of these studies examined whether providing participants with 
the instruction to identify a target’s emotional state led to an increase in facial 
mimicry. Cannon, Hayes and Tipper (2009) found that participants exhibited greater 
facial mimicry when they were given the goal of identifying static facial expressions 
relative to when they made colour judgements. Similarly, Murata, Saito, Schug, 
Ogawa, and Kameda (2016) found that facial mimicry was greater when participants 
were given the goal of identifying a static emotional expression than when given no 
instruction (passive viewing conditions). In a second experiment, they found that 
participants were more likely to mimic facial expressions when asked to identify the 
 169 
target’s emotion than when asked to make inferences about a physical trait unrelated 
to emotion.  
The third study has provided evidence that mimicry is influenced by the 
intentions of the observer and can be induced by imagination. Houde, Simard, and 
Hess (2009) found participants produced facial mimicry activity congruent with 
expressions of happiness, sadness and anger when they observed neutral facial 
expressions but were told that the targets were experiencing these emotions. This 
suggests that imagining how others feel can elicit facial mimicry. 
While the studies mentioned above demonstrate that top-down factors may 
influence the occurrence of facial mimicry, to date there has been a dearth of research 
seeking to identify factors that moderate facial mimicry. This is particularly so among 
populations of individuals with alexithymia, who have been shown to have lower 
levels of facial mimicry than controls (see Experiment 3(a), also published studies by 
Sonnby-Borgstrom (2009) and Scarpazza, Ladavas, & Cattaneo (2018) which were 
described in detail in Experiment 3(a) of this thesis). As facial mimicry is thought to 
feed into emotion recognition processes, it may be of relevance to future treatment 
applications to investigate whether the manipulation of participants’ goals to simulate 
feelings might result in greater facial mimicry responses. 
 For these reasons, the current study aimed to investigate whether providing 
instructions to adopt the same emotion as that depicted on others’ faces leads to an 
increase in congruent facial mimicry. Given Murata et al., (2016) found that asking 
participants to identify a facial expression led to an increase in facial mimicry, it is 
hypothesised that providing participants with the explicit goal of adopting, or in other 
words, internally simulating the same emotion state as that shown in happy and angry 
 170 
dynamic facial expressions (Emotion Simulation condition) would increase facial 
mimicry responses, relative to simply viewing faces on screen (Passive Viewing 
condition). However, it was hypothesised that if individuals with alexithymia have 
difficulty with the intentional generation of an internal simulation of an observed 
emotion, then they would show less increase in facial mimicy in the Emotion 
Simulation condition compared to the Passive Viewing condition than controls. 
Further, given that in Experiment 3(a) the MA group produced less facial mimicry 
than the HA group, it was expected that, in the current experiment, the MA group 
would produce less of an increase in facial mimicry than the HA group when given 
the instruction to adopt an emotion compared to the passive viewing of facial 
expressons.  
Further, in Experiment 3(a) the groups with TAS-20 scores in the clinical range 
produced lower levels of smiling facial mimicry than controls, but similar levels of 
frown facial mimicry. Hence, in the current experiment, the amount of facial mimicry 
was expected to differ between participant groups depending on the emotion 
condition. Groups with clinical range TAS-20 scores were expected to produce less 
smile facial mimicry than controls in the Passive Viewing and Emotion Simulation 
conditions. It was further predicted, based on the results of Experiment 3(a), that the 
HA group would produce a greater amount of smile facial mimicry than the MA group 
in both the Passive Viewing and Emotion Simulation conditions. Given the results of 
Experiment 3(a), it was predicted that groups would not differ in the level of frown 
facial mimicry they produced in the Instruction Presentation conditions. 
A further aim of Experiment 3(b) was to reproduce aspects of Experiment 3(a) 
to determine whether the results were replicable. An analysis of Passive Viewing 
condition data was undertaken for this purpose. It was expected that controls would 
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produce a higher level of facial mimicry than the clinical range TAS-20 groups, and 
that the HA group would produce a greater level of facial mimicry than the MA group, 
as found in Experiment 3(a).  
 
Experiment 3(b) - Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 65 individuals (22 males, 43 females) took part in Experiment 3(b). 
Participants were between 17 and 44 years of age, with a mean age of 21 years (SD, 
4.7 years) and had a mean of 2.2 years of tertiary education (SD, 1.4). None of the 
participants who took part in this experiment participated in any of the other studies 
in this series of experiments. Participants were recruited, screened and allocated to 
two clinical level TAS-20 groups and a control group using the same method as 
described in Experiment 3(a). Respondents with scores in the clinical range on any of 
the subscales of the DASS-21 (i.e., Depression (<9), Anxiety (<7) and Stress (<14)) 
or or reported a history of psychological or neurological conditions, head injury 
involving loss of consciousness, or uncorrectable visual difficulty were excluded from 
participation. As in Experiment 3(a), the target sample size was 20 participants per 
group but as many additional participants were recruited as available. In the present 
experiment, groups comprised 20 high ‘alexithymia’ (HA) participants, 23 moderate 
‘alexithymia’ (MA) participants and 22 controls. Participants were allocated into the 
HA and MA group based on a median split (TAS-20 = 64) of the total pool of TAS-
20 scores that were above the clinical TAS-20 cut-off score. 
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The mean TAS-20 score of the HA group was 66 (SD, 2), the mean TAS-20 
score of the MA group was 63 (SD, 1) while the mean TAS-20 score of the control 
group was 40 (SD, 8).  
 
Table 6 Descriptive and Demographic Data of Participant Groups 
 Controls MA HA ANOVA Chi-sq 
 M    SD M   SD M  SD F     p x2   p 
Age 21.6 (5.5) 20.4 (3.7) 22 (4.7) 1.016  ns  
Tertiary Education (years) 2.5 (1.4) 2   (1.6) 2.3 (1.3) .705  ns  
Gender (males/females) 15 / 7 13 / 10 15 / 5  .429 ns 
Ethnicity (Caucausian/Asian) 17 / 5 17 / 6 17 / 3        .668  ns 
 
Statistical tests (see Table 6 above) revealed no significant differences among 
participants on the variables of age, tertiary education, gender or ethnicity. This 
analysis confirmed that the three groups were matched on relevant demographic 
variables.  
All participants either participated in return for course credit or received $10 
(AUD) reimbursement for their time and travel costs. This project was granted 
approval by the Murdoch University Human Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Stimuli 




The procedure was almost identical to that of Experiment 3(a), except for the 
following modifications. All participants in this experiment took part in two 
Instruction conditions (Passive Viewing condition and Emotion Simulation 
condition). They were allocated to the Passive Viewing condition and Emotion 
Simulation condition in counterbalanced order to minimise order effects. Between 
conditions, participants performed an unrelated ten-minute distractor task.  
All aspects of the procedure were identical in the two Instruction conditions, 
apart from the instructions given to participants. In the Passive Viewing condition, the 
instructions were identical to those given in Experiment 3(a). They were the following:  
“This experiment is a test of memory for faces. You are about to see a 
series of faces presented on the computer screen. Your task is to simply 
observe the faces and try to remember the TYPE of FACIAL 
EXPRESSION depicted on each face. LATER you will be shown some 
of these faces again and asked to answer some questions about them. 
Please stay relaxed but keep your eyes on the computer screen at all 
times to ensure you attend fully to the images being presented. You are 
not required to make a response during this part of the task; you simply 
watch the faces on screen. Please press the MIDDLE button on the 
response box to start the experiment”. 
In the Emotion Simulation condition, participants received the following 
instructions in the two Expression conditions (Happy, Anger), adapted from Weiss, 
Salloum and Schneider (1999):  
"During the next task, I will be showing you pictures of faces expressing 
happiness (anger). Look at each face and use it to help you to feel 
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happy (angry). You are not required to make a response during this 
part of the task; you simply watch the faces on screen.”  
In the neutral emotion condition of the Emotion Simulation condition, 
participants received the following instructions:  
“During the next task, I will be showing you pictures of faces. I would 
like you to simply observe these faces. Please stay relaxed but keep 
your eyes on the computer screen at all times to ensure you attend fully 
to the images being presented. You are not required to make a response 
during this part of the task; you simply watch the faces on screen.” 
In the Passive Viewing and Emotion Simulation conditions, participants 
viewed the same 48 trials which consisted of two presentations of each of the 24 morph 
movie stimuli. On each trial, a centrally placed fixation cross was first presented for 
500ms. Then the stimulus was presented for 2040ms, followed by an inter-trial interval 
of 3000ms. 
All trials in each of the instruction conditions were presented in random order 
within three blocks of Expression category (comprising Happy, Neutral and Anger 
Expression conditions). The three blocks of emotion trials were administered in a 
counterbalanced order so that half the participants saw the Anger trials first and the 
other half saw the Happy trials first. The neutral trials always appeared in the middle 
block to minimise carry-over mood effects from the emotion trials.  
As in Experiment 3(a), participants’ faces were covertly videotaped during all 
experimental trials. Following the experimental trials, all the study participants stated 




Video data was coded following the same scoring parameters described in 
Experiment 3(a). To briefly re-iterate, target AUs (AU12, AU4) were coded as a facial 
mimicry response if: 1) there was a fast rise in facial muscle activity; 2) the AU was 
of relatively small magnitude; 3) the AU was sustained for over 100ms; and 4) the AU 
occurred within the time window of 100ms to 3000ms. 
The inter-coder reliability among scorers of the video data reached an 
agreement ratio of .90, indicating that there was a 90% similarity in ratings between 
coders. This level of agreement among coders is considered satisfactory (Ekman, 
Friesen, & Ancoli, 1980).  
As the Percent Occurrence of Congruent Facial Mimicry data violated the 
homogeneity of variance assumption, a square root transformation was applied. 
Following this, there was homogeneity of variance as tested by Levine’s statistic 
(p>.05) and homogeneity of co-variances, as assessed by Box’s test of equality of co-
variance matrices (p = .264).  
 
Experiment 3(b) - Results 
 
Passive Viewing condition 
First, to determine whether the results from Experiment 3(a) would be 
replicated with a different group of participants, the Passive Viewing data was 
analysed separately. Expression (Happy, Anger) was the repeated subjects variable 
and Group (HA, MA, controls) was the between-subjects variable. The Percent 
Occurrence of Congruent Facial Mimicry was the dependent variable, which was 
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calculated as 100*(total number of trials where target AUs occurred/total number of 
trials). Please see Figure 13 for the mean percent of facial mimicry produced in the 
Passive Viewing condition in Experiment 3(b) as a function of Expression condition 
(Happy, Anger) and Participant Group (HA, MA, Controls). 
The mixed model 3 x (2) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Group, 
F(2, 62) = 6.625, p = .002, indicating that the percent occurrence of mimicry responses 
differed among Participant Groups. An inspection of the means showed that controls 
produced the most facial mimicry overall (i.e. on 12.49% (SD 2.6%) of trials). The 
HA group produced facial mimicry overall on 7.1% (SD 1.8%) of trials. The MA 
group produced the least overall facial mimicry, on 3.5% (SD = 1.1) of trials. This 
follows the general pattern found in Experiment 3(a).  
The ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of Expression F(1,62) = 
39.66, p <.001, indicating that significantly more facial mimicry was produced in the 
Happy condition compared to the Angry condition. That is, averaged across groups, 
smile facial mimicry was produced on 11.6% (SD = 2.3) of trials in the Happy 





Figure 13: The Percent Occurrence of Facial Mimicry in the Passive Viewing Task Condition 
in Experiment 3(b) as a function of Expression Condition (Happy, Anger) and Participant Group (High 
Alexithymia, Moderate Alexithymia, or controls). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
These main effects were subsumed by a significant interaction between 
Expression and Group (F(2,62) = 11.616, p =<.001), indicating groups differed in the 
level of mimicry they displayed depending on the Expression condition. This 
interaction was explored in a series of repeated measures samples t-tests that analysed 
the amount of mimicry in the Happy and Anger conditions for each group. These 
comparisons revealed that controls produced significantly more mimicry responses in 
the Happy condition than in the Anger condition (i.e. 14.2%; (t(21) = 5.65, p < .001). 
Likewise, the HA group produced significantly (6.25%) more mimicry in the Happy 
condition than the Anger condition, (t(19) = 3.24%, p = .004). In contrast, there was 
no significant difference in mimicry responses in the Happy and Angry conditions in 
the MA group, which produced only 1.06% more mimicry in the former condition 













































As in Experiment 3(a), simple effects were then calculated using between-
group One-way ANOVAs for the Happy and Anger condition data separately. The 
univariate ANOVA revealed a significant effect for Group in the Happy condition 
(F(2,62) = 10.225, p < .001) but not the Anger condition (F(2,62) = .712, p = .495). 
This is clearly illustrated in Figure 13.  The significant main effect for Group in the 
Happy condition was analysed further using two planned contrasts. The first contrast 
showed that the occurrence of facial mimicry for the HA and MA groups combined 
was less than the occurrence of facial mimicry produced by controls (t(26) = 3.3, p = 
.003). The second planned contrast revealed that the HA group produced significantly 
more facial mimicry than the MA group (t(28) = 2.4, p = .021).  
Two planned contrasts were performed on the Anger data. The first contrast 
revealed no significant difference in the occurrence of frown facial mimicry between 
the combined HA and MA groups and controls (t(31) = .931, p = .341). The second 
planned contrast indicated there was no significant difference in the occurrence of 
frown facial mimicry produced by the HA group relative to the MA group (t(37) = 
.607, p = .547).  
These results replicate the results of Experiment 3(a) with a different group of 
participants. 
 
Passive Viewing versus Emotion Simulation 
This experiment had a 3 x (2 x 2) mixed factors design, with Group (HA, MA, 
Control) as the between-subjects variable. Expression (Happy, Anger) and Instruction 
(Passive Viewing, Emotion Simulation) were repeated-measures variables. The 
outcome variable was the mean Percent Occurrence of Congruent Facial Mimicry (or 
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‘facial mimicry’), which was calculated as 100*(total number of trials where target 
AUs occurred/total number of trials). Please refer to Figure 14 for the Mean Percent 
Occurrence of Facial Mimicry in the Happy condition in Experiment 3(b) as a function 
of Instruction Condition and Participant Group. Please also see Figure 15 for the Mean 
Percent Occurrence of Facial Mimicry in the Anger condition in Experiment 3(b) as a 
function of Instruction Condition and Participant Group.  
A mixed 3 x (2 x 2) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Group 
(F(2,62) = 14.96, p < .001). This indicates that there were significant differences 
between groups in the amount of facial mimicry they produced. An inspection of the 
means showed that overall, and as expected, controls produced the highest level of 
facial mimicry (i.e. 16.89% (SD, 3.6) of trials). The HA group produced facial 
mimicry on 8.2% (SD, 1.9) of trials overall, while the MA group produced the least 
facial mimicry (i.e. on 3.6% (SD, 1.1) of trials overall). 
There was also a significant main effect for Expression (F(1,62) = 57.04, p < 
.001), indicating that significantly more facial mimicry was produced in the Happy 
condition than in the Anger condition. Facial mimicry was produced on 14.6% (SD, 
2.7%) of trials in the Happy condition overall and 4.49% (SD, 1.2%) of trials in the 
Anger condition overall.  
As well, there was a significant main effect for Instruction (F(1,62) = 47.02, p 
<.001), with a significantly greater amount of facial mimicry in the Emotion 
Simulation condition than the Passive Viewing condition. The mean scores for the 
Instruction condition indicated that facial mimicry occurred on 11.45% (SD, 2%) of 
trials overall in the Emotion Simulation condition and on 7.74% (SD, 1.18%) of trials 




Figure 14: Percent Occurrence of Zygomaticus (Smile) Facial Mimicry in the Happy condition 
in Experiment 3(b) as a Function of Instruction Condition (Passive Viewing, Emotion Simulation) and 





Figure 15: Percent Occurrence of Corrugator (Frown) Facial Mimicry in the Anger condition 
in Experiment 3(b) as a Function of Instruction Condition (Passive Viewing, Emotion Simulation) and 







































































































The interaction of Group and Expression condition was non-significant, 
(F(2,62) = 2.426, p = .097). However, the analysis revealed a significant Instruction 
by Group interaction (F(2,62) = 25.22, p <.001), indicating that groups displayed 
different levels of facial mimicry as a function of the Instruction condition. In the 
Passive Viewing condition, controls produced the greatest amount of facial mimicry 
(19.6% (SD, 3.5%) of trials). The HA group produced facial mimicry on 10.3% (SD, 
2.3%) of trials. The MA group produced facial mimicry on the fewest trials, at only 
4.1% (SD, 1.2%). In the Emotion Simulation condition, a similar pattern was evident, 
but was more accentuated. The controls produced the greatest amount of facial 
mimicry, on 33.3% (SD, 4.7%) of trials. The HA produced facial mimicry on 14.7% 
of trials, while the MA produced the least facial mimicry, on 6.3% (SD, 1.6%) of trials.  
The above interactions were subsumed by a significant three way interaction 
between Group, Expression and Instruction condition (F(2,62) = 21.870, p <.001), 
indicating that groups displayed different levels of facial mimicry depending on the 
Expression Instruction condition. This significant interaction is depicted in Figures 14 
and 15. It was explored further in an analysis of simple effects, using a series of One 
Way Between Groups ANOVAs and planned contrasts, to ascertain whether there 
were group differences in the amount of facial mimicry produced at each level of the 
Expression and Instruction conditions.  
 
Angry Expressions  
The One Way Between Group ANOVA produced a significant main effect of 
Group when Angry Expressions were presented in the Emotion Simulation condition 
(F(2,62)=21.59, p<.001; please refer to Figure 15). Controls produced frown facial 
mimicry on 9.7% (SD, 1.2%) of trials. The HA group produced frown facial mimicry 
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on 3.7% (SD, 1.05%) of trials, while the MA produced the least amount of smile facial 
mimicry on just 1.1% (SD, 0.5%) of trials.  
Two planned contrasts comparing the amount of facial mimicry among groups 
in the Anger Expression under Emotion Instruction conditions were both significant. 
That is, controls produced significantly more frown facial mimicry than the HA group 
and the MA group combined (t(30) = 5.37, p <.005). In addition, the HA group 
produced significantly more frown facial mimicry than the MA group (t(27)=2.27, p 
= .031).  
Then, to test the hypothesis that groups would show more facial mimicry in 
the Anger Emotion Simulation condition than the Passive Viewing condition, a series 
of planned repeated measures t-tests was carried out on the Anger data. Interestingly, 
an inspection of the means of the Percent Occurrence of Congruent Facial Mimicry in 
the Anger condition shows that while controls displayed greater facial mimicry in the 
Emotion Simulation condition than the Passive Viewing condition, the alexithymia 
groups (particularly the MA group) displayed less facial mimicry in the Emotion 
Simulation condition than the Passive Viewing condition (please refer again to Figure 
15 above).  
Planned repeated measures t-tests comparing differences in the Percent 
Occurrence of Frown Facial Mimicry among the participant groups on Instruction 
(Anger Emotion Simulation, Passive Viewing) showed that while controls produced 
more facial mimicry in response to unfolding angry expressions in the Emotion 
Simulation condition than in the Passive Viewing condition (t(21) = 2.82, p = .010), 
there was no significant difference in facial mimicry produced by the HA group for 
Passive Viewing and Emotion Simulation conditions in response to these angry 
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expressions (t(9) = .231, p = .823). In contrast, the MA group produced significantly 
less facial mimicry in the Emotion Simulation condition than in the Passive Viewing 
condition (MA, t(22) = 3.16, p = .004). This was an unexpected finding.  
 
Happy Expressions 
For Happy expressions, a One Way Between Group ANOVAs revealed a 
significant main effect for Group in the Emotion Simulation condition (F(2,62)=17.51, 
p<.001; please refer to Figure 14 above). Further statistical analysis of this statistically 
significant simple effect was then undertaken with planned contrasts. These contrasts 
showed that in the Happy Emotion Simulation condition, controls produced 
significantly more smile facial mimicry than the HA and MA groups combined (t(27) 
= 4.47, p = .031) and the HA group produced significantly more smile facial mimicry 
than the MA group (t(28) = 2.39, p = .023). 
To compare groups across the Instruction conditions (Happy Emotion 
Simulation, Passive Viewing), and to test the hypothesis that groups would show more 
facial mimicry in the Emotion Simulation condition than the Passive Viewing 
condition, a series of planned repeated measures t-tests was also carried out on the 
Happy Expression data. These t-tests revealed that controls produced significantly 
more smile facial mimicry in the Emotion Simulation condition (33.3%, SD, 4.6%) 
compared to the 19.6% mimicry responses produced in the Passive Viewing condition 
(SD, 3.5%; t(21) = 2.83, p =.010). The HA group produced significantly more smile 
facial mimicry in the Emotion Simulation condition (14.7%, SD, 3.2% compared to 
10.31% (SD, 2.3%) in the Passive Viewing condition (t(19) = 2.33, p = .031). The MA 
group produced a trend toward more mimicry in the Emotion Simulation condition 
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(6.3%, SD, 1.6% relative to 4.17%, SD, 1.2%) in the Passive Viewing condition (t(22) 
= 2.00, p = .057).  
 
Summary of Results 
In summary, the results showed that groups produced different levels of 
congruent facial mimicry depending on the instruction they received and the 
expression they viewed. When passively viewing dynamic happy faces, there was a 
significant difference in smile facial mimicry among groups. That is, controls 
produced more smile facial mimicry than the HA and the MA groups, and the HA 
group produced more smile facial mimicry than the MA group. A similar pattern in 
smile facial mimicry was observed in the Emotion Simulation condition. Within group 
comparisons showed that relative to the Passive Viewing condition, the increase in 
smile facial mimicry in the Emotion Simulation condition was significant for controls 
and the HA group, while the MA group only produced a trend toward more mimicry 
in the Emotion Simulation condition.  
When passively viewing dynamic angry faces, there were no significant 
differences among groups in frown facial mimicry. In the Emotion Simulation 
condition, controls produced significantly more frown facial mimicry than the HA 
group and the MA group combined.  The HA group also produced significantly more 
frown facial mimicry than the MA group.  
Within group comparisons showed that while controls produced a significant 
increase in frown facial mimicry when asked to adopt the observed emotion (Emotion 
Simulation condition) than when they passively viewed dynamic faces, the HA group 
produced similar levels of facial mimicry across the instruction conditions, while the 
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MA group produced less frown facial mimicry in the Emotion Simulation condition 
than the Passive Viewing condition.  
 
Experiment 3(b) - Discussion 
 
Firstly, the results of the current study replicated the findings of Experiment 
3(a), using a different group of participants. That is, an analysis of the Passive Viewing 
condition of Experiment 3(b) showed that when participants viewed happy facial 
expressions that unfolded from neutral to full expression, the two groups with clinical 
range TAS-20 scores produced significantly less smiling facial mimicry than the 
control group. Further, the clinical range group with the highest TAS-20 scores (HA) 
produced significantly more smile facial mimicry than the MA group. All groups 
produced less facial mimicry in response to dynamic angry facial expressions than to 
the dynamic happy facial expressions.  
The analysis of the Passive Viewing data also showed that there was no 
significant group difference in the amount of facial mimicry in response to dynamic 
angry faces. Further, while both the HA group and controls produced less frown 
mimicry than smile mimicry, the MA group produced equally low levels of congruent 
facial mimicry to both smiles and frowns. These results show that the findings of this 
thesis on facial mimicry among groups representing alexithymia and controls under 
passive viewing conditions are replicable. In addition, the current experiment confirms 
that participants with TAS-20 scores in the high clinical range produce more facial 
mimicry than a group with TAS-20 scores in the moderate clinical range. This was a 
robust finding across two experiments using different groups of participants. 
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Secondly, to understand further the differences in congruent facial mimicry in 
response to happy and angry facial expressions, Experiment 3(b) examined whether 
manipulating participants’ intention to internally simulate a feeling while they were 
viewing congruent dynamic facial expressions (in the Emotion Simulation condition) 
would increase the facial mimicry they produced compared to simply viewing facial 
expressions in a passive manner (in the Passive Viewing condition).  
While it was predicted that an increase in congruent smile and frown facial 
mimicry would be demonstrated by all groups under the Emotion Simulation condition 
relative to the Passive Viewing condition, this was evident for controls only. This 
suggests that, for controls at least, the goal-directed intention to simulate happiness or 
anger while observing the same facial expression leads to an increase in congruent 
facial mimicry compared to passively viewing faces. As all aspects of the 
methodology remained constant apart from the presentation condition (Passive 
Viewing or Emotion Simulation), this shows that facial mimicry is not solely an 
automatic proess. This finding extends a small body of research indicating that 
automatic facial mimicry is affected by top-down processes (see Beall et al., 2008; 
Blaison, Hareli, Strauss, & Hess, 2012; Cannon, Hayes, & Tipper, 2009; Hess & 
Bourgeois, 2010; Hess, Herrera, Bourgeois, & Blairy, 1997; Hess, Houde & Fischer, 
2014; Hess & Fischer, 2014, Jakobs, Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Moody et al., 2007; 
Murata, Saito, Schug, Ogawa, & Kameda, 2016; Reichmann-Decker et al., 2009).  
In response to the instruction to simulate happiness when viewing dynamically 
unfolding happy facial expressions, the HA group produced more smiling facial 
mimicry than when they passively viewed dynamic happy facial expressions, although 
this was a relatively small increase of 4.4% compared to the 13.6% increase produced 
by controls. In contrast, the MA group produced low levels of smile facial mimicry 
 187 
regardless of the task instructions and a non-significant difference of only 2.2% more 
mimicry responses in the Emotion Simulation condition compared to the Passive 
Viewing condition.  
However, when viewing dynamic angry expressions, unlike controls who 
produced 4.4% more frown facial mimicry when given the instruction to simulate 
anger while they observed dynamic angry facial expressions, the HA group showed 
similar levels of frown facial mimicry across the task instruction conditions, with a 
non-significant difference of only 0.4% more in the Emotion Simulation condition 
compared to the Passive Viewing condition. Surprisingly, the MA group showed a 
small yet significant decrease of 1.8% in frown facial mimicry following the 
instruction to simulate anger compared the passive viewing of dynamic angry faces.  
The findings in the Anger condition therefore did not support the hypothesis 
that the instruction to simulate an emotion while viewing dynamic facial expressions 
on screen would lead to an increase in facial mimicry responses among all participant 
groups compared to conditions in which they were passively viewing the dynamic 
stimuli (although it was expected that the level of increase would vary with the HA 
and MA groups producing less of an increase in mimicry when given the Emotion 
Simulation condition compared to the Passive Viewing condition). This prediction 
was based on previous related research demonstrating that asking participants to 
identify an expression leads to more facial mimicry than providing no instructions or 
asking them to perform and emotion-irrelevant judgement task (see Cannon, Hayes & 
Tipper, 2009; Murata, Saito, Schug, Ogawa, & Kameda, 2016).  
One possible explanation for the finding in Experiment 3(b) of group 
differences in facial mimicry depending on the expression condition, is that groups 
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with clinical level TAS-20 scores have some preserved ability to process happy facial 
expressions but deficient ability to process angry facial expressions (while the HA and 
MA groups produced significantly less smile facial mimicry than controls, they did 
nevertheless produce a greater level of smile facial mimicry than frown facial 
mimicry). This is consistent with the explanation provided by Scarpazza, Ladavas, and 
Cattaneo (2018) who found delayed smile mimicry and an absence of frown facial 
mimicry in a group with clinical level TAS-20 scores. They interpreted this as due to 
hypo-activation of the amygdala causing intact but dysfunctional processing of the 
emotion of happiness and a selective inability to process negative emotions such as 
fear and anger. However, while this explanation is consistent with imaging studies that 
show hypoactivation of the amygdala among individuals with alexithymia, it may 
represent only a partial explanation of the current results as it does not fully account 
for the reduction in frown mimicry shown by the MA group when they were asked to 
simulate anger compared to when they passively viewed angry faces.  
Sonnby-Borgstrom (2009) also found reduced frown facial mimicry in the 
group representing alexithymia compared to a control group, although in her study the 
‘alexithymia’ group (who as stated, had a mean TAS-20 score that fell in the normal 
range) produced similar levels of smile facial mimicry as controls. She stated that this 
may be due to an avoidance strategy employed by individuals with alexithymia to 
avoid unwanted negative emotional states. Such an account does take motivational 
factors into account and might mean that when instructed to feel the emotion of anger 
(such as in the Emotion Simulation condition of the present study), people in the 
alexithymic range might attempt to avoid that emotion, resulting in the suppression of 
frown facial mimicry. This is consistent with the finding that individuals with a history 
of physical abuse produced less facial mimicry of angry facial expressions 
 189 
(Reichmann-Decker et al., 2009). Further, given that there is a greater likelihood of an 
higher abuse history among individuals with alexithymia compared to the general 
population (e.g., Evren et al., 2009; Paivio & McCulloch, 2004; Zlotnick, Mattia, & 
Zimmerman, 2001), abuse history might represent a potential confound when studying 
frown facial mimicry among individuals with alexithymia. However, this explanation 
would not readily account for the greater level of frown mimicry among the HA group 
compared to the MA group, and would predict that groups with TAS-20 scores in the 
clinical range also should produce similar levels of smile facial mimicry as controls, 
and this was not the case in the present study.  
In keeping with the theoretical thrust of this thesis, there is another potential 
explanation for the current results. This is that the MA group, in contrast to controls, 
did not produce an increase in congruent (i.e., smiling and frowning) facial mimicry 
when instructed to internally adopt an emotion in the Emotion Simulation condition 
compared to the Passive Viewing condition because they were not able to easily 
transpose, in a goal-directed way, the feelings of happiness and anger depicted in the 
facial expression stimuli onto their own internal representations. This lack of emotion-
relevant simulation may have resulted in the lower occurrence of facial mimicry 
responses in these groups.  
In Experiment 3(b), the HA group generally produced more facial mimicry 
than the MA group (apart from the Passive Viewing condition, where no significant 
difference was found among any of the groups in frown facial mimicry). It was argued 
earlier in this thesis that the HA group may have an awareness of their emotional 
processing deficits and so employ a compensatory strategy that enhances their 
performance by providing a motor-based or action relevant simulation of the observed 
facial expressions. The pattern of results in Experiments 3(a) and 3(b) are consistent 
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with this explanation and suggest that compensatory motor simulation might account 
for the greater level of facial mimicry among the HA group relative to the MA group.  
However, this compensatory motor simulation account still does not address 
the lower level of facial mimicry produced by the MA group when given the 
instruction to simulate anger while they observed angry facial expressions. A further 
factor that might explain this finding relates to the use of implicitly learned 
behavioural response patterns. Earlier it was argued that facial mimicry, in addition to 
being considered an automatic process, may also be modulated by contextual 
variables. Behavioural programs reflect implicit learning that may help to produce the 
socially appropriate bodily and emotional responses to social situations, including 
facial mimicry reactions (see Kavanagh & Winkielman, 2016; Wang & Hamilton, 
2012). For instance, smiles tend to be socially rewarding and have low social cost 
(Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Hess & Bourgeois, 2010; Hess & Fischer, 2014), therefore 
smile facial mimicry is likely to be learned as a socially appropriate response, in most 
contexts, to others’ expressions of happiness. Unlike happy facial expressions, the 
implicitly learned facial mimicry response to angry facial expressions might involve, 
in some cases, the suppression of frown facial mimicry responses. This is somewhat 
similar to situations, for example, where facial expressions of anger displayed by high 
status individuals are responded to with ‘counter-mimicry’ smile responses (Carr et 
al., 2014). Or alternatively, as mentioned above, individuals with abuse histories may 
produce reduced frown facial mimicry when viewing angry facial expressions 
(Reichmann-Decker et al., 2009). The implicit learning of automatic behavioural 
responses might have thus contributed to the overall lower levels of frown facial 
mimicry produced in response to angry faces than smile facial mimicry to happy faces 
in the current experiment.  
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Arguably, implicit programs relating to learned social behaviours may be more 
likely to be activated in situations where individuals are required to interpret the social 
context. The instructions provided to participants in the Emotion Instruction condition 
to look at each facial expression and use it to help them to feel that emotion may have 
served to provide a context that increased the relevance of social or emotional 
behavioural responses. Individuals with alexithymia are noted for a tendency to be 
guided by external cues rather than feelings and they report reduced interoceptive 
awareness of their internal emotional state (Naring & van der Staak, 1995; Roedema 
& Simons, 1999). This might have led to the activation of learned behavioural 
programs involving the suppression of frown facial mimicry to angry faces, 
particularly among the MA group, who were argued to experience reduced emotion or 
action relevant simulation relative to the other participant groups.  
This experiment is the last in this series to examine facial emotion recognition 
processes and alexithymia. However, the reader is directed to additional data that is 
presented in the Appendix of this thesis that examines facial feedback effects and 
alexithymia. This research was not conducted as part of the thesis proper but may shed 
further light on the topic of embodied processes of facial emotion recognition and 
alexithymia. Unfortunately, due to the time constraints associated with the recruitment 
of participants with high clinical levels of alexithymia, the study in the Appendix (i.e. 
Experiment 4: Alexithymia and The Facial Feedback Effect - A Preliminary Study) is 
limited by a small sample size. These preliminary findings revealed that the group 
with the highest clinical range TAS-20 scores (HA) had significantly poorer ability 
than controls to consciously experience a facial feedback effect involving internal 
feelings of happiness and anger consistent with their facial expression. This suggests 
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that emotion-relevant or ‘hot’ simulation processes may be impaired in those with 
clinically high TAS-20 scores. 
In the next chapter a brief summary of Experiments 1(a) to 3(b) will be 
outlined, followed by a discussion of the overall limitations of this research. 
 
Summary of the Current Experiments  
 
The ability to read others’ facial expressions is crucial to gaining an 
understanding of our social context. While individuals with alexithymia are known to 
experience problems with the identification and naming of their own subjective 
emotions (hence the term alexithymia, a=lack, lexis = word, thymia = emotion) there 
is relatively sparse experimental research investigating the ability of such individuals 
to recognise the facial expressions of others. The few studies that have explored this 
question, however, are limited by numerous methodological deficiencies, rendering 
the overall findings inconclusive. 
To redress this, the present series of studies applied paradigms and techniques 
drawn from a broad theoretical framework in order to develop our understanding of 
facial emotion recognition skills among individuals with alexithymia. This comprised 
a cognitive science perspective, using the traditional facial expression judgement 
paradigm that involves the identification and naming of facial expressions18, as well 
 
18 A limited literature has examined alternative contributors to decision time, such as 
individual differences in the level of subjective confidence in one’s performance on accuracy-based 
tasks  (e.g., Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). This research finds that individuals are 
unjustifiably confident in their decisions on tests of general knowledge (Fischhoff, Slovic, & 
Lichtenstein, 1977; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980), cognitive ability (Pallier et al., 2002), and 
various social predictions (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990). 
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as an affective neuroscience perspective pertaining to the processes putatively 
involved in embodied cognition, such as facial mimicry. A summary of each study 
will be provided in the section that follows. This will then be followed by a discussion 
of the limitations of this research, and then in the next chapter, a general discussion 
will be presented. 
 
Summary of Experiment 1(a) and 1(b) 
In Experiments 1(a) and 1(b), facial emotion recognition was examined among 
participant groups using the traditional facial emotion recognition paradigm, where 
participants chose a verbal label from a given list of labels to best identify the emotion 
depicted in the facial stimuli. As previous studies using this methodology to 
investigate facial emotion recognition in alexithymia have yielded equivocal results, 
these experiments improved upon the methodology used in previous research on this 
topic. That is, in these first two studies of the current research, dynamic stimuli were 
used that depicted facial expressions that unfolded in intensity. These dynamically 
unfolding stimuli are more ecologically valid than static photographic stimuli. 
Throughout all experiments, participants were screened for relevant demographic, 
psychiatric and neurological factors and were excluded from taking part in the 
experimental research if they returned scores in the clinical range on any of the 
subscales of the DASS-21 or reported a history of psychological or neurological 
conditions, head injury involving loss of consciousness, or uncorrectable visual 
difficulty. This was done to reduce the potential confounding of results by factors 
which are known to affect facial emotion recognition ability (Lynch et al., 2006; 
Naranjo, Kornreich, Campanella, Noel, & Vandriette, 2011; Rossignol, Phillipot, 
Douilliez, Crommelinck, & Campanella, 2005). As with all the experiments in this 
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series, participants with a wide range of TAS-20 scores were allocated to two clinical 
groups and a control group. While initially this was done to examine a ‘dose’ effect of 
alexithymia among participant groups with moderate and high TAS-20 scores, 
evidence was unexpectedly found for qualitatively different mechanisms at work in 
the Moderate and High Alexithymia groups. 
In Experiment 1 (a and b), performance was measured using decision time in 
addition to task accuracy to capture a potentially more sensitive aspect of performance. 
As anticipated, participants with TAS-20 scores in the clinical range were slower and 
less accurate at identifying emotional expressions than controls. Interestingly, while 
there was no difference in accuracy between two groups in the clinical range, the group 
with moderate TAS-20 scores (MA) were slower to recognise facial expressions than 
the group with high TAS-20 scores (HA). This suggests that the decision time outcome 
variable was more sensitive to variability in performance between the two groups with 
clinical range TAS-20 scores than accuracy, consistent with other cognitive studies 
that have demonstrated a difference in the sensitivity of accuracy and DT (see Collins, 
1999; Collins, 2002; Collins, & Coney, 1998; Collins, & Cooke, 2005; Osgood, 1953; 
Shapiro, 1968; Wearing & Montague, 1970). A lower sensitivity using accuracy 
compared to DT as an outcome measure may also partially explain the mixed results 
of previous studies into alexithymia and facial emotion recognition that relied 
exclusively on the measurement of facial emotion recognition using accuracy.  
In Experiment 1(b) group performance in Dynamic and Static stimuli 
presentation conditions was also examined. It was of interest to determine whether 
groups would perform differently in these presentation conditions, indicating a 
difference in their underlying processing mechanisms. This assumption was based on 
research findings suggesting the preferential processing of static stimuli using motor 
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simulation and dynamic stimuli using affect-relevant simulation (e.g., Enticott et al., 
2008; Kilts et al., 2003). Further to this, brain imaging studies have suggested that 
alexithymia is associated with increased activation of motor-related mirror-neuron 
brain regions that are responsible for motor simulation (Moriguchi et al., 2006; 
Karlsson et al., 2008).  Individuals with alexithymia also show reduced activation of 
brain structures implicated in the simulation of emotion states (eg Berthoz et al., 2002; 
Borsci et al., 2009; Gundel et al., 2004; Kano et al., 2003; Karlsson, Naatanen & 
Stenman, 2008; Paradiso et al., 2008; Reker et al., 2009; Silani et al., 2008).  As the 
examination of dynamic and static presentation conditions has not been addressed 
previously in research on alexithymia, it was thought this investigation might assist in 
clarifying the unusual findings of Experiment 1(a) involving faster facial emotion 
recognition performance by the HA group relative to the MA group. Experiment 1(b) 
replicated the results of Experiment 1(a) in the Dynamic condition, with a different 
group of participants. In the Static condition, alexithymia groups were slower than 
controls to recognise facial expressions. However, there was no significant difference 
in DT between the HA and MA alexithymia groups. In terms of accuracy in the Static 
condition, the combined alexithymia groups were less accurate than controls, but again 
there was no difference in accuracy between the HA and MA groups. This shows that 
the HA group were significantly faster to recognise facial expressions than the MA 
group under Dynamic conditions but that the HA and MA groups performed with 
equivalent speed under Static conditions.  
It was put forward that the HA group may have had less of a DT advantage in 
the Static condition of Experiment 1(b) compared to the Dynamic condition because 
the static condition is likely to have encouraged both groups to utilise motor simulation 
processes. It was suggested that these results may indicate that the HA group relied on 
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the recruitment of motor-simulation processes to improve their performance in 
Experiments 1(a) and 1(b). 
 
Summary of Experiment 2(a) and 2(b) 
As the testing procedure used in Experiments 1 (a) and (b) relied upon 
linguistic processes, with participants required to name emotional expressions, 
Experiments 2 (a) and (b) utilised a discrimination task to exclude the possibility that 
performance differences among groups were due to the task requirement to assign a 
verbal label to the stimuli, rather than the recognition process itself, which involves 
gaining conscious access to emotion representations in conceptual knowledge. For this 
reason, a discrimination task was used to assess whether HA, MA and control groups 
were able to rapidly and accurately distinguish between same and different facial 
expressions without recourse to verbal labelling. 
In Experiment 2(a), two facial emotion stimuli depicting 100% intensity of 
emotion appeared simultaneously on a computer screen and participants were required 
to make a speeded same or different button press response. There were no group 
performance differences on this task in either accuracy or decision time latency. These 
results raised the possibility that the performance difficulty in alexithymia is related 
to the verbal labelling of emotion. 
This was followed up in Experiment 2(b) by reducing the intensity of the 
expression in the facial emotion stimuli to 25% intensity. This appeared to increase 
the level of task difficulty and therefore encourage deeper processing of the stimuli. 
Reducing facial expression intensity also allowed the discrimination of facial 
expressions using faces depicting milder intensities of emotion. This achieved greater 
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ecological validity given that in everyday life people process facial expressions that 
are less intense than full blown facial expression displays. Under these conditions, 
group differences did emerge. The MA group was slower than the HA group, and the 
two clinical groups (MA, HA) combined were slower than controls to perform the 
discriminations. In terms of accuracy, the HA group was less accurate than the MA 
group, and the MA and HA groups combined were less accurate than controls to 
perform the task. These results demonstrated that the emotion recognition deficit 
associated with alexithymia does not solely reflect a language-based deficit because 
the clinical range TAS-20 groups did not perform as well as controls on this task 
despite not being required to name the emotional expression depicted.  
Together, the results of Experiments 2(a) and (b) suggested that facial emotion 
discrimination performance differences among groups with clinical level TAS-20 
scores and controls are apparent under more difficult task conditions where the timely 
processing of the emotion depicted in the stimuli is required, using information 
processing strategies that require access to conceptual knowledge of emotion 
representations. It was also argued that the pattern of results in Experiment 2(b) 
involving the HA group producing faster, but less accurate, facial discriminations than 
the MA group are consistent with the use of a compensatory motor-based strategy in 
the HA group, resulting in the facilitation of latency, but not accuracy, to discriminate 
facial expressions.  
 
Summary of Experiment 3(a) and 3(b) 
One proposed means of recognising others’ emotional expressions is by 
simulating within oneself the same emotional state as that observed in others’ faces. 
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As facial mimicry is considered key to the simulation process, Experiments 3 (a and 
b) employed a facial mimicry paradigm to investigate whether alexithymia is related 
to deficits in the spontaneous facial mimicry of facial expressions. Dynamic happy 
and angry facial expressions unfolded from neutral to full facial expression while the 
participant’s face was covertly video-recorded, and their facial mimicry was measured 
using the FACS coding system (Ekman, & Friesen, 1978). Happy and angry stimuli 
were presented in separate conditions as previous research has revealed differences in 
the occurrence of facial mimicry in response to happy and angry facial expressions.  
In the Happy condition of Experiment 3(a), the groups with clinical level TAS-
20 scores showed reduced facial mimicry behaviour compared to controls, with the 
HA group producing more smile facial mimicry than the MA group. However, in the 
Anger condition of Experiment 3(a), all groups produced a similarly low level of facial 
mimicry.  
 These results were interpreted to suggest an impaired ability to effectively 
recruit greater extended mirror neuron activity in response to dynamic smile stimuli 
among groups with clinical TAS-20 scores compared to controls. The greater smile 
facial mimicry produced by the HA group compared to the MA group is compatible 
with the idea that the HA group used a compensatory strategy to improve their task 
performance. Motor simulation was put forward as a possible candidate for this 
mechanism. 
In contrast to the pattern of results in the Happy condition, results in the Anger 
condition were consistent with the general facial mimicry literature, where angry facial 
expression stimuli generally elicit very low levels of facial mimicry responses 
(Rymarcyk et al., 2011; Weyer et al., 2006). These findings have been viewed 
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previously as evidence for the moderation of facial mimicry by goal-directed or top-
down factors (Hess & Bourgeois, 2010; Hess & Fischer, 2014).  
Experiment 3(b) then aimed to further our understanding of top-down or 
motivational factors relating to facial mimicry and alexithymia by exploring potential 
differences in facial mimicry following the manipulation of the instruction given to 
participants. In the Passive Viewing condition, the same stimuli were presented under 
identical conditions to Experiment 3(a) where participants were instructed to simply 
view stimuli on screen. In an additional Emotion Simulation condition, participants 
were instructed to feel a target emotion while the corresponding facial expression was 
presented to them on screen.  
The results of Experiment 3(a) were replicated in the Passive Viewing 
condition of Experiment 3(b). Further analyses showed that groups produced different 
levels of facial mimicry depending on whether they passively viewed stimuli on screen 
or were given the instruction to internally simulate the observed emotion. However, 
results differed for different emotional expressions. In response to happy expressions, 
controls and the HA group produced significantly more smile facial mimicry in the 
Emotion Simulation condition than in the Passive Viewing condition. However, 
instructions did not induce smile facial mimicry in the MA group.  
In contrast, in response to angry expressions, while controls showed an 
increase in frown facial mimicry in the Emotion Simulation condition compared to the 
Passive Viewing condition, there was no significant difference in frown facial mimicry 
produced by the HA group in the Emotion Simulation condition compared to the 
Passive Viewing condition and the MA group produced significantly less facial 
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mimicry in the Emotion Simulation condition than in the Passive Viewing condition 
(albeit this was a small difference). 
This finding extends a small body of evidence indicating that automatic facial 
mimicry is affected by top-down factors, and shows that the occurrence of facial 
mimicy is influenced by the instruction to feel an observed emotion (e.g.,  Blaison, 
Hareli, Strauss, & Hess, 2012; Hess, Houde & Fischer, 2014; Murata, Saito, Schug, 
Ogawa, & Kameda, 2016; Reichmann-Decker et al., 2009). The results also suggest 
that the clinical range TAS-20 groups might rely upon implicitly learned facial 
mimicry responses. In particular, this might involve the suppression of frown facial 
mimicry responses in response to angry faces in relevant social contexts. 
 
Limitations of the current work 
A limitation of the series of studies in this thesis is that there may be inherent 
selection problems with the use of self-report questionnaires to identify participants 
with alexithymia. Self-report measures are a commonly used method of assessment in 
emotion research due to the notion that introspection provides a unique form of access 
to emotional processes. On more practical terms, self-report measures provide the 
important benefit of timely and efficient data collection. However, the use of self-
report questionnaires has been criticised on the grounds that an individual may have a 
limited ability to accurately determine their level of functioning relative to normative 
levels, particularly in cases such as alexithymia, where the abilities being measured 
relate to deficient or impaired self-knowledge (of emotion) (e.g., Lane, Ahern, 
Schwartz, & Kaszniak, 1997; Lundt et al., 2002; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & 
Sitarenios, 2001). This issue raises the possibility of alternative explanations for the 
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results obtained in the current thesis. This is that the MA group reported lower TAS-
20 scores than the HA group because they actually had more severe alexithymia but 
were less aware of their deficiencies. It is also possible that the HA group is composed 
of individuals with poor insight into their performance ability and so they over-
estimated their difficulties on the TAS-20 whilst they were able to objectively perform 
well on experimental tasks. These alternative explanations would also account for the 
‘better’ performance of the HA group relative to the MA group. 
In response to this criticism regarding the identification of alexithymia using 
self-report measures, various alternate approaches to the self-reporting of alexithymia 
have been developed. For instance, the modified Beth Israel Hospital Psychosomatic 
Questionnaire (Modified BIQ: Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) is based on the clinical 
interview method and thus benefits from the use of clinically trained interviewers to 
explore issues in depth and expand answers more thoroughly. 
Another approach to assessing alexithymia is to obtain collateral reports. The 
Observer Alexithymia Scale (OAS; Haviland et al., 2000) was developed using this 
method, based on the assumption that alexithymia results in behaviours that can be 
reliably reported by those who know the target well. However, while it is suggested 
that future research might employ multiple measures to address this potential 
limitation of the present research, a number of studies have shown that the TAS-20 
correlates highly with the ratings of collaterals and interviews (see Arimura, Komaki, 
& Murakami, 2002; Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994; Lumley, Gustavson, Partridge, & 
Labouvie-Vief, 2005). The consensual agreement between the self-ratings of TAS-20 
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scores and observer and interviewer ratings suggests that when used as a sole measure, 
the TAS-20 can assess the alexithymia construct adequately19.  
Another potential limitation of this thesis relates to the construct validity of the 
TAS-20. Some have recommended the use of the Difficulty Describing Feelings 
(DDF) subscale score rather than the use of the TAS-20 total score. Supporting 
evidence for this position is largely based on the results of a study by Parker, Prkachin, 
& Prkachin (2014). Parker and colleagues found that the TAS-20 DDF correlated more 
highly with facial emotion discrimination performance than the TAS-20 total score. 
However, Ihme et al (2014b) found conflicting evidence that the TAS-20 DDF 
subscale did not correlate significantly with reaction time on an emotion labelling task 
while the total TAS-20 score did. 
 In the present series of experiments, the TAS-20 total score was used in 
preference to the TAS-20 DDF for the following reasons. Firstly, clinical cut-off 
scores are available for the TAS-20 total score. (As stated in the Introduction, although 
alexithymia is generally considered a dimensional construct, upper and lower cut-off 
scores have been established for the TAS-20 total score). Secondly, as the TAS-20 
total score has frequently been used to identify alexithymia in the extant research, the 
use of the same designation in the present study allows for comparisons across studies. 
Thirdly, the TAS-20 total score and the DDF sub-score have been shown to be highly 
correlated (e.g. correlations between the TAS-20 total score and the DDF factor have 
been reported as r= .85 (Ihme et al., 2014b), r = .88 (Lumley, Gustavson, Partridge, & 
 
19 Since the testing phase of this research, a new self-report measure of alexithymia has been 
developed, called the Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire (PAQ), which is based on an attention-appraisal 
model of alexithymia. This new measure has performed well on markers of validity and reliability 
(Preece, Becerra, Robinson, Dandy & Allan, 2018). An alternative measure of alexithymia, the 
Bermond–Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ), also corresponds well with objective measures 
of emotional processing in alexithymic participants.  
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Labouvie-Vief, 2005) and r = .84 (Parker, Prkachin & Prkachin, 2005). It is suggested 
that future research establish whether keeping the TAS-20 subscale measures separate 
or forming composites will predict behavioural outcome criteria most powerfully.  
Finally, the experiments in this thesis examined four basic emotions (anger, 
fear, sadness and happiness). While many researchers have included disgust as a basic 
emotion, others consider disgust to be a sensory affect, akin to hunger and thirst (see 
Panksepp, 2007). Similarly, surprise is often viewed as a cognitive emotion that 
signals the violation of one’s expectations (see Munnich, Foster, & Keaneb, 2019). It 
has been suggested that classifying disgust and surprise as basic emotions is a category 
error, and for this reason these emotions were not included in the stimulus sets of the 
current experiments. While it is acknowledged that this may have affected the overall 
accuracy and decision time rates, as disgust and surprise are known to be difficult 
emotions to identify (e.g., Munnich, Foster, & Keaneb, 2019), the omission of these 
emotions would nevertheless not be expected to obscure group differences on these 
performance measures. 
This concludes the discussion of the overall limitations of the current research. 








Theoretical Inferences  
Despite evidence of facial emotion recognition performance deficits among 
participants with TAS-20 scores indicative of alexithymia, the overall results of the 
current thesis are difficult to reconcile with the prevailing theoretical view of 
alexithymia. Lane’s (1987, 1997) Levels of Emotional Awareness Theory describes 
alexithymia as a “blindfeel” that is analogous in nature to blind syndromes, where 
relevant information is processed at an implicit or sensory level without the contents 
of such processing being available to consciousness. This theory posits that 
alexithymia reflects a split between implicit and explicit forms of emotional 
processing, resulting in a deficient ability to construct an explicit cognitive 
representation of emotional knowledge. This would be expected to place a substantial 
constraint on the speed and accuracy of emotion recognition performance, particularly 
on tasks that require the verbal labelling of facial expressions (such as the task 
employed in Experiment 1). This is because performance on verbal labelling tasks 
requires explicit or conscious access to conceptual stores of knowledge, particularly 
under conditions of high task demand (Balconi & Lucchari, 2007; De Houwer & 
Moors, 2012; Herba et al. 2007; Neely, 1977; Shiffrin, & Schneider, 1977).  
The findings from the present studies do not support this account. Instead, 
groups with high and moderate clinical level TAS-20 scores demonstrated almost 90% 
accuracy when identifying facial expressions of emotion in Experiments 1(a) and 1(b). 
They also produced comparable accuracy to controls on the discrimination task of 
Experiment 2(a) and substantially better than chance accuracy in Experiment 2(b). The 
high level of accuracy shown by the clinical level TAS-20 groups in Experiments 1 
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and 2 is thus inconsistent with the contention that alexithymia reflects an 
implicit/explicit dissociation that results in a deficient ability to form a conscious 
representation of emotion. Rather, the findings of this thesis relating to accuracy 
suggest that basic conceptual representations of emotion are intact and available to 
consciousness in those with alexithymia.  
Looking further afield, other research has yielded findings that are inconsistent 
with Lane’s implicit/explicit dissociation theory of alexithymia. For instance, groups 
representing alexithymia have performed poorly on implicit performance measures 
such as the affective priming paradigm (e.g., Suslow, Junghanns, Donges, & Arolt, 
2001; Vermeulen, Luminet, & Corneille; 2006) and the emotional stroop task (Lundh, 
& Simonsson-Sarnecki, 2002; Muller, Alpers, & Reim, 2006). They have also 
demonstrated preserved performance on explicit emotion tasks, particularly where the 
task does not involve time constraints (e.g., Mann, Wise, Trinidad, & Kohanski, 1994; 
Pandey & Mandal, 1997; Parker, Prkchin, & Prkchin, 2005). Findings such as these 
do not fit with Lane’s (1987, 1997) theory of alexithymia which predicts intact 
performance on implicit emotion tests and impaired performance on explicit emotion 
tests among groups with clinical level TAS-20 scores.  
 
Embodied simulation account of alexithymia 
Arguably, there is a stronger explanation for the overall pattern of findings. 
This alternate explanation rests on the assumption that the perception of others’ facial 
expressions activates partially separable action and emotion simulations in the 
observer. This embodied perspective holds that disruption to the simulation process 
interferes with the facilitative priming of conceptual knowledge stores, resulting in 
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slower emotion recognition decision times while conceptual knowledge of emotion 
may be basically intact and accessible (Niedenthal et al., 2005). 
While it was not the aim of this thesis to directly test Lane’s theory, an 
embodied cognition interpretation is more consistent with the findings of the current 
thesis, where groups representing alexithymia tended to produce slower decision times 
than controls but maintained relatively high rates of accuracy. Further, a strong 
relationship was also observed between Group and Decision Time (DT), while a weak 
relationship was observed between Group and Accuracy. Specifically, in Experiment 
1(a), the effect sizes (Cohen’s f) were 60% for DT and 7% for Accuracy. These results 
are consistent with those of a recent study by Ihme and colleagues (2014b), where a 
significant positive correlation was found between TAS-20 scores and reaction times 
to negative emotional expressions, while no significant correlation was found for 
TAS-20 scores and recognition accuracy. While there may be other reasons for 
response time to be affected more than accuracy, such as a greater general sensitivity 
to individual differences or task difficulty, the findings of this thesis appear to be 
inconsistent with Lane’s functional dissociation proposal, which would logically 
predict a marked impact on both speed and accuracy outcome measures.  
The finding that the combined Moderate Alexithymia (MA) and High 
Alexithymia (HA) groups produced less facial mimicry than controls in Experiments 
3(a) and 3(b) of the current thesis also fits with the notion of dysfunctional simulation 
processes. According to the simulation framework, facial mimicry is a basic 
mechanism of embodied cognition that is involved in the re-activation of simulations 
relating to modality-specific perception, action, and emotion states (Hatfield et al., 
1992; Lundquist & Dimberg, 1995). In support of this view, research has indicated 
that mimicry of facial expressions tends to produce stronger neural responses to facial 
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expressions in structures associated with emotional experience than the perception of 
facial expressions alone (e.g., Carr et al., 2003). In line with the idea of reduced 
emotion simulation in alexithymia, brain imaging studies indicate reduced activation 
in emotion-relevant circuitry located in the anterior insula, amygdala, and secondary 
sensory cortices among individuals with alexithymia compared to controls (see Ihme 
et al., 2014a; Moriguchi et al., 2006; Karlsson, Naatanen & Stenman, 2008). Further 
instances of reduced facial mimicry in alexithymia (see Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2009; 
Scarpazza, Ladavas, & Cattaneo, 2018) appear to support the idea of a deficit in the 
ability to re-instantiate emotion simulations in alexithymia.  
Additional data in Experiment 4 that was included in the Appendix indicated 
that the groups representing alexithymia reported experiencing less emotion congruent 
with the adopted facial expressions of happiness and anger relative to controls (this 
was referred to as a reduced facial feedback effect). This finding suggests that for 
individuals with high TAS-20 scores, the activation of motor patterns relating to 
deliberately posed facial expressions is weakly linked to conscious subjective feeling 
states. While facial feedback may be considered a component of interoceptive 
awareness of emotion signals, facial feedback effects have traditionally been located 
within an embodied theoretical framework and possibly for this reason facial feedback 
effects and interoception have been viewed as disparate fields of research. 
Interestingly however, Quattroki and Friston (2014) have proposed a computational 
predictive model of interoceptive deficits that appears to provide an alternative 
explanation to the embodied simulation account of alexithymia (see Brewer, Cook, & 
Bird, 2016, and Murphy, Catmur, & Bird, 2017, for endorsement of this theory in 
relation to alexithymia).  
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According to Quattroki and Friston’s account, predictive Bayesian algorithms 
continually update probabilistic expectations (or predictions), which are ‘internal 
models of the world’ based on sensory information. These top-down expectancies 
initiate “...the neuromodulation of emotions, behaviours and cognition that are crucial 
to accomplishing prosocial and affiliative objectives” (p. 413). These expectations 
assign ‘emotional affordance’ (or salience or meaning) to certain exteroceptive or 
perceptual cues, such as eye contact, facial expressions, etc. Internal models or 
expectancies are tested against bottom-up sensory evidence so that new information 
can be updated and assimilated into higher-level representations of the “sentient self”. 
According to this account, a poorer associative learning of emotional affordances, with 
less attention being directed toward emotion cues, results in a failure to develop 
appropriate expectancies. This, along with a poor ability to regulate the awareness of 
interoceptive and exteroceptive signals, is thought to give rise to alexithymia.  
At face value, Quattroki and Friston’s (2014) computational, predictive 
account of interoception appears to be in direct opposition to an embodied simulation 
explanation of alexithymia. However, as predictive processing has become an 
increasingly popular concept in the cognitive sciences, the question of how predictive 
processing may be positioned with respect to embodied cognition has become a topic 
of some debate (e.g., Brown & Brune, 2012; Kirchhoff, 2018; Newen, 2018). Rather 
than emphasising how these accounts differ, theorists such as Clark (2016) have 
attempted to emphasise commonalities among these perspectives. Indeed, Clark 
(2016) has argued that predictive processing models might provide “the perfect neuro-
computational partner for work on the embodied mind” (p. 1). (See also Bruineberg 
& Rietveld 2014; Kirchhoff, 2015, 2016, 2017).  
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As noted by Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, & Hess (2010), clearer 
understanding of the role of the mirror neuron system in human emotion recognition 
is required. Interestingly, they also propose in their SIMS embodied simulation model 
(Niedenthal et al., 2010) that individuals possess and use knowledge and expectations 
about the meanings of facial expressions to activate simulations. They state that these 
conceptually triggered simulations may not always be relevant or correct in 
interpreting the current situation. They further identify that a challenge for the 
embodied simulation approach is to suggest how this stored knowledge is represented 
and also how it relates to embodied simulations.  
This theoretical challenge may be addressed through the integration of 
embodied and predictive models of the mind. Such a perspective sees sensory 
information captured as chains of actions during action observation and then 
assimilated into existing simulations (or in predictive terms, ‘internal models of the 
world’) that code not only the action but also the goals and intentions of the action. 
These action representations would produce an action prediction about the likely 
consequence and outcome of an observed action that assists the observer to draw 
further inferences and facilitate higher information processing, such as recognition 
memory (See Barsalou, 2009; Quattroki & Friston, 2014). This idea implies that 
expectations (or, “conceptually triggered simulations”) are, in fact, represented in the 
content of simulations. As the mirror neuron system is conceptualised as comprising 
partially separable motor and affective subsystems, chains of actions might be 
captured as motor or affective representations. As argued earlier in the Introduction, 
eye contact may trigger the ‘hot’ emotion simulation of a perceived facial expression 
and its correspondent feeling for use in interpretation (reflected in higher levels of 
facial mimicry). This might occur due to the emotional affordance assigned to eye 
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contact. While expectancies (or simulations) may assign emotional affordance to 
certain cues, it is possible that these cues, specifically eye contact, also trigger 
predictions involving hot emotion-relevant simulation. 
Where simulations are not relevant or accurate, they would feature high 
predictive error and attempts would be made to reduce this predictive error by 
updating existing simulations. A further strategy for reducing predictive error may be 
the recruitment of additional simulation, such as the proposed recruitment of cold 
motor simulation. 
It was argued that the generally better performance of the HA group compared 
to the MA group across the current experiments may reflect the recruitment of such a 
compensatory mechanism. It is plausible that individuals with high levels of 
alexithymia rely more on the use of compensatory strategies than those with moderate 
clinical levels of alexithymia. This is because they are likely to experience greater 
emotion deficits than those with lower TAS-20 scores and may have a preserved 
awareness of these deficits. This preserved awareness is evidenced by their 
endorsement of a high number of items on the TAS-20, which paradoxically taps an 
awareness of a lack of awareness (Lundh et al., 2002; Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 
1997). Such awareness may be heightened in the laboratory context, where procedures 
are typically not disguised, and features of the procedure, such as task instructions, 
may make it apparent that participants’ ability to process emotional cues is being 
tested.  
Consistent with the idea of a compensatory mechanism operating among those 
with high TAS-20 scores, activation within the mirror neuron system (MNS) 
architecture is thought to be moderated by the intentions or motivational states of the 
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observer. For instance, the grasping of food elicits greater activity in the MNS when 
participants are hungry than when they are satiated (Cheng, Meltzoff & Decety, 2007). 
This high plasticity within the human mirror neuron system make it an ideal candidate 
for a compensatory mechanism that assists in the processing of facial expression 
stimuli. As stated, individuals with high TAS-20 scores may have an awareness of 
their emotional processing deficits and so seek to reduce their predictive error through 
the greater recruitment of motor simulations based on learned action representations.  
It was argued in the current thesis that neuroimaging evidence suggests that 
the mirror neuron system comprises two partially separable subsystems relating to 
motor and affect-relevant simulation (for review, see Molenberghs et al., 2012). Not 
surprisingly, a substantial number of brain imaging studies indicate that individuals 
with alexithymia have reduced activation in emotion-relevant circuitry located in the 
anterior insula, amygdala, and secondary sensory cortices in response to emotion 
eliciting stimuli compared to controls (e.g., Ihme et al., 2014a; Moriguchi et al., 2006; 
Karlsson, Naatanen & Stenman, 2008). In line with both embodied and predictive 
theories of cognition, the strong association between alexithymia and non-nurturing 
early environments, characterised by insecure attachment (e.g., Besharat, 2010; Gulec, 
Altintas, Inanc, Bezgin, Koca, & Gulec; 2013; Evren et al., 2009), would suggest that 
empathetic failures between caregiver and child are likely to have occurred and 
affected the quality of the associative learning process. This learning process delivers 
the content of the simulations (or ‘expectancies’ in predictive terms) that then assign 
emotional affordance to certain cues, such as facial expressions. A failure to develop 
appropriate expectancies in alexithymia would not only result in these external cues 
holding reduced saliency for these individuals but also internal or interoceptive signals 
associated with these cues would be likely to be poorly differentiated. This might also 
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contribute to interoceptive confusion in regard to physical and emotional interceptive 
signals (see Brewer, Cook, & Bird, 2016; Murphy, Catmur, & Bird, 2017). 
Presumably, if one cannot clearly represent one’s own feelings, it would be harder 
to simulate those of others (Winkielman et al., 2018). This suggests that alexithymia 
is associated with less activation or recruitment of affect-relevant simulation, 
particularly in the context of tasks that require the identification or processing of facial 
expressions. 
Relevant to the idea of a motor compensation mechanism operating among 
those with high TAS-20 scores, brain imaging also shows that when individuals 
representing alexithymia view emotion-eliciting stimuli they demonstrate greater 
activation in action-relevant motor regions, particularly the premotor cortex, 
compared to controls (Ihme et al., 2014a; Moriguchi et al., 2006; Karlsson, Naatanen 
& Stenman, 2008). Neuroimaging evidence also suggests that the level of activation 
in brain regions responsible for motor simulation is dependent on the significance the 
observer places on others’ actions. For instance, there is greater activation in motor 
regions for stimuli paired with reward conditions (e.g., Gros, Panasiti & Chakrabarti, 
2015). The increased activation in motor brain regions among those with high TAS-
20 scores may provide an explanation for the enhanced performance (involving faster 
decision times and higher levels of facial mimicry) of the HA groups compared to the 
MA groups in the current experiments. While such a motor based compensation 
strategy would not deliver a simulation of what the other individual is feeling, it might 
nonetheless allow a basic cold simulation of what the observed individual is doing and 
the intention or motivation behind that action that facilitates higher level information 
processing on emotion tasks such as those employed in the current thesis.  
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The findings of Experiment 1(b) are consistent with the idea that the HA group 
recruited a motor based compensatory mechanism to help them perform emotion tasks. 
In the dynamic condition of Experiment 1(b), the HA group were faster to perform the 
facial emotion recognition task than the MA group. However, in the Static condition, 
there was no significant decision time advantage for the HA group compared to the 
MA group. Brain imaging findings indicate that static stimuli activate neural regions 
involved in motor planning, suggesting that static images are processed using motor-
based simulation strategies (Enticott, Johnson, Herring, Hoy & Fitzgerald, 2008; Kilts, 
Egan, Gideon, Ely & Hoffman, 2003). It was argued that the HA group relied on motor 
simulation to improve their performance, and for this reason there was no decision 
time advantage for the HA group in the static presentation condition. 
The results of Experiment 4 (see Appendix) where a reduced facial feedback 
effect was found for the HA group relative to the MA group suggests that the HA 
group, while able to produce a better performance on tests of emotion recognition 
(Experiment 1) and discrimination (Experiment 2), and produce greater levels of facial 
mimicry (Experiment 3), were nevertheless not able to generate, or be aware of, 
emotion signals associated with facial expressions. This again points to the HA group 
relying on processes other than emotion simulation to improve their performance 
relative to the MA group.  
Interestingly, in Experiment 3(b), when presented with angry facial 
expressions on screen and instructed to simulate the depicted emotion, the MA group, 
in contrast to the other groups, produced a decrease in their frown facial mimicry 
compared to when they passively viewed angry facial expressions. It was argued that 
the instruction to adopt the same emotion as that shown on screen (rather than simply 
viewing faces) may have increased the social relevance of the facial expression and in 
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the MA group produced a learned social response involving responding to angry facial 
expressions with the suppression of frown facial mimicry (for theory of learned facial 
mimicry responses, see Kavanagh & Winkielman, 2016). This explanation is in 
keeping with Schilbach et al.’s (2008) finding that facial mimicry is associated with 
elevated activation in the hippocampus, a region involved in memory (although 
Schilbach et al. did not investigate individual differences in hippocampal activation in 
their study). The activation of the hippocampus in a mirror neuron network (see also 
Mukamel et al., 2010) suggests that facial mimicry responses may be based on learned 
associations from previous experiences that are assimilated into embodied 
simulations. These simulations not only inform socially appropriate responses to 
situations, but also provide predictions regarding the facial expressions of others. The 
MA group may not employ a cold motor compensation mechanism but instead rely on 
these implicitly learned behavioural responses (see Kavanagh & Winkielman, 2016). 
Future studies will be important in clarifying and strengthening these points. 
 
Simulation Applications in Therapy 
Emerging research in neuroscience about the putative human mirror neuron 
system has begun to prompt discussion on the use of simulation principles in 
therapeutic contexts. For instance, Liew, Garrison, Werner and Aziz-Zadeh (2012) 
initially outlined the potential practical applications of mirror neuron principles in 
occupational therapy. In addition, Singh and Feifel (2013) have discussed the potential 
development of a new system of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment based on a mirror 
neuron framework.  
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Initial treatment studies based on action observation and imitation (or 
simulation) methods are also emerging. For instance, Small, Buccino and Solodkin 
(2012) examined whether action observation and imitation would improve hand motor 
performance in patients with ischemic stroke. During treatment, patients observed 
short videos of actors performing different ecological actions (i.e., drinking a cup of 
coffee, eating an apple) before being required to execute the observed action with their 
impaired arm and hand. Preliminary results showed significant improvement of motor 
functions in the treatment group compared to controls.  
Lee, Fowler, Rodney, Cherney and Small (2010) also reported the 
commencement of clinical trials examining the efficacy of a computer-based treatment 
for aphasia based on action observation and imitation called the Intensive Mouth 
Imitation and Talking for Aphasia Therapeutic Effect or IMITATE. This therapy 
consists of a period of observation followed by imitation. The patient, sitting opposite 
the computer screen, is instructed to look at and listen to audiovisual clips of the same 
stimulus (observation) and then to say it aloud (imitation). The therapeutic tasks use 
only stimuli that are part of normal speech (e.g., words, sentences) and are uttered with 
normal prosody by a speaker whose face, lips, and mouth are visible. Lee et al. 
reported promising preliminary behavioural treatment outcome data. This principle of 
observation and imitation might similarly be applied to the associative learning of 
emotional states and facial expressions in alexithymia.  
More recently, Snyder, Waddell and Blanchet (2016) conducted a treatment 
study for persistent developmental stuttering based on simulation principles. 
Participants were asked to speak while they were either producing self-generated 
manual gestures, producing and visually perceiving self-generated manual gestures, 
or visually perceiving manual gestures, relative to a non-manual gesture control 
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speaking condition. Results revealed that while all experimental speaking conditions 
enhanced fluent speech, the simultaneous perception and production of manual 
gesturing produced a trend toward greater fluency enhancement. 
Given the interest in therapeutic approaches based on simulation principles, 
can the findings from the current dissertation advance the treatment of alexithymia? 
Firstly, the results of Experiments 1(a and b), and 2(b), confirm that facial emotion 
recognition and discrimination processes are detrimentally affected in alexithymia. 
Given the potential negative outcomes associated with facial emotion processing 
deficits of this sort, which were outlined in early chapters of the present thesis, this 
area is a worthy focus of intervention. In particular, the current results indicate that 
intervention may primarily attempt to address the issue of the speed of emotion 
recognition through observation and imitation training. Furthermore, training in 
identifying and naming facial emotion may be of greater relevance in addressing 
alexithymia deficits than discriminating among facial emotions, given that in this 
series of studies behavioural performance deficits only emerged among alexithymia 
groups on a discrimination task with a high level of task difficulty. On the other hand, 
it could be argued that discrimination between two facial emotions under more 
difficult conditions may have real-life significance and thus also is an important area 
to target for treatment. 
Nevertheless, based on the current research findings, future therapeutic work 
on ameliorating the facial emotion recognition deficits in alexithymia may consider 
the suggestion in the current dissertation that individuals with high levels of 
alexithymia may recruit motor simulation to help them more rapidly identify emotions 
in others. Overall, further investigation of the link between emotion and behavioural 
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motor programs among individuals with high levels of alexithymia may lead to 
promising new therapeutic approaches.  
Relevant to this approach, Penn and Combs (2000) investigated whether a 
facial feedback intervention strategy would significantly improve performance on a 
facial emotion identification task for persons with schizophrenia. They found that 
observation and imitation of facial expressions (facial feedback condition) led to 
significant improvements in facial recognition and resulted in higher recognition 
scores than simple observation alone. Penn and Combs speculated that the subjects 
receiving facial feedback instructions were able to use proprioceptive cues to help 
them identify the emotion depicted in the target faces. Given that imitation has been 
found to produce greater MNS activation than observation alone (Buccino et al., 
2004), a further explanation is that the imitation performed in the facial feedback 
condition of Penn and Combs’ study may have led to greater simulation in the mirror 
neuron system which then enhanced recognition of facial emotions. Furthermore, the 
results of Experiment 3(b) on facial mimicry and alexithymia indicate that instructing 
individuals with alexithymia to generate feelings consistent with observed facial 
emotion stimuli, as opposed to passively viewing emotions on others’ faces, increases 
the level of their smile facial mimicry. Whether a combination of these instruction 
techniques leads to improved facial emotion recognition and a greater re-experiencing 
of the emotion associated with a target facial expression (i.e., hot simulation) requires 
further investigation but may be of relevance to the design of therapy programs. 
A caveat, however, is that our current understanding of the mirror neuron 
system is mostly based on functional neuroimaging studies of the brain. More research 
is needed to provide insight on how this basic science can be translated into clinical 
applications. Furthermore, in addition to raising performance to normative levels, a 
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true measure of the clinical significance of an intervention is one that also impacts 
functional outcomes (Bellack et al., 1999; Green, 1996; Spaulding et al. 1999). 
Therefore, it remains to be seen whether programs targeting facial emotion recognition 
or facial mimicry expression do produce lasting concomitant functional improvements 
in social cognitive abilities.  
 
Suggestions for future research 
The methodological implications from the current thesis, particularly 
involving the use of dynamic stimuli, the measurement of decision time in addition to 
accuracy, and the use of two clinical level TAS-20 groups, as well as suggestions for 
future studies, will now be discussed. 
At the commencement of this project, morphing was a new technology that 
was rarely used in emotion research. Interestingly, the morphing technology owes its 
existence to the late pop-singer Michael Jackson, who poured much financial capital 
into the development of morphing software for use on the video-clip of the song 
‘Thriller’. Many years down the track, morphing stimuli are more commonplace in 
studies on facial emotion recognition for the reasons put forward in the Introduction 
regarding the advantages of using dynamic stimuli. Nevertheless, our knowledge of 
alexithymia is largely based on past research that has utilised static photographic 
images. Future studies should refer to findings from the broader literature on the 
differential brain activation and processing strategies implicated in the use of dynamic 
versus static facial emotion stimuli. It is recommended that this be an important 
consideration in the future design of experimental tasks. 
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In the current research, a large effect was found for decision time while a small 
effect was found for accuracy. This may partially explain the equivocal outcomes of 
previous research on alexithymia and facial emotion recognition, as this research has 
primarily focused on accuracy as an outcome measure. More broadly, studies 
investigating the link between facial mimicry and facial emotion recognition have also 
primarily focused on recognition accuracy. While it has consistently been shown that 
blocking facial mimicry results in longer latencies to recognise facial expressions 
(Niedenthal et al., 2001; Stel & van Knippenberg, 2008), mixed results have been 
obtained in investigations that have measured the relationship between facial mimicry 
and the accuracy of facial emotion judgments (for significant effects see Kunecke et 
al., 2014; Maringer, Fischer, Krumhuber, & Niedenthal, 2011; Oberman et al., 2007; 
Ponari et al., 2012; Rychlowska et al., 2014. For null results see Blairy, Herrerra, & 
Hess, 1999; Hess & Blairy, 2001). These equivocal findings may reflect the use of 
accuracy as an outcome measure. In any case, the findings of the current thesis 
demonstrate that speed of response should not only be included as an outcome variable 
in future studies addressing facial emotion recognition and alexithymia but should be 
considered to be the primary dependent variable. This is also an important 
methodological consideration due to issues of ecological validity as in everyday 
interactions the speed of change in emotion expression must be accurately perceived 
and processed in order to follow the social dynamic. 
Another methodological consideration arising from the current research is that 
performance differences were found among participants with clinical range TAS-20 
scores following allocation to two groups based on a median-split of these scores. This 
finding was replicated across different groups of participants. Previously, some 
authors have hypothesised the existence of two subtypes of alexithymia (Bermond et 
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al., 2007; Chen, Xu, Jing, & Chan, 2011; Kajanoja, Scheinin, Karlsson, Karlsson, & 
Karukiyi, 2017; Vorst & Bermond, 2001). However, others have argued a two-factor 
solution is not a good fit for the variance observed in this population (Bagby et al., 
2009).  
This remains a controversial issue with on-going debate on whether the 
alexithymia construct is best described as dimensional or categorical in structure. For 
instance, Taylor, Bagby and Parker (2016) refer to findings of Mattila et al. (2010) 
and Parker et al. (2008) that support a dimensional conceptualisation of alexithymia. 
Similarly, Primmer (2013) argues that emotional awareness is not a categorical 
construct, and so alexithymia should not be defined according to subtypes, stating “it 
is more likely that there exist various degrees of alexithymia, just as there are various 
degrees of emotional awareness ranging from mere awareness of bodily sensations to 
full-blown awareness” (p. 115). In direct contrast, Lane et al. (2015) declare that 
“…the tendency to jump to the explanation that alexithymia is a continuum obscures 
a critical issue…” (p. 607) involving distinctions between sub-types of alexithymia. 
The results of this thesis strongly indicate qualitatively different mechanisms at work 
in the Moderate and High Alexithymia groups. Whether subtypes exist within the 
clinical alexithymia population remains an open question and further on-going 
investigation of potential subtypes in alexithymia is clearly an important issue for 
future research.   
A further issue of considerable importance is that the majority of previous 
studies on alexithymia are limited by participant selection issues. Participants with 
TAS-20 scores below the clinical cut-off score have been selected to represent 
alexithymia, which means that while these studies purport to examine the alexithymia 
construct, participants in fact do not meet current clinical criteria for alexithymia. For 
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this reason, the approach adopted in this thesis was to consider alexithymia as a 
categorial variable and to include participants with extreme TAS-20 scores (the mid-
range TAS-20 scores of 51-60 were excluded due to the use of cut-off criteria). This 
approach was justified by performing a correlation between TAS-20 scores and the 
outcome variables of Decision Time and Accuracy. In both analyses a significant 
negative correlation confirmed that the choice of the median split to divide the TAS-
20 scores into two subgroups was appropriate (as, unexpectedly, Decision Time was 
shorter rather than longer for participants with higher TAS-20 scores), however a 
consequence of this decision is that groups are reduced in size and may become more 
heterogeneous. 
It was argued in the current thesis that there has been a failure to control for 
confounding variables such as depression in most previous studies on facial emotion 
recognition and alexithymia. These participant selection issues have potentially 
muddied our understanding of the characteristics of alexithymia and for this reason 
these limitations were redressed in the methodology of the current series of 
experiments. However, despite attempts to screen for psychopathology and 
neurological symptoms, and to it remains possible that sub-clinical depressive 
symptoms or other psychological or neurodevelopmental conditions related to 
alexithymia were present in the current participants. Assessing clinical level 
alexithymia in normative samples is an important step in furthering our understanding 
of alexithymia. An alternative approach for future research to take, however, might be 
to consider alexithymia as a dimensional construct and to conduct linear mixed model 
analyses on the full range of TAS-20 scores. This would allow the analysis of a number 
of additional variables that may moderate or mediate alexithymia, such as depression, 
gender, and autism. 
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It was argued in the current thesis that the HA group may have employed a 
compensatory mechanism to improve their test performance. Future experimental 
studies might consider manipulating task variables that influence the use of 
compensatory strategies, such as test awareness, to see if that has some bearing on 
results. Another approach is to test performance under increasing task demands. 
Performance underpinned by compensatory mechanisms is argued to resemble an 
inverted U-shaped curve where, in response to increasing task demands, compensation 
improves performance until a certain point is reached where compensation 
mechanisms fail and performance drops below normal levels (van der Velde et al., 
2013). More generally, further research is needed to understand what processes 
operate in a given context and under what task conditions. It may be of particular 
interest to determine how action based and emotion-relevant simulation systems, as 
well as implicitly learned contingencies, relate to each other in alexithymia.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, the current series of investigations sought to clarify whether 
alexithymia is characterised by a deficit in the ability to recognise the facial 
expressions of others. By redressing several limitations in previous research, this 
question can be answered unequivocally – alexithymia is indeed related to slower and 
less accurate recognition of others’ facial emotion. This performance deficit is not 
solely due to a difficulty with the verbal naming of emotional expressions. 
Alexithymia is also associated with the reduced occurrence of facial mimicry and a 
reduced facial feedback effect.  
 223 
Currently, the prevailing theoretical understanding of alexithymia is based on 
Lane’s (1987, 1997) Levels of Emotional Awareness theory. It was argued that this 
implicit/explicit dissociation model does not fit well with the results of the current 
thesis and other empirical findings (e.g., Lundh, & Simonsson-Sarnecki, 2002; Mann, 
Wise, Trinidad, & Kohanski, 1994; Muller, Alpers, & Reim, 2006; Pandey & Mandal, 
1997;  Parker, Prkchin, & Prkchin, 2005; Suslow, Junghanns, Donges, & Arolt, 2001; 
Vermeulen, Luminet, & Corneille; 2006). While Lane proposed a reformulation in 
1997 (referred to as the Blindfeel hypothesis), which specified the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) to be the site of the underlying mechanism responsible for poor 
interoceptive ability in alexithymia, this conceptualisation has not been updated to 
accommodate the current neuroscientific literature that points to a dysfunctional 
insula-ACC network in alexithymia (see Borsci et al., 2009; Kano et al., 2003; Reker 
et al., 2009; Silani et al., 2008). Further, Lane’s (1987, 1997) theoretical understanding 
of an “interoceptive deficit” is limited to the process of understanding one’s own 
emotional states and does not articulate how interoception may affect the recognition 
of others’ facial expressions. 
It was further argued in this thesis that the rapid identification of the emotions 
of others is subserved by a sensori-motor mirroring mechanism that allows us to re-
experience the same emotional states that we observe in others (Niedenthal, 2007; 
Niedenthal et al., 2010). This mirroring mechanism comprises partially separable 
systems that allow action-relevant (cold) simulation and emotion-relevant (hot) 
simulation (Molenberghs et al., 2012). The findings from the current research are 
consistent with the notion of dysfunction of emotion-relevant simulation networks in 
alexithymia. It is proposed that individuals with high clinical levels of alexithymia use 
action-relevant simulation networks to gain a compensatory motor-based 
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understanding of the facial emotions of others. Those with moderate levels of 
alexithymia may be less aware of their deficits and rely instead on implicitly learned 
facial mimicry responses in social contexts. This was argued to account for the 
generally poorer performance of the MA groups in the current experiments.  
Since brain activity was not measured in the present study, these assumptions 
concerning the role of possible underlying neural mechanisms in alexithymia remain 
speculative. However, it is argued that this motor-based compensation proposal is 
consistent with some of the current findings in affective neuroscience, which were 
outlined (particularly regarding greater activation in action-relevant regions of the 
MNS, see Ihme et al, 2014b; Karlsson, Naatanen & Stenman, 2008; Moriguchi et al., 
2006).  
While it is argued in the present thesis that the integration of the alexithymia 
literature with a neuroscientific understanding of embodied simulation processes can 
advance our knowledge of the alexithymia construct, many of the finer details of the 
simulation explanation of alexithymia have not been formulated (Niedenthal et al., 
2010). Further advancement of existing theory of alexithymia may be achieved by 
reconciling an embodied account with predictive models of the mind (see Quattroki & 
Friston, 2014). Particularly, notions of emotional affordance and prediction may help 
to explain how external emotion cues and interoceptive signals of emotion hold little 
significance for these individuals, resulting in a dysfunctional emotion simulation 
process. 
Simulation theories of embodied emotion and predictive models provide 
powerful new directions for theorising about representations of emotional cues and 
the mechanisms that process them. They should be integrated with research findings 
 225 
on alexithymia to form a coherent framework. As the ability to recognise others’ facial 
emotion provides an important basis for interpersonal competency, a key question is 
whether these deficits can be ameliorated, and this dissertation provides suggestions 
for simulation-based intervention. There has been little empirical work on developing 
specific psychological strategies for remediating emotion recognition deficits in 
alexithymia. However, there are indications that this will be an area of expanding 
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Experiment 4 - Alexithymia and Facial feedback Effects - A Preliminary 
Study 
The facial feedback hypothesis currently rests on the assumption that a facial 
expression not only expresses an emotion, but also produces afferent sensory feedback 
that influences the emotional experience. For instance, it is proposed that lifting the 
cheeks makes an individual happier, while bringing the brows together makes an 
individual angrier. In support of this hypothesis, a large literature reports that when an 
individual adopts a particular facial expression, they experience the corresponding 
emotion (e.g., Davis, Senghas, Brandt, & Ochsner, 2010; Duclos & Laird, 2001; 
Duclos et al., 1989; Flack, Laird, & Cavallaro, 1999; Strack et al., 1988; Davis, 
Senghas, & Ochsner, 2009; Laird et al., 1994; Lewis & Bowler, 2009; van 
Swearingen, Cohn, & Bajaj-Luthra, 1999, cf., Reisenzein, Studtmann, & Horstmann, 
2013). Similarly, research has produced evidence that inhibiting facial expressions is 
associated with a reduction of emotional experience (e.g., Davis, Senghas, & Ochsner, 
2009; Duclos & Laird, 2001; Laird et al., 1994; Lewis & Bowler, 2009; van 
Swearingen, Cohn, & Bajaj-Luthra, 1999).  
According to theories of embodied cognition, afferent feedback from facial 
expressions serves to re-instantiate motor, somatosensory and emotion-related 
simulations that aid the process of emotion recognition (for theoretical descriptions 
see Berkowitz, 1990; Bower, 1981; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-
Gruber, & Ric, 2005). Studies with normal populations where facial expressions are 
prevented for example, by chewing, biting, or by direct instruction have generally 
found emotion recognition deficits (e.g., Kunecke et al., 2014; Maringer, Fischer, 
Krumhuber, & Niedenthal, 2011; Niedenthal et al., 2001; Oberman et al., 2007; 
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Ponari et al., 2012; Stel and van Knippenberg, 2008; Rychlowska et al., 2014. 
However, for null results see Blairy, Herrerra, & Hess, 1999; Hess & Blairy, 2001). 
While no direct investigation has been undertaken on facial feedback and 
alexithymia, facial feedback effects have been found to be modified by a construct 
that arguably may overlap conceptually with alexithymia. This is the construct of 
field-dependence or field-independence, which is commonly measured by the Rod-
and-Frame Task20 (Witkin & Asch, 1948). It refers to individual differences in the 
reliance on internal versus external perceptual cues. Field-independent individuals are 
more responsive to internal, bodily cues while field-dependent individuals are thought 
to rely to a greater extent on situational or contextual cues outside of their bodies. 
Similarly, individuals with alexithymia are characteristically described as having 
difficulties identifying their internal feeling states and motivations and a propensity to 
be guided by contextual cues or social norms (Parker et al., 1997). Early studies by 
Laird and colleagues (Duncan & Laird, 1977; Laird & Crosby, 1974; Laird & Berglas, 
1975) demonstrated that field-dependent individuals are less able to generate facial 
feedback effects from facial expressions than field-independent individuals. In a later 
study, field dependent individuals were slower to classify emotion metaphors that 
were congruent with their posed facial expressions than field independent individuals, 
suggesting that facial feedback affects the speed of emotional judgements (Schnall & 
Laird, 2007). 
 
20 In the Rod-and-Frame Task (Witkin & Asch, 1948), the participant sits in an entirely dark 
room and is presented with a luminous rod surrounded by a luminous frame which is tilted to the left 
or right. The rod can be moved independently from the frame, and the participant’s task is to adjust the 
rod to make it appear vertical.  
Field independence is measured as the extent to which the participant either relies on external 
cues from the contextual frame, rather than from proprioceptive cues from their body. 
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As to date no study has directly investigated the facial feedback effect among 
individuals with alexithymia, the current experiment examined whether individuals 
with alexithymia experienced a self-reported change in their subjective feelings of 
emotion following the direct manipulation of their facial expression using the 
Expression Manipulation Task, developed by Laird and Strout (2007).  
 This task involves directly instructing participants to adopt a facial expression 
and then self-report on their phenomenological or subjective experience of emotion. 
This is done in order to preserve the naturalism of the expressions, which does not 
occur when disguised procedures are used (Dimberg & Soderkvist, 2011; Flack, Laird, 
& Cavallaro, 1999). At the same time, demand characteristics are potentially reduced 
in this task by encouraging participants to report their actual experiences and by 
providing them with instructions that emphasise the possibility of remaining 
unaffected by the emotional stimuli (Nielson & Kaszniak, 2007).  
The broad aim of this investigation was to further our understanding of the 
whether the proposed mechanisms underlying facial emotion recognition are affected 
in alexithymia. It was anticipated, given reduced facial feedback effects have been 
found among field-dependent individuals who, like individuals with alexithymia, tend 
to rely on situational cues rather than internal bodily cues, that following the adoption 
of smile and frown facial expressions, participants in the clinical range TAS-20 groups 
would self-report less intensity of the corresponding emotion (Happy, Angry) than 
controls. Furthermore, given the general pattern in the data that was found in the thesis 
proper in Experiments 1(a and b), 2 (b) and 3(a and b), where the HA group produced 
a ‘better’ performance than the MA group, it was predicted that the High Alexithymia 
group (HA) would self-report greater intensity of the corresponding emotion than the 
Moderate Alexithymia group (MA). 
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Experiment 4 - Method 
 
Participants 
A total of 55 Murdoch University undergraduates (29 males, 26 females) took 
part in this experiment. The same method as described in Experiment 1(a) was used 
to recruit, screen and allocate participants to two groups with TAS-20 scores in the 
clinical range for alexithymia and a control group. Potential participants were 
excluded from taking part in the experiment if they scored above clinical cut-off levels 
on the DASS-21 (i.e., Depression (<9), Anxiety (<7) and Stress (<14)). While the 
target sample size was 20 participants per group (please refer to Experiment 1(a) for 
the rationale for this sample size), there was not sufficient participants to meet this 
target. The three resultant groups comprised: 17 high ‘alexithymia’ participants (HA), 
22 moderate ‘alexithymia’ participants (MA) and 16 controls.  
The mean TAS-20 score of the HA group was 66.3 (SD, 0.4), the mean TAS-
20 score of the MA group was 62. 4 (SD, .24) and the mean TAS-20 score of the 
control group was 44.7 (SD, 1.9).   
Further statistical analyses (see Table 7) revealed no significant differences 
among participants with respect to the demographic factors of age, tertiary education, 
gender and ethnicity. This confirmed that the three groups were matched on relevant 
demographic variables.   
Participants either participated in return for course credit or received $10 
(AUD) reimbursement for their time and travel costs. This project was granted 
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approval by the Murdoch University Human Research Ethics Committee (Permit 
number 2007/286). 
 
Table 7 Descriptive and Demographic Data of Participant Groups 
 
Controls MA HA ANOVA Chi-sq 
 
M   SD M   SD M   SD F     p 
 
χ2    p 
 
Age 20.6 (2.1) 20.5 (2.3) 20.5 (1.9) .983 (ns) 
Tertiary Education (years) 1.8  (.5) 2     (.9) 1.7   (.5) .284 (ns) 
 
Gender (males/females) 10/6 11/11 8/9 
 
.119 (ns) 






Participants were read the following instructions, taken from Laird and Strout 
(2007):  
"A great deal of research has demonstrated that when people adopt 
facial expressions of emotion, some people feel the emotions they are 
expressing. For example, some people feel happier when they smile 
and angrier when they frown. Other people are unaffected by their 
expressions. Most of us have not noticed whether we respond to our 
expressions or not, probably because we are too busy living our lives. 
However, recent research has demonstrated that if people sit quietly, 
deliberately adopt their normal expressions, and focus their attention 
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carefully on their feelings, they can report their responses quite 
accurately. 
So, what we would like you to do is to adopt certain facial expressions 
and then report what you are feeling by filling out four sets of mood 
rating scales, beginning with the one on the next page. When you fill 
it out, please try to describe as accurately as possible how you actually 
felt.  
If you felt happier when smiling, or angrier or sadder when frowning, 
we need to know that, but if you felt nothing, or felt happy while 
frowning, it is equally important that we know that. People who are 
affected by their expressions and those who are not are about equally 
common, and the only way we can know what sort you are is what you 
tell us here. So please try to be as accurate as possible. 
Each trial starts with an instruction about which expressions to adopt. 
You need only maintain the expressions for 10 or 15 seconds, or 
whatever seems right to you, so that you can be reasonably confident 
about your reactions. Notice that we would like you to repeat the two 
expressions, for a total of four trials. 
Please close your eyes to avoid distractions.” 
Participants were then handed a four-page test sheet booklet. On two of the test 
sheets were the Smile condition instructions and on the other two sheets were the 
Frown condition instructions. Test sheets were organised in an alternating fashion and 
counterbalanced among participants so that half performed the Frown manipulation 
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first and the other half performed the Smile manipulation first. Written instructions at 
the top of the page were as follows:  
"On this trial, we would like you to adopt a SMILE (FROWN). Smile 
(frown) as you naturally do, and then notice how you are feeling. Then 
please describe your feelings by making an 'X' on the line that best 
describes how strongly you felt each of the emotions. For example, if 
you felt an emotion somewhat, but not too strongly, you would put a 
mark somewhere in the middle of the line." 
Below the instructions were visual analogue rating scales for eight different 
emotions (anxious, interested, angry, sad, happy, disgusted, afraid, and surprised). 
Under the typed word for each emotion was a 15 cm line with the words: "Did not feel 
at all" at the far left of the line; "Somewhat" in the middle of the line; and "Felt very 
strongly" at the far right of the line. Scores had a possible range of 0 – 15. 
After the participant had read the test sheets, the researcher inquired whether 
they understood the instructions and then left the room while participants performed 
the task. All participants were tested individually.  
 
Experiment 4 - Discussion  
 
This study sought to examine whether clinical range TAS-20 groups and 
controls produce different levels of facial feedback, as measured by self-reported 
intensity of feelings following the adoption of smile and frown facial expressions. 
Rather than using disguised procedures for eliciting facial feedback, an effort was 
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made to reduce demand characteristics by providing participants with an 
understanding of the research question and instructions that emphasised the possibility 
of remaining unaffected by the emotional stimuli. The results showed that asking 
participants to adopt a smile or frown facial expression and then report directly on 
their feelings produced an overall change in their self-report of emotion corresponding 
to that facial expression.   
It was predicted that the groups representing alexithymia would produce less 
of a facial feedback effect than controls. This hypothesis was supported by a 
significant group difference in self-reported congruent feelings on the task between 
the combined HA and MA groups compared to controls. While a wealth of data 
indicates that among typical populations a reciprocal relationship exists between facial 
muscle activity and subjective emotional experience, the current study has confirmed 
that this connection is altered in individuals with clinical levels of alexithymia who 
demonstrated a reduced ability to detect emotional internal states that are induced by 
facial expression.  
The hypothesis that the HA group would produce a greater MI score than the 
MA group, was not supported. The results showed the opposite pattern with the MA 
group producing a greater MI score than the HA group. Contrary to expectations, the 
HA group had the least ability to generate subjective feelings consistent with their 
facial expression.   
There are a number of possible limitations to the present study that might be 
addressed in future. While it is difficult to identify subjective emotional states in 
emotion research without the necessity of participants’ self-report, such reports may 
clearly be confounded by demand effects. This may also be so in the current 
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experiment, as there was no attempt to disguise the nature of the task. However, as 
mentioned, the use of instructions emphasising the importance of accurate responding 
and the possibility of remaining unaffected by the task, may have reduced potential 
demand effects to some extent (Nielson & Kaszniak, 2007). Nevertheless, even the 
mention in the instructions that some people are not affected by their expressions 
might have led to subtle demand characteristics within the alexithymia group, who 
might have assumed that their emotions would not be affected by their facial 
expressions. Future studies on facial feedback may attempt a more comprehensive 
evaluation of phenomenal experience and reduce reliance on self-report through the 
inclusion of psychophysiological markers of emotional response, such as galvanic skin 
response. A further suggestion to reduce demand characteristics is to consider 
administering a body sensations scale in addition to a subjective emotion scale (e.g., 
see Dethier, Blairy, Rosenberg, & McDonald, 2013). This may not only reduce 
demand expectancies during self-report but would also further assess the level of 
interoceptive confusion among alexithymia participants regarding physical and 
emotional interoceptive domains (see Brewer, Cook, & Bird, 2017; Longarzo et al., 
2015; Zeng, 2014).   
A further potential limitation of this experiment is that not all participants may 
have been equally facially expressive and so they may have received varying afferent 
facial muscle signals when performing this task. As alexithymia is associated with 
reduced facial expression in laboratory studies (McDonald & Prkachin, 1990; 
Naatanen et al., 1999; Rasting, Brosig & Beutel, 2005; cf. Berenbaum & Irvin, 1996; 
Luminet et al., 2004; Roedema & Simons, 1999); therapeutic interviews (Troisi et al., 
1996; Wagner & Lee, 2008) and observer judgments of prototypical alexithymia traits 
(Haviland & Reise, 1996), the reduced facial feedback response among the HA group, 
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compared to the control group, may have been due to the level of participants’ facial 
expressiveness. To counteract this, future studies might administer detailed 
instructions in the facial expression manipulations (e.g., push your eyebrows together 
and down toward your nose) and introduce a manipulation check, such as filming 
participants or measuring facial EMG to ensure that all participants produce and 
maintain their facial expressions for the same time period and to a similar intensity of 
expression (see Dethier, Blairy, Rosenberg & McDonald, 2013). 
While it is possible that previous studies of alexithymia examining emotional 
processing have manipulated expressive facial behaviours indirectly through the 
motoric action of forming a facial expression as part of an emotional response to 
emotion-eliciting stimuli (Niedenthal, 2007), the current study is the first study of 
alexithymia to directly manipulate facial expression production. The findings of this 
study further our understanding of alexithymia and demonstrate an impairment in the 
subjective awareness of emotional experiences corresponding to facial expressions 
among individuals with clinical level alexithymia. 
 
Experiment 4 - Results 
 
Firstly, following Laird and Strout (2007), a manipulation check was carried 
out to ascertain whether the Expression Manipulation Task was effective at producing 
Emotion Ratings that were consistent with the Expression condition. This involved 
performing a mixed ANOVA, with Emotion Ratings (Happy, Anger) and Expression 
(Smile, Frown) as the repeated measures independent variables and Participant Group 
(HA, MA, controls) as the between-groups independent variable. The dependent 
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variable was the participant's mean visual analogue scale (VAS) score. The 
manipulation check specifically examined whether there was a significant interaction 
between Emotion Ratings condition and Expression condition.  
The mixed ANOVA revealed significant main effects for Expression (F(1,52) 
= 216, p <.001) and Ratings (F(1,52) = 41.219, p = <.001). The main effect of Group 
was non-significant (F(2,52) = .597, p = .554). More importantly for the purposes of 
a manipulation check, the interaction between Rating and Expression was significant 
(F(1,52) = 10.226, p = .002). This showed that averaged across participant groups, in 
the Frown condition, the mean Anger score of 4.43 (SD 3.52) was significantly higher 
than the mean Happy score of 2.59 (SD.5), while in the Smile condition, the mean 
Happy score of 7.58 (3.61) was significantly higher than the mean Anger score of 1.4 
(0.6). This analysis confirmed that the manipulation was effective at producing 
emotion ratings congruent with the expression condition.  
Then, again following Laird and Strout (2007), a manipulation index (MI) was 
calculated by adding the Frown scores (by subtracting the Anger ratings in the Smile 
Condition from the Anger ratings in the Frown condition) and the Smile scores 
(subtracting the Happy ratings in the Frown Condition from the Happy ratings in the 
Smile condition). This yielded a mean index (MI) score. The MI score is a mean 
difference score that is greater if participants report to be happier when smiling and 
angrier while frowning.  
 304 
 
Figure A1: Mean Index Scores (MI) in Experiment 4 as a Function of Participant Group (High 
Alexithymia, Moderate Alexithymia, or control). 
 
As shown in Figure A1 above, controls produced the highest MI scores, with 
a mean score of 7.24 (SD 3.8). The MA group had a mean MI score of 6.99 (SD = 5). 
The HA group produced the lowest MI score, with a mean MI of 4.13 (SD 2.8). A One 
Way ANOVA with Group as the between subjects independent measure and MI as the 
dependent measure revealed a trend toward a significant effect of Group (F(2,52) = 
3.074, p = .05). The MI data was then subjected to two planned contrasts. These 
contrasts revealed that the combined MI scores for the HA and MA groups was 
significantly less than the MI score of the controls (t(28)=5.05, p <.05), indicating the 
alexithymia groups reported less subjective congruent emotion than controls. The 
planned contrast comparing MI for the MA versus the HA group was also significant 
(t(34)=.2.2, p = .031).  
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